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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the transition from compulsory competitive tendering 
(CCT) to best value (BY) in local government. Based upon primary research conducted 
in three local authorities, between 2000 and 2003, it examines the differences between 
the two policies at both a national and local level and considers how far BY represents 
an advance over CCT. More specifically, the study addresses four key objectives. These 
are to review the rationale, policy, outcome and impact of CCT; to trace the rationale 
and development of BY and to examine critically the attributes of it that can be seen to 
represent an improvement on CCT; to compare empirically the implementation of BY 
policy within three specifically chosen contexts; and to examine how far the claimed 
attributes of BY appear, in practice, to resolve the difficulties the Labour Government 
identified with CCT. 
In completing the empirical objectives of the thesis, case study research was conducted 
in three local authorities using a threefold combination of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, documentary analysis and observations. In each case, the research began by 
tracing the experience of CCT in the services of interest before moving on to an 
examination of the implementation of the BY review process and the response of the 
BY inspectorate to it. The findings obtained from the three case studies were then 
compared to identify the impact of four key attributes of BY that had earlier been 
identified as representing potential sources of advance over the system CCT - 'public 
involvement,' 'flexible tendering', 'public-private partnerships' and 'inspection'. 
Overall, the case study findings suggest that whilst the four investigated attributes of 
BY have gone some way to improve upon the situation under CCT, in doing so, they 
.. 
n 
have also created a new set of complications and controversies that, arguably, stem from 
the fact that BY remains overly committed to counteracting the potential perceived 
threat posed by the state provision of public services. Consequently, whilst the official 
raison d'etre of BY is to continuously improve the performance of local services, 
underlying and at times conflicting with this objective is an attempt to ensure a mixed 
economy of local service provision which necessitates a degree of central control that 
interferes negatively with much of the potential that the policy has to offer. As a result, 
while the policies of CCT and BY clearly differ in terms of their means and impact, it 
cannot straightforwardly be concluded whether the introduction of the latter has resulted 
in a significant advance on the former. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the policies of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
and best value (BV) in local government. Drawing upon primary research conducted in 
three local authorities, between 2000 and 2003, it considers the extent to which BV 
represents an advance over the limitations the Labour Government identified with CCT. 
The examination of the relative merits of BV is constructed around four attributes of the 
policy which this thesis identifies from the policy literature and uses as a conceptual 
framework to examine the key differences between the two policies. These are 'public 
involvement,' 'flexible tendering', 'public-private partnerships' and 'inspection'. 
In providing a general overview to the thesis, this chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first of these provides an explanation of the rationale behind the thesis and 
identifies the gap in the literature that the thesis seeks to close. The second section then 
offers a short discussion of the four research objectives chosen to shape this thesis' 
investigation of CCT and BV and provides an insight into the nature of the methodology 
employed for the empirical study. The third section, finally, provides an outline of the 
structure of the reported thesis in terms of chapter content. 
Rationale for thesis 
The rationale for this thesis is related to the fact that the policies of CCT and BY 
represent two of the most important local government policy initiatives in the past 
twenty-five years. Whereas CCT was a key policy initiative of consecutive 1979-1997 
Conservative governments, BV, legislated for in 1999, remains a major policy initiative 
of New Labour. As a result, a comparison of CCT and BV provides an effective means 
of examining how far the present Labour Government's approach to the management of 
local government services differs, in practice, to that adopted by the preceding 
Conservatives regime via CCT. 
BV was promulgated as providing a means of addressing what were perceived to be a 
number of fundamental weaknesses of the previous regime ofCCT. Initially, this policy 
objective gained broad support because there seemed to be good reason to believe that it 
would be able to offer a model of reform that would allow the deVelopment of local 
services to proceed on criteria other than mere cost. However, as BY policy developed 
the reform agenda increasingly became based around the introduction of a wide-ranging 
performance management framework. This prescribed model not only encapsulates all 
local government services but also supplements competitive tendering, now referred to 
as competition, with the three additional tools of challenge, consultation and 
comparison. BY policy also contains specific audit and inspection processes, thus 
increasing drastically the time, costs and efforts local authorities need to commit to this 
centrally imposed policy initiative. 
According to the claims made for BY, however, local authorities would actually make 
gains in service delivery as a result of adopting the processes and related guidance 
created by BY, with continuous service improvement rather than lowest cost now 
governing policy priorities. Thus, whilst one outcome, according to some critics might 
be to replicate the work intensification widely reported to have occurred under CCT 
(Geddes, 2001), in its own terms, BY makes a number of telling revisions to CCT that 
will lead to noticeable improvements in local service delivery. The most noteworthy of 
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these revisions relating to the emphasis the policy gives to public consultation and 
involvement, quality as well as cost, partnership working and safeguards to protect the 
public from failing services. 
By situating the debate of BV in the context of CCT it is possible to examine the impact 
of BV from the inherited position of the widespread dissatisfaction with CCT and the 
perceived damage it had caused the then system of local government service delivery. 
Whilst there have been a reasonably large number of studies and investigations of the 
BV phenomenon (Davis and Wright, 2004; Enticott, Walker, Boyne, Martin and 
Ashworth, 2002; Higgins, James and Roper 2004a; Martin, Davis, Bovaird, Downe, 
Geddes, Hartley and Lewis, Sanderson and Sapwell, 2001), the majority of the 
empirical work has been survey-focused (Enticott, Walker, Boyne, Martin and 
Ashworth, 2002; Higgins, James and Roper 2004a, Roper, James and Higgins, 2005) 
and thus not fully able to capture the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation. 
What is particularly notable in this regard is that the existing study findings have tended 
to be reported in terms of standardised responses, which align themselves closely with 
the dominant values of formal performance improvement. There is therefore an urgent 
need for a more detailed investigation of BV that not only examines what happened as a 
result of the policy but which also recognises that exclusive recourse to formal 
definitions might serve to mask other more fundamental processes or underlying 
mechanisms. 
Indeed, there have only been a handful of articles detailing the transition from CCT to 
BV (Entwistle and Laffin, 2005, Higgins and Roper, 2002) and these have been situated 
at the national policy level. This, therefore, creates an obvious gap for a study of the 
transition from CCT into BV at the local implementation level and thus a detailed 
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comparison of the workings and impact of the two policies. In addition to addressing 
this research gap, the present study also retains an independence from the predominant 
discourse on BV, which tends to accept, without question, the aspirationallanguage of 
the policy and its dominance by contemporary definitions of performance. The impact 
of CCT was, after all, fairly dramatic and rarely associated with success and 
achievement. Thus, whether BV can actually increase the quality of local services 
cannot merely be assessed by reference to the manufactured concepts of performance 
and improvement but demands a deeper investigation of their operationalisation. This is 
particularly true in relation to the examination of policy impact given that CCT was 
marked by the existence of winners and losers. A rounded study ofBV, therefore, needs 
to move beyond consideration with only certain conceptualisations of the public and 
other affected interests. 
Finally, by fine-tuning this thesis towards four distinguishing elements of BV, it is more 
generally able to critically add to a number of prominent themes in the existing public 
sector management literature. These notably include public consultation and 
involvement (Rowe and Shepherd, 2002; Adams 2004), competition (Bovaird, 2000; 
Boyne, 1998a; Entwistle, Martin, Enticott, 2002), contracting (Erridge and Green, 2002; 
Grimshaw, Vincent and Wilmott, 2002), performance (Andrews, 2004; Boyne 2003; 
Bruijn, 2002) and inspection (Millward, 2005; Boyne, Day, Walker, 2002; Timmins, 
2004). 
Objectives and methodology 
Given the above rationale, the thesis has been structured in accordance with the four 
following research objectives: 
1. To review the rationale, policy, outcome and impact of CCT 
2. To trace the rationale and development of BV and to examine critically the 
attributes of it which are seen to represent an improvement on CCT 
3. To empirically examine the implementation of BV policy within a suitable number 
of chosen contexts 
4. To examine how far the claimed attributes of BV appear in practice to resolve the 
difficulties the Labour Government identified with CCT 
The first of these objectives, to review the rationale, policy, outcome and impact of 
CCT is intended to provide a solid foundation from which to understand and, ultimately, 
compare the approach that New Labour has adopted with regard to the refonn of local 
government services through its policy of BV. More specifically, the completion of the 
first objective will remind the reader of a number of the important properties of CCT 
such as how it exemplified 'new right' solutions to the problems identified with the then 
prevailing system of local government service delivery, how it worked, what its 
outcome was in terms of contract wins and the impact it had in tenns of cost and 
employment. 
The thesis' second objective, to trace the rationale and development of BV and to 
critically examine the attributes of it which are seen to represent an improvement on 
CCT, strengthens this link between CCT and BV by providing a platfonn from which to 
explore Labour Party views of CCT and how, both in opposition and after coming to 
power, these helped shape the approach that the post-1997 governments adopted with 
5 
regard its abolition and replacement. In particular, pursuit of this objective enables 
detailed attention to be paid to not only what it is about BV that is considered to enable 
it to drastically improve upon the 'unsatisfactory' impact of CCT, but also the 
soundness of these views. 
Having thus identified the claims of BV in the policy literature and also subjected them 
to critical theoretical examination, the third and fourth objectives then, in combination, 
make clear that the thesis is intended to provide an empirical investigation of the 
implementation of BV in a number of different contexts and that the focus of this 
investigation is to be how far the alleged attributes of BV do, in practice, resolve the 
problems with CCT that led to the policy's development. 
In particular, these last two objectives, as alluded to earlier, were informed by a desire 
to complement the existing work already undertaken on the transition from CCT to BV 
at the national policy level (Entwistle and Laffin, 2005, Higgins and Roper, 2002). For 
this r~ason, as will be explained more fully in chapter five, it was decided that they 
should be pursued through a case study approach enacted in three local authority 
contexts and exclusively amongst former CCT activities. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is subdivided into ten chapters. Chapters two to four report the outcomes of 
the thesis' literature review element, chapter five details its research methodology, 
chapters six to eight present the individual case study findings, chapter nine outlines the 
results of a cross-case comparison of these findings and the final chapter presents the 
thesis' overall conclusions. 
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In chapter two, a basis from which to critically examine the Labour Government's 
policy of BV is provided in the shape of a review of the rationale, policy, outcome and 
impact of the Conservatives' policy of CCT. Chapter three, then, goes on to examine the 
evolving nature of Labour's response to CCT, considers how this response acted to 
prompt and shape the resultant policy of BV, details the key features of this policy, and 
identifies, from these features four key 'attributes' that it would seem underlay the 
government's belief that the policy can yield outcomes superior to those of CCT. The 
attributes so identified are those of 'public involvement', 'flexibility of means', 'public-
private partnerships' and 'inspection'. 
Against this backdrop, the fourth chapter is more analytical in nature and proceeds, first, 
by outlining the claims the Labour Government makes for each of these four key 
attributes and, then, by revealing a number of the potential limitations of them. 
The remainder of the thesis' attention is then directed towards an empirical examination 
of BV and the claims made for it. This begins in chapter five, with a detailed overview 
of the research philosophy, strategy and method selection processes behind the chosen 
approach of the primary study. Chapters six, seven and eight then present research 
findings from the three longitudinal case studies undertaken, while the results from a 
cross-case comparison of their findings are provided in the ninth. Finally, chapter ten 
provides an overall summary of the study and reaches conclusions on all of the thesis' 
original research objectives. 
7 
Chapter 2 
The contribution of compulsory competitive tendering to the 
development of best value 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a basis from which to chart the development and 
composition of the Labour Government's policy of best value (BV). In doing this, a 
detailed and critical examination of the Conservative's policy of compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT), which BV replaced in 1999, is provided. The chapter is 
organised into four sections beginning first with a retrospective overview of the original 
underlying rationale for CCT and a summary of its key operational properties. In the 
second section of the chapter, a more detailed description of the actual policy of CCT is 
then provided and this takes the form of a description of a number of its key properties. 
Following on from this, the third section of the chapter turns attention towards an 
examination of the resulting outcome of the policy as defined in terms of the results of 
the contract award process. A fourth and final section then adds to this examination by 
considering also the impact of CCT and, in particular, its effect on the costs and 
employment of local services. 
The rationale for and key operational properties of CCT 
Drawing inspiration from public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Jackson, 1990; Self, 
1995; Boyne, 1996a, 1998a, b and c) and the economic philosophy of Hayek (1944), the 
rationale for CCT was aired most powerfully in the ideas and publications of a number 
of 'new right' think-tanks (Butler, 1987; Butler and Pirie, 1989; Pirie, 1988: Carnaghan 
and Bracewell Milnes, 1993) and in the speeches of Conservative politicians at both a 
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national and local level (Ridley, 1988; Howard, 1987; Beresford, 1987). Assuming the 
voice of the honest and hardworking (private) taxpayer, these assorted interests shared a 
view of local government that conceptualised local authorities as economic rather than 
public policy entities (Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Domberger, Meadowcroft and 
Thompson, 1988) and took issue with their perceived inefficient and wasteful practices 
(Kavanagh, 1990; Butler, Adonis, and Travers, 1994; Desai, 1994). 
A key part of their concern with local government was the presence of monopoly power 
(Hayek, 1944) which allowed local authorities to provide a range of services through 
taxation rather than to charge for them at the point of consumption (Harris and Seldon, 
1987; Carnaghan and Bracewell-Milnes, 1993). This method of resource allocation was 
identified as divorcing local government from the real market economy and 
consequently leading to both deficiencies of knowledge about consumers' requirements 
and deficiencies of motivation on the part of decision takers who were not spending 
their own money and thus had no incentive to economise (Carnaghan and Bracewell-
Milnes, 1993). 
This lack of true market incentives was seen to encourage 'political interests' to dictate 
priorities - and these naturally encouraged expanding budgets to meet the needs of 
competing political interests (Butler, 1987; Ridley 1988). A key 'political interest' in 
this context was that of the workforce, which through the lack of an external 
competitive threat and via their unions, had insulated itself from the need to adapt 
working practices to improve productivity (Butler, 1987; Cubbin, Domberger and 
Meadowcroft, 1987). The result, so the arguments went, was that municipal workforces 
had generated 'rents' in the form of pay levels and practices that would exceed those in 
competitive markets (Levacic, 1991 and 1993). 
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Whether this state of affairs represented outright collusion between local politicians, 
administrators and the workforce or simply the 'grip' that trade unions had on local 
authorities depended on the precise interpretation of events (Ascher, 1987; Butler, 1987; 
Ridley, 1988). What was consistent with them, however, was the property that whereas 
private sector monopolies always remain susceptible to the threat of competition, the 
same was not true of such tax financed state monopolies as local authorities (Hayek, 
1944). Instead, as creatures of legislation and able to raise taxes, local authorities were 
considered to be immune from the threat of takeover and bankruptcy, and as a result, 
had no incentive to confront the types of abusive practices being identified with the then 
prevailing system of local government (Goodson-Wickes, 1984; Ivens, 1992). In short, 
neither the prices secured by local authorities nor the efforts of their direct workers had 
to be competitive (Thomas, 1988). 
Indeed, the problem of public sector monopoly was considered to be particularly 
problematic in the local government setting because of its high dependence on central 
government funding (Taylor, 1995; Hale and Travers, 1996; Wilson and Game, 1994). 
This meant that the potential curb of high local taxation and the threat of political 
ousting for extravagant and wasteful councils did not operate (Boyne, 1988a and b), 
with consequential losses, safeguarded by wasteful municipal union practices, passed 
directly onto 'captive' taxpayers forced to pay higher prices (Butler, 1987; Lister, 1995). 
The conclusions drawn from these various activities was that the taxpayer was not 
receiving value for money and producer group interests were being compensated 
beyond that normally available under market conditions. 
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Key operational properties of CCT 
The Conservative's answer to these problems of local government was CCT. CCT 
sought to create 'contestable markets' in the various activities of local government 
services by opening up to competition activities previously immune from competition. 
In particular, CCT demanded in-house, direct service organisations (DSOs) to be made 
into distinct organisational entities within the local authority (Deakin and Walsh, 1996; 
Walsh, 1995a; Shaw, Fenwick and Foreman, 1993) and to bid for contracts on the same 
basis as private contractors, that is, to match the price at least of the cheapest externally 
submitted bid. In this way a 'vigorous' commercially-oriented management could be 
introduced to replace the model of 'public administration' that preceded it (Pollitt, 
1993), with local authorities no longer existing as monolithic, vertically integrated 
direct service providers but increasingly separated into distinct 'client' and 'contractor' 
roles. 
In some cases, the result of competitive tendering was that service provision moved 
from the public to the private sector, while in others, the result was that service 
provision remained with the incumbent provider (Harden, 1992). The shift was not 
necessarily pennanent, however, since under CCT each resultant contract was for a 
finite period only and the local authority, assuming that it had the sufficient resources to 
invest in the necessary facilities to make a subsequent bid (Ascher, 1987), had the 
possibility of winning back the contract in another round (Uttley and Harper, 1993; 
Uttley and Hooper, 1993). This is one of the reasons why CCT, given its assumed focus 
on competition rather than ownership, has been likened to a process of marketisation -
with fluid, penneable markets - rather than privatisation - a single transfer (Doogan, 
1997). 
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However, although competition rather than ownership is often seen to provide the 
underlying rationale for CCT (Hartley and Huby, 1986; Bailey, 1995), it also needs to 
be recognised that this commitment to competition was a qualified one in that it was 
directed at ensuring that local authorities were no longer immune from competition 
rather than to the promotion of competition per se. One illustration of this is that all of 
the services encapsulated by the policy were those provided by local authorities. 
Moreover, local authorities were not given the requisite powers to compete in the 
private market (Painter, 1991). It is thus in the context of these parameters that CCT has 
been likened to a one-directional tendering exercise (Ascher, 1987) which threatened to 
replace a given pool of local authorities' in-house units with those of external 
contractors. 
Moreover, while it was true that CCT allowed local authorities to continue to provide 
services directly, the parameters of the legislation were such that only those local 
authorities that wished to retain services in-house had to comply with it (Painter, 1991; 
Unison, 1998). Therefore, if a local authority simply decided to contract out the service, 
there was no requirement for it to do so via CCT (Painter 1991), although it was still 
required to adhere to EU procurement legislation (Robbie and Wright, 1996; Cox, 
Martin and Hartley, 1999). 
Consequently, local authorities were allowed to bypass CCT if the resulting outcome 
led to the involvement of external contractors in service delivery at a level at least 
consistent with 'competitively tendering out' under CCT (Unison, 1998). The potential 
outcomes of services exposed to CCT policy were, therefore, as follows: 
1) competitive tendering in under CCT 
2) competitive tendering out under CCT 
3) voluntarily contracting out functions, with or without, reference to CCT provisions. 
Despite the inherent bias in CCT against continued municipal provision it is still, 
nonetheless, important to stress also the limitations of any external service provision 
brought about by the policy. Most notable in this regard, was that, irrespective of 
whether service provision was public or private, local authorities were not required to 
transfer assets nor relinquish control over how services were actually financed or 
managed (Bailey, 1995). Local authorities continued, therefore, to fund the CCT 
services and these remained paid for predominantly out of a combination of central and 
local taxation (Sharland, 1997). They also continued to determine such matters as when 
the contracts would operate and what level of service they would provide (Sparke, 
1993). In addition, local authorities were authorised to impose financial penalties and, 
ultimately, to replace recruited contractors in the event of contractual failure (Seal and 
Vincent Jones, 1997). Given the enhanced public sensitivity to local services, the 
retention by local authorities of such financial and strategic responsibilities was an 
important feature of CCT and led to the claim that services provided externally under 
CCT were no less public than the same services provided by public agencies (Audit 
Commission, 1989, 1995). 
In summary, therefore, CCT provided a practical solution to the ills identified with 
prevailing municipal monopoly provision of local services and did so by injecting a set 
of carefully organised market mechanisms into the realm of local government. At the 
broad level, these mechanisms related exclusively to the opening up to competition of 
certain local authority provided services rather than to the promotion of competition per 
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se. At the same time, however, they were also limited to the service provision elements 
of local services rather than to their financing and service specification and thus did not 
embrace full privatisation. Having, therefore, outlined the rationale and broader 
properties of CCT attention can now be turned to a more detailed examination of the 
actual policy. 
The policy of compulsory competitive tendering 
As its title suggests, compulsory competitive tendering enforced an obligation upon 
local authorities to expose to competition a centrally defined set of services (Shaw, 
Fenwick and Foreman, 1995). CCT also involved central determination of the criteria 
local authorities used to tender services (Milne, 1997; Stoker, 1995) and the timescales 
by which this was to be done. These compulsory features, therefore, mark a distinction 
from the discretionary 'make or buy' practices of private sector organisations in that 
they are free to decide by what criteria they contract for services (Audit Commission, 
1989, Prager, 1994). Indeed, such were the prescriptive tendencies of CCT that some 
commentators argued that it was wrong to discuss the policy in terms of Hayek's notion 
of the market as a 'spontaneous order' because, in reality, CCT was rather more about 
rules, regulation and bureaucracy (Deakin and Michie, 1997). 
In fact, it was precisely because competition was compulsory in the Conservatives 
policy of CCT, that the British model of competitive tendering has been rightly 
distinguished from other European (Kane, 1996; Fenwick, Shaw and Foreman, 1994; 
Snape and Fenwick, 1996), New Zealand (Domberger and Hensher, 1993; Domberger, 
Hall and Lik Li, 1995) and Northern American (Parker, 1990, Donahue, 1989) variants. 
Thus, for example, whilst competitive tendering has been encouraged in a variety of 
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European countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, there has been 
no compulsion and no list of defined activities (Fenwick, Shaw and Foreman, 1994). 
Similarly, although competition and contracting are well established in America, their 
use has related more to local circumstance, rather than prescription, with a variety of 
approaches having been used in different states and at different levels of government 
(Smyth, 1997). 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this section is to describe the actual policy of CCT 
and to do so by charting briefly, in turn, three of its most salient properties. These are 
service coverage and organisation, tendering criteria and evaluation and post-tender 
regulations. 
Service coverage and organisation 
Precisely for which services CCT was required, and by implication which members of 
staff would remain 'core' and which members of staff would become 'peripheral' 
(Atkinson, 1984), depended on central government judgements about the ease with 
which services could be specified (Harrison, 1992; Davis and Walker, 1997), the 
centrality of services to core and strategic functions (Steel and Liddle, 1995, 1996; 
Walsh, 1989) and whether a market of alternative service providers existed, or could be 
generated (Smyth, 1997). The Government's decisions in this respect can be seen to 
reflect principal agent theory (Kettl, 1993; Cohen, 2001) and the extent to which agents 
(contractors), tasked with performing a particular function, can be readily controlled by 
the principal (the client) (Prager, 1994; Entwistle; Martin and Enticott, 2002). 
1 " 
In line with the adoption of a staggered approach to the development of CCT, the 
defined services encapsulated by the policy were, at first, restricted to approximately £4 
billion pounds worth (1993 prices; Bailey, 1995) of building, highway construction and 
maintenance work under the auspices of the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land 
Act - see Figure 2.1. The impact of CCT on these services was relatively minor and 
uncontroversial, however, because local authorities had much previous experience of 
defining the work to be carried out, finding appropriate contractors and making sure that 
work was carried out as required (Audit Commission, 1989; Walsh, 1989). In addition, 
contracts awarded under the Act tended to be either for small portions of total workload 
or for short periods of time (Audit Commission, 1989). Therefore, the loss of a single 
contract did not have a decisive impact in terms of the direct labour organisations' share 
of contract work (Walsh, 1989). Walsh (1989, in Cutler and Waine, 1997), for example, 
calculated that between 1982/3 and 1985/6 the private sector's share of the CCT market 
increased by only 0.7 per cent in England and Wales. 
A further eight blue collar services worth £2.4 billion in 1997 prices (LGMB, 1997a) 
were subsequently brought within the scope of the CCT regime under the most 
significant piece of CCT legislation, the Local Government Act 1988 (Walsh, 1989). 
The significance of this Act related not only to the fact that it extended the remit of the 
policy to local services never before exposed to competition but also because it 
contained far more detailed regulations (Walsh, 1989). 
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Figure 2.1 
Brief summary of services affected bv CCT legislation 
1980 Local Government Planning and Land Act 
Building, Highway construction and Maintenance 
1988 Local Government Act 
Refuse collection, street cleaning, building cleaning, schools and welfare catering, other 
catering, vehicle maintenance, and later the management of sports and leisure facilities 
(added in November 1989) 
The 1992 Local Government Act 
Legal services, construction and property services, financial services, information 
technology, personnel services and housing management. 
CCT legislation further widened to cover on-street parking, fleet management of 
vehicles and security 
Finally, the coverage of CCT expanded from an initial focus on various categories of 
manual work to encompass £5-6 billion worth (Steel and Liddle, 1996) of 
white/professional services. The introduction of white collar CCT, by virtue of the 
Local Government Act 1992, meant that the CCT market had effectively tripled in size 
between the years 1980-1992 to approximately £12 billion, in 1997 prices. The scope of 
white collar CCT was, however, far more limited than was the case for blue collar CCT, 
both in terms of its competition threshold and competition requirements (Taylor, 
Setchell, Pinto, 1996; Walsh, 1995b; Watt, 1996; see Table 2.1). These regulations 
having been designed to ensure that the preparation and tendering costs involved in 
using the tendering process were not higher than the savings achieved (Marsh, 1998). 
There were also exemptions for emergent services and where staff performed work for 
which the defined activity was only a small part of their total activity (Carnaghan and 
Bracewell-Milnes, 1993). 
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Table 2.1 
s ervlce coverage 0 fbi d hO ue an W Ite co 11 CCT ar 
Service Competition Competition Typical elements of service 
threshold requirement exposed to competition 
(£) (%) 
Blue Collar CCT 100,000 100 All aspects of the function 
White Collar CCT 
Construction and property 450,000 65 Design work and project 
management 
Financial services 300,000 35 Internal audit and cash 
collection 
Information technology 300,000 70 All aspects of the function 
Legal services 300,000 45 Advice, litigation and 
conveyance 
Personnel Services 400,000 30 Training, recruitment and 
payroll 
Housing Management 500,000 95 All aspects of the function 
Source: Adapted from Local Government Management Board 1997a 
In discussing the service coverage of CCT legislation Domberger and Jensen (1997) 
also highlight how the CCT process was organised in such a way so as to retain the 
natural monopoly characteristics of the local services, especially in terms of economies 
of scale and economies of congruity. In particular, they note that, for each of the defined 
activities, it was common for a single organisation to take responsibility for the entire 
service and thus be required to manage such discrete physical units as kitchens for the 
provision of meals for a school or a number of streets for the collection of refuse 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Similarly, despite the wishes of the more radical new 
right think tanks to introduce direct charges (Harris and Seldon, 1987), CCT activities 
remained publicly financed and free at the point of delivery. In these ways, therefore, 
the policy of CCT could be differentiated from the laissez faire route of 'open 
competitive arrangements' adopted in, for example, North American variants of 
competitive tendering and, in particular, North American refuse collection rounds 
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(Donahue, 1989), whereby households receive separate bills for separately organised 
collection procedures. Donahue (1989), however, criticises these open competitive 
arrangements on the basis that they are tarnished by costly administration charges and 
the exposure of consumers to rogue contractors and cartel operations. The arrangements 
for British CCT tended to avoid these problems. 
Tendering criteria and evaluation 
Much of the onus for the successful implementation of CCT was placed upon client side 
officers who were expected to initiate a break with frontline workforces considered 
peripheral to local authorities' core functions. From the Government's standpoint, this 
objective was likely to incur resistance from those Local Authorities that were under the 
control of the Government's, legitimately elected political opponents - primarily the 
Labour Party, but particularly the local Labour Party in its 'New Urban Left' guise 
(Lansey, Goss and Wolmar, 1989). 
In anticipation of such opposition, the Conservative government explicitly framed the 
rules of CCT in such a way as to prohibit the restriction, distortion or prevention of 
competition (Local Government Act 1988, 87). Thus, for example, each of the CCT 
services had to be prepared, priced, tendered and provided separately, with the 
exception of grounds maintenance, which was tendered as a number of separate 
contracts to benefit a market characterised by a large number of small and local 
operators (Painter, 1991). Local authorities were also required to provide external 
contractors with sufficient time to prepare tenders and to invite at least three external 
bidders to tender, or as many as wished to do so, if the number was less than three 
(Painter, 1991). 
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The desire to ensure the fair treatment of external contractors in the CCT process also 
led to the introduction of requirements concerning the way in which competing bids 
were evaluated. Central to government regulations, in this regard, was that local 
authorities could not make invalid cost comparisons between competing bids in order to 
bias the evaluation process in favour of in-house bids. For example, local authorities 
could not add the cost of contract monitoring to private bids when comparing them with 
in-house bids, on the questionable assumption that the latter could be trusted to fulfil 
contract obligations while the former could not. Equally, local authorities could not 
insist upon too high a performance bond, as an insurance against contractual failure, to 
unfavourably distort the price of external bids. 
Then, in terms of actual evaluation, local authorities were required to select the lowest 
cost-qualifying supplier, or more accurately, the contractor that could meet the terms of 
the contract specification whilst providing the greatest net saving to the authority 
(Cutler and Waine, 1994). The most controversial component of the evaluation criteria 
in this respect was Section 17(5) of the Local Government Act 1988 which prohibited 
councils from considering: 
'The terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers or 
the composition of, the arrangements for the promotion, transfer or training of 
or the other opportunities afforded to, their work/orces '. 
This clause, therefore, abolished the practice of 'contract compliance' under which 
contractors were required to meet certain employment related conditions in order to 
secure work (Beaumont, 1991; Foster, 1991). In practice, this meant that local 
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authorities could no longer insist that the workforce was paid at nationally agreed wage 
rates nor could they prescribe the methods of work to be used and the minimum number 
of staff (Foster and Scott, 1998a). Instead, the threat of losing contracts was expected to 
entice the need for flexibility in employment contracts, such as the substitution of part-
time for full-time workers or equipment for labour (Chaundy and Uttley 1993; Colling, 
1995a). Thus, the Audit Commission offered the following advice to managers faced 
with implementing CCT: 
'Employees must be used more flexibly so that full time staffing levels are not 
dictated by peaks. A smaller worliforce working flexible rosters, supplemented 
by seasonal, casual and part-time staff is more competitive; part time workers 
can also reduce employers national insurance costs' (Audit Commission 1989: 
23). 
Failure to comply with any of the above regulations posed the threat of sanctions and 
ultimately the removal of the right of the in-house provider to compete for the defined 
activities (Local Government Act 1988, s 13, 14). Meanwhile, District Auditors and 
competing contractors were encouraged to police these tendering regulations to ensure 
that local authorities adhered to them (Colling, 1999). What all of this meant, therefore, 
was that local authorities could oppose the outsourcing of services and bid to retain 
services in-house, providing that they complied with the rules and demonstrated that 
they were more cost effective than external tenders (Higgins and Roper, 2002). 
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Post-tender regulations 
In terms of the potential tendering outcomes of the CCT process, a contract could either 
be awarded to an external contractor or a local authority could retain it. In the event that 
the contract was awarded to an external contractor there was only one organisational 
form that could exist, a formal separation of responsibilities. The client was a named 
officer of the Council and the contractor was required to undertake work under contract 
and to meet the terms of the contract. In the event that the local authority won the 
contract, however, there were a variety of central government regulations that had to be 
observed and which served to pose a longer-term threat to the continued survival of the 
in-house provider (Vincent-Jones, 1996, 1997). 
One of the most notable requirements placed upon retained in-house units was that they 
had to be renamed a direct service organisation (DSO) and to account separately for 
their incomes and expenditures in a trading account, with charges to the client account 
and credits to the DSO account being calculated as if the DSO was a private contractor 
(Local Government Act 1988, S9). These trading accounts were further required to meet 
financial criteria that the Secretary of State had the power to determine. The major one 
of these was that DSOs had to achieve an annual six percent rate of return on capital 
employed for each service which had sufficient capital outlay (Lapsley and Llewellyn, 
1991). Failure to meet this rate of return in two consecutive years could lead to the 
closure of the DSO concerned. 
It can be seen, therefore, that whilst many of the tendering regulations of CCT were 
designed to create a level playing field between in-house and external contractors and to 
engender fair competition, the post-tendering regulations were directed exclusively at 
local authorities. Indeed, even though the requirement placed upon DSO's to make a 
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rate of return on capital has often been viewed as a means of providing symmetry with 
competing private contractors who would also be expected to make positive rates of 
return, the difference was that both the time span for the rate of return (annual) and the 
amount of return required (six per cent) was prescribed for DSOs (Cutler and Waine, 
1997). 
The outcome of CCT 
Having identified both the rationale and resulting policy of CCT, it is now time to turn 
attention to an examination of its outcome beginning first with a summary of how far it 
actually resulted in services being retained by local authorities as against being 
competitively tendered out. For roundedness, this infonnation is further supplemented 
with an analysis of the level of external contractor interest in the services subjected to 
CCT. In then seeking to provide some explanation for the resulting figures, the section 
moves on to identifying in more detail the views of private contractors with respect to 
their enthusiasm to compete for CCT contracts. A discussion of the implications of this 
for the geographical and political distribution of contract awards then concludes the 
section. 
Tendering outcomes and competition levels 
Table 2.2 draws upon survey evidence from the now discontinued Local Government 
Management Board to provide a number of descriptive statistics relating to the 
tendering outcomes for a variety of blue and white-collar services. The data have been 
compiled using 1997 figures, the last year in which CCT was compulsory in all English 
and Welsh local authorities, though it is still broadly reflective of CCT throughout its 
duration (LGMB, 1997a). The second column of Table 2.2 provides data on the DSO 
success rate by value of contracts won and the third column the average number of 
external bid submissions received per contract. 
In terms of the DSO success rate by value of contracts won, the second column of Table 
2.2 demonstrates that, for blue-collar services, DSOs managed to win approximately 
two-thirds of CCT contracts for building cleaning, grounds maintenance, refuse 
collection, street cleaning and other catering and three-quarters of contracts by value for 
vehicle maintenance and education catering. Meanwhile, the lower part of column two 
shows that for white collar services, DSO's managed to win approximately two-thirds 
of contracts by value for construction and property management and approximately 90 
per cent of contracts by value for legal services and housing management. 
Table 2.2 
Tendering outcome for serVIces ex~osed to CCT 
Service 
Blue collar 
Building Cleaning 
Grounds Maintenance 
Refuse Collection 
Other Cleaning 
Education Catering 
Catering Other 
Vehicle Maintenance 
Leisure Management 
Selected white collar 
Legal services 
Construction and 
Property 
Housing Management 
Percent of contracts 
won by DSO (by 
value) 
69.3 
67.7 
63.4 
70.1 
77.9 
71 
75.7 
84.3 
88.9 
64.1 
90.2 
Average no. of 
tenders (including in-
house) 
4.8 
4.2 
3.8 
3.8 
3.2 
2.3 
2.3 
1.9 
4.3 
4.2 
1.7 
Source: Local Government Management Board (1997) 
These differences in DSO success rates appear, in part, to be related to variation in the 
extent to which private contractors had demonstrated an interest in bidding for the 
services put out to tender. These figures are shown in the third column of Table 2.2 and 
are expressed in terms of the average number of external bid submissions received per 
contract. It can be seen that at least four bids per contract were galvanised from external 
contractors for building cleaning, grounds maintenance, legal services and construction 
and property services. For other services, meanwhile, the levels of competition were 
lower and in four of the eleven services listed even struggled to reach the statutory 
request of three external bids. Whether these lower levels of competition reduced the 
disciplining effects exerted by the policy has been the subject of some debate 
(Syzmanski, 1996) and illuminates the distinction between the threat of competition 
(Bailey, 1995; Bailey and Davidson, 1999) and the existence of real competition 
(Buckley and Chapman, 1997; Kerley and Wynn, 1991)1. 
The private sector view 
Research by the British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) during the mid-1990's 
investigated the view of private contractors who had participated to varying degrees in 
the tendering processes (BMRB, 1995) and amongst private contractors which had not 
participated in the tendering process (BMRB, 1996). Its first report sampled the views 
of senior executives and managers from 220 contractors involved in the tendering 
process and found that while respondents tended to regard CCT as important in 
providing 'new business opportunities' (45 per cent), 'the guarantee of regular income 
with continuity of work' (26 per cent) and 'no bad debts' (20 per cent). they also felt that 
it was very complex. of high risk and conducted within a hostile tendering environment. 
For example, 80 per cent of the 220 respondents totally disagreed with the statement 
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that 'there is fair competition between in-house teams and outside contracts' (BMRB, 
1995:33). More generally, respondents felt that CCT offered limited opportunity for 
private contractors to build a pre-emptive local position, not least, because the contract 
would regularly be subjected to competition (BMRB, 1995). 
Meanwhile, a second report, amongst 596 non-bidding private contractors (BMRB, 
1996), revealed that the two most important factors, accounting for 59 per cent of all 
responses, which had 'discouraged' them from participating were the 'amount of work 
involved' and 'profitability'. Again, respondents felt that the process of CCT was 
excessively complex and with little value adding potential. In particular, the CCT 
process was perceived as being devoted towards cost-minimisation, rather than value, 
and this was seen to limit the opportunity for contractors to add extra value and to earn 
higher margins. Respondents also believed that, even if they had competed and won 
contracts, the work would have been awarded reluctantly, and led to a difficult working 
relationship (BMRB, 1996). The CCT market was, therefore, considered to be a 
relatively risky one given that there was no guarantee that they would win contracts 
against authorities who had entered into CCT on the basis that they wanted to retain 
servIces. 
Geographical and political variations 
At the same time contractor willingness to submit bids under CCT and the likelihood of 
them being successful varied geographically (Painter, 1990; Patterson and Pinch, 1995). 
In particular, more tendering activity occurred in the south of the country than in the 
north (LGMB, 1997a). This has been linked to political differences between authorities 
that both directly influenced the degree of internal support for in-house DSOs and 
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indirectly impacted on the willingness of private sector contractors to bid in situations 
where they faced an unfriendly council and trade union opposition (Fenwick, Shaw and 
Foreman, 1994). In this respect, the greater propensity for private sector success in the 
south of the country related to the fact that southern authorities were more likely to be 
Conservative-controlled and more inclined to embrace a pro-CCT stance (Cutler and 
Waine, 1997). 
Indeed, and more generally, evidence that Conservative-controlled authorities tended to 
engage in the spirit of CCT more than their Labour-controlled counterparts has 
continuously been reported in studies of CCT. For example, research by Walsh and 
Davis (1993) found that in all services, other than grounds maintenance, Conservative 
controlled authorities were significantly more likely to award contracts to the private 
sector. Similarly, Szymanski's (1996) economic analysis of the impact of CCT on 
refuse collection services reported that authorities which had let contracts out to private 
contractors had, on average, twice as many Conservative as Labour members 
(Szymanski, 1996). Finally, RaIlings and Thrasher's (1990: 13) study of CCT within 231 
authorities (45 per cent of the total) between 1989-1990 found that 'Conservative 
authorities were more willing than Labour ones to allow departmental administration 
sections the freedom to contract out '. In addition, their research also revealed that in 
Labour controlled authorities, the private sector's share of the CCT market by value of 
contracts won was twelve per cent in contrast to thirty per cent for Conservative-
controlled authorities. 
The impact of CCT 
Although it has been a reasonably straightforward and objective process to ascertain 
how the share of contracts between DSOs and external contractors were divided the , 
examination of the impact of CCT has been far more complicated and controversial. 
This partly relates to the fact that when one considers the impact of CCT one has to 
decide what features to focus on; some studies deal with quality (Public Sector 
Privatisation Research Unit, 1992, 1997), others with costs (Cubbin, Domberger and 
Meadowcroft, 1988) and others still with employment (Escott & Whitfield, 1995a). 
Then, having chosen which avenue to pursue, methodological difficulties are then 
usually encountered. One difficulty involved in accurately identifying the changes in the 
costs of services exposed to CCT, for example, is that the impact of CCT has to be 
isolated from other local government policy initiatives such as budget cuts, rate capping 
and the poll tax (Escott & Whitfield, 1995a). Likewise, changes in the quality of 
services, such as the introduction of wheeled bin systems for refuse collection 
(Szymanski, 1996; McIntosh and Broderick, 1996), revised opening hours for leisure 
centres (Walsh and Davis, 1993) and new standards of quality for street cleaning 
(Environmental Protection Act, 1990) also have to be held constant, which they seldom 
are (Boyne, 1998a; Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Instead, many of the estimations of 
the costs of CCT services are compiled by data provided by the respondents themselves, 
with no allowances made for differences in service characteristics, contract preparation 
costs and monitoring costs (Boyne, 1998a)2. 
These difficulties have been further added to by the controversy that has surrounded the 
policy in terms of tendering criteria and potential eradication of the terms and 
conditions of municipal employment (Allen and Henry, 1997; Reimer, 1997). Indeed, 
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such was the controversial nature of CCT that even research published by academics, 
mostly in the fonn of journal articles, which would nonnally ensure 'that the evidence 
reaches a minimum standard of rig our , (Boyne, 1998a: 701), was not and could not be 
decided on scientific grounds alone (see, for example, the debate between Ganley and 
Grahl and Cubbin, Domberger and Meadowcroft in a 1988 edition of Fiscal Studies 
regarding the source of the technical efficiency of tendered versus non-tendered refuse 
collection services). 
In recognition of these difficulties, this section presents a number of research findings, 
which are organised, firstly, in tenns of the extent to which CCT reduced the 
microeconomic costs of services and, secondly, in tenns of its associated impact on 
employment. 
Microeconomic impact 
While CCT had not led to a widespread transfer of services from local authorities to 
external contractors and may not have even generated the desired level of contractor 
interest (LGMB, 1997a), the Government could still claim, nonetheless, that it had 
broken the a priori monopoly provision of local government services and that this 
success would manifest itself in tenns of a reduction in the costs of the local services 
affected. Indeed, this had been the experience of the voluntary competitive tendering 
initiatives conducted in both North American (Parker, 1990; Donahue, 1989) and 
British local authorities (Audit Commission, 1987; Cubbin, Domberger and 
Meadowcroft, 1987; Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993; Parker and Hartley, 1990; see 
appendix 1 for a summary of voluntary competitive tendering research evidence) and 
there was little reason to believe that these results would not be repeated again for CCT. 
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Consequently, when these early success stories of voluntary competitive tendering were 
later joined by news that the economic impact of CCT had been to reduce the cost of 
defined local services by an average of six to nine per cent (Local Government 
Chronicle, 1990; Walsh, 1991a; Walsh and Davis, 1993; Austin Mayfield, 1997; see 
appendix 2 for summary of main research evidence on CCT), the main concern related 
to the fact that the level of cost reductions seemed rather modest in comparison to those 
reported via voluntarily tendering experiments throughout the early to middle 1980's3. 
One explanation as to why the evidence for compulsory competitive tendering has not 
been as impressive as the evidence for voluntary competitive tendering is that the latter 
exercises were, by definition, voluntary. In other words, it is possible that authorities 
that undertook them strongly anticipated cost savings. In addition, the evidence from 
these voluntary tendering exercises was collected mostly from the experiences of refuse 
collection. The significance of this is that refuse collection, in contrast to some of the 
CCT services, belongs to a relatively experienced and developed private sector market, 
where the pressures of competition are likely to be higher than average. What then of 
the distribution of cost savings across the range of services exposed to CCT? 
Although the microeconomic impact of CCT has been the subject of numerous studies 
(Local Government Chronicle, 1990; Walsh, 1991a; Austin Mayfield, 1997) Walsh and 
Davis (1993) research of the first round ofCCT remains the most detailed and is drawn 
upon here for illustrative purposes. Utilising evidence collected from 40 local 
authorities amongst all of the services encapsulated by the Local Government Act 1988, 
the Walsh and Davis (1993) study reported average cost reductions of six and a half per 
cent. More specifically, however, they also identified that in twenty-four per cent of the 
contracts they examined the costs of services actually increased (Walsh and Davis, 
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1993). As can be seen in Table 2.3, the largest cost reductions of more than ten per cent 
were reported in building cleaning, refuse collection and grounds maintenance - all 
relatively highly competed for areas of activity. In contrast, the costs of the street 
cleaning and schools and welfare catering services were reported to have actually 
increased. Walsh and Davis (1993) partly attributed this outcome to the advent of new 
standards of service such as the Environmental Protection Act in street cleansing (Walsh 
and Davis, 1993). 
Table 2.3 
Cost changes to CCT Services 
Service Cost changes 
before/after 1st round 
Building Cleaning 
Refuse Collection 
Grounds Maintenance 
Leisure Management 
Catering Other 
Vehicle Maintenance 
Street Cleaning 
Education Catering 
Average 
(Walsh and Davis, 1993) 
-12.7 
-11.3 
-10.9 
-5.0 
-4.9 
-l.3 
+2.6 
+2.8 
-6.5 
Despite CCT appearing to have been reasonably successful in terms of reducing the 
costs of local services, some researchers identified worrying evidence in relation to the 
sustainability (Szymanski, 1996) and structure (Austin Mayfield, 1997) of the 
reductions and, therefore, placed question marks against the then existing direction of 
CCT. In terms of sustain ability, for example, Szymanski's (1996) detailed econometric 
study of refuse collection revealed that at least half of the contract renewals with 
external contractors took place on the basis of negotiation with the existing contractor. 
In tum, this process, and its associated lack of robust competition was attributed to 
having reversed the cost savings achieved in the first round of tendering: 
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'For private contractors, cost reductions are halved by the fourth full year of 
the contract. This may be associated with the fact that the fourth year, is in 
most cases, also the last full year before the service was due to be tendered 
again' (Syzmanski, 1996: 11). 
Similarly, concerns have also been expressed in terms of the structure of the cost 
reductions associated with CCT. Research by Austin Mayfield (1997), for example, 
identified that whereas contracts valued at over £ 1 million per annum achieved average 
cost reductions of 9.8 per cent, the respective figure for contracts valued between 
£500,000 and one million per annum was only 7.5 per cent. Contracts of less than 
£500,000 per annum, meanwhile, were found to have actually increased the annual cost 
of services by a figure of 0.6 per cent. This finding, therefore, resonates with the 
concerns of private contractors (BMRB, 1995 and 1996) that some of the contracts 
created as a result of CCT legislation were so small that they were hardly worth 
competing for. 
Impact on employment 
If, as suggested above, the Conservative Government was able to claim that its policy of 
CCT had been successful in terms of reducing the micro economic costs of local 
government services, a slightly more complicated picture emerged when the source of 
these cost reductions had to be accounted for in terms of their employment impact 
(Foster and Scott, 1998b; Bach and Winchester, 1999). 
However, as with much CCT research, the information regarding the impact of CCT on 
employment has to be treated carefully. Part of the reason being that when a CCT 
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contract 1S awarded, there are three possible employment outcomes for staff: 
redeployment with the local government organisation, transfer to the contractor, or 
redundancy (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). One major implication of such variety is 
that, in detailing the employment impact of CCT, one cannot be sure whether one is 
measuring real job losses or transfers of employment. What is generally accepted, 
however, is that the introduction of CCT has been identified as a major factor in the 
reduction in the level of local authority employment (Doogan, 1997, 1999; LGMB, 
1997b). Doogan (1997), for example, estimates that in 1994 there were 339,000 (31 per 
cent) fewer local government manual jobs than there were in 1979 and this was 
equivalent to 90 per cent of the total local government job loss throughout this period. 
Moreover, approximately half of this reduction had occurred since 1990 and, hence, 
following the coming into force of the Local Government Act 1988. 
Whilst many of the reductions in these local authority employment levels can be 
attributed to transfers in employment from the local authority to external contractors, a 
significant number of the reductions can also be attributed to absolute job losses (Escott 
and Whitfield, 1995a; Walsh, 1991a; Walsh and Davis, 1993; Colling and Ferner, 1995). 
Research conducted by the IRS Employment Review (1995), for example, found that 
over 90 per cent of the local authorities they surveyed had made redundancies between 
the years 1990-1995 and that these involved a total loss of 16,000 jobs, of which 40 per 
cent were compulsory redundancies. Likewise, research conducted by the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (Escott and Whitfield, 1995a) among five services in 39 
authorities estimated that the policy ofCCT had generated 12,587 job losses. 
Similarly, there has also been a reported deterioration in the terms and conditions of 
employment of those who retained their jobs and even those who managed to keep their 
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local authority employment (Storey and Fenwick, 1990; Pinch, 1991; Colling, 1993; 
Walsh and Davis, 1993; Local Government Information Unit, 1994; White, 1996 and 
1997; Corby and White, 1999; Kessler, Coyle-Shapiro and Purcell, 1999). The Walsh 
and Davis (1993) study, for example, revealed that although the highest reported 
employment-related change post-CCT was 'reduced workers " this was closely followed 
by 'rearranged hours of work' for those retained, both accounting for just over fifty per 
cent. The same study also found that while basic wages were relatively unaffected by 
CCT, the impact of other changes, notably to bonus systems, on take home pay could be 
considerable (Walsh and Davis, 1993). Sick and holiday pay arrangements were also 
reported as having become tighter. Table 2.4 provides a summary of these changes. 
Table 2.4 
Ch anges to terms an d dO ° f I con Ihons 0 emp oyment ~ II o owmg CCT 
Change Number of Percentage 
cases 
Reduced workers employed 114 56 
Rearranged hours of work 104 51 
Change bonus system 65 32 
Changed shift system 51 25 
Altered approach to sick pay 36 18 
Abolished bonus system 30 15 
Altered approach to holiday pay 24 12 
Increased basic wages 20 10 
Increased workers employed 12 6 
Source: Walsh and Davis, 1993 
The multifarious employment impact of CCT led, in tum, to a debate concerning the 
overall cost effectiveness of the policy, once account had been taken of social transfer 
payments made to those people that had either lost their jobs or had their pay reduced 
(Elden, 1995; Escott and Whitfield, 1995b; Watson, Ward and George, 1997; Shaoul, 
1999). One important point to note about this debate is that it moved the focus of 
attention away from a purely microeconomic examination of CCT towards a broader 
macro-economic perspective (Barry, 1987). 
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Research by Escott and Whitfield (1995b), for example, suggested that, for every pound 
of cost savings achieved at the microeconomic level, central government was forced to 
payout two pounds on increased unemployment benefits and reduced national 
insurance contributions. Consequently, the assumed gains of CCT to taxpayers might 
have been exaggerated by focusing purely on direct service costs (Turnball and Wass, 
1995; Froud, Haslam, Johal, Williams and Williams, 1999); an observation that led to 
calls for a distributional analysis of the use of market mechanisms in the public sector 
(Cutler and Waine, 1998). Moreover, as White (1996) concludes, viewed from this 
macroeconomic perspective, the policy of CCT presented the government with a 
contradiction between its role as an employer, keen to devolve pay decisions to the local 
level and its role as an economic regulator with responsibility for the wider economy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the rationale, policy, outcome and impact of 
CCT. It began by explaining that, in terms of rationale, the precept of Conservative 
support for CCT was that it would break up hitherto protected public sector monopolies 
by ensuring the potential for competition. In this way, it was anticipated that in-house 
providers would be forced to act as if potential operators could undercut them and, as a 
result, ensure greater efficiencies in the delivery of local services. 
The chapter then moved on to provide an overview of resulting CCT policy and detailed, 
in turn, a number of its most salient properties. In doing this, it was revealed that, in 
terms of coverage, the services encapsulated by the policy were not the major services 
provided by local authorities such as education or social services but confined mostly to 
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ancillary and support services such as cleaning and maintenance. Then, with respect to 
the tendering process, it was explained that although local authorities were able to 
submit bids in an attempt to retain services in-house, in doing so, they had to ensure that 
they complied with the rules, demonstrated that they were more cost effective than 
external tenders and did not take into consideration a range of non-commercial matters 
when evaluating competing tenders. In addition, provisions were also made to subject 
any retained DSO units to a range of post contract regulations, which in the event of 
failure, further threatened their closure. 
Meanwhile, in terms of tendering outcome, the third section of the chapter demonstrated 
that while CCT achieved its main outcome of encroaching upon the public sector 
monopoly of public service provision, the mechanisms employed to do this were not 
wholly successful in achieving this aim on a large scale, with the average number of 
competing bidders per contract frequently lower than the statutory request of three 
external bids. Part of the explanation for this reasonably low level of external contractor 
interest related to concerns on the part of potential contractors that the CCT process was 
too risky and had low value adding potential. 
Finally, while the policy was shown to have been largely successful in terms of 
reducing the costs of local services, the prescriptive nature of the regime's tendering 
requirements was also shown to have led to overly high transaction costs and negligible 
or no cost reductions for smaller contracts. Similarly, although the microeconomic costs 
of services exposed to the policy were reduced, doubts about the wider macro-economic 
implications of the policy were raised. These concerns stemmed from evidence which 
showed that one by-product of reducing the costs of local services was an increase in 
unemployment, an outcome which then had to be compensated for to some degree by 
increased social transfer payments. It is, therefore, against the backdrop of this rather 
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mixed, complicated and contradictory policy outcome and impact that the next chapter 
examines the response of the Labour party. 
Notes 
1 Some commentators, drawing from contestable market theory (Bailey, 1995; Bailey and Davidson, 
1999), for example, have suggested that the key factor is the possibility of competition, or threat of 
competition, rather than the actual number of competitors. Other commentators (Buckley and Chapman, 
1997), however, dispute this view and suggest that in order to test the influence exerted by the threat of 
competition one would need to conduct a detailed empirical examination of the contract award process. 
Kerley and Wynn (1991), for example, have suggested a number of reasons for doubting the threat of 
competition in cases where no external bids were submitted. One such example being that recalcitrant 
managers and staff feel secure in the knowledge that competition does not exist, and as a result, may 
revise their demands and seek no loss in pay and conditions when preparing bids future bids. 
2 This is a view that can be illustrated by reference to Cope's (1995) analysis of the impact of CCT on 
school cleaning in Kent County Council which unearthed eight different estimates of the extent to which 
CCT had reduced or increased the cost of the service - ranging from savings of £1,389,760 to losses of 
£425,000 - depending on who was asked for information and how, for example, contract preparation costs 
were calculated. 
3 Thus, for example, one of the most detailed studies into the economic impact of voluntary competitive 
tendering in refuse collection services (Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson, 1986) identified cost 
reductions in the region of twenty per cent. 
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Chapter 3 
Best Value in local government: the policy and its evolution 
This chapter documents the Labour Government's response to the Conservative's policy 
of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) by charting the development and 
composition of its best value (BV) policy. It begins by outlining the broader context of 
the development of BV via a summary of Labour's critique of CCT during its period in 
opposition. This then forms the backdrop to the second section of the chapter, which 
charts the actual development of BV, while the third provides an overview of the 
composition of the resulting policy. Finally, a fourth section concludes the chapter by 
summarising the key differences between CCT and BV and by highlighting a number of 
attributes ofBV which can be argued to represent an improvement on CCT. 
Labour's response to CCT 
Although the Labour Party, both at local and national level, consistently expressed 
opposition towards CCT, what is important to note is that the nature of this opposition 
went through a number of revisions or transformations. Consequently, as this first 
section reveals, by the time of Labour's election victory in 1997, its rationale for 
wanting to replace CCT was built on a very different set of concerns from those it had 
held during the time of the introduction of the policy. 
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Revisions to the Labour critique 
During the early stages of CCT, one particular line of criticism that Labour adopted 
towards the policy was that, as democratically elected bodies, the final decision about 
how certain services should be provided should rest with local authorities rather than be 
imposed upon them by central government (Sharland, 1997). This concern about the 
deleterious democratic implications of CCT was, in tum, extended by concerns as to the 
criteria local authorities were expected to use during the evaluation of tenders and the 
threat this posed to the level and conditions of employment. In particular, a number of 
Labour MP's openly complained that CCT would unfairly redistribute resources away 
from already badly compensated producer groups and was likely, therefore, to undercut 
civilised employment conditions (Straw, 1987, Cunningham, 1987). As Labour Member 
of Parliament Cunningham argued during the second reading of the 1987 Local 
Government Bill, CCT would: 
'Exploit low paid people, often from ethnic communities. It exploits women, 
10H'ers standards and generates public squalor .. .It is Labour control of the 
local authority employer's side that has ensured that people on low wages 
have had some fairness of treatment that the Government seek to deny them' 
(1987:9). 
Increasingly, however, this particular brand of opposition towards CCT was viewed by 
the Labour party leadership as an electoral liability. particularly in the face of 
Conservative accusations and right wing media reports that the Labour party was at the 
mercy of producer groups and too closely associated with trade unions (Stevens, 2003) l. 
Consequently. in the face of these damaging accusations, the Labour party. set about to 
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dispel its image of high taxation and the perception that it was unable to improve the 
quality of public services (Heath, lowell and Curtice, 1994, in Hills 1998). 
Increased convergence between Labour and Conservatives 
The result of this transformation was that, during the build up to the 1992 General 
Election, the Labour party became increasingly active, at both a national and local level, 
in its promotion of 'quality' public services (Labour Party, 1989, 1991). Local 
experiments with customer contracts, charters and guarantees, which utilised quality 
concepts imported directly from the private sector (Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 
1995; Walsh, 1991b and 1995c; Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 1999; Fitzgerald, 
Rainnie and Stirling, 1996), were duly supported in official Party literature (Labour 
Party, 1989, 1991) and exemplified a shift from concerns with producer group interests 
towards the recipients of services. 
In taking up this revised position, the Labour party began to endorse a conceptualisation 
of quality that was shorn of some of its 'traditional' (Pfeffer and Coote, 1991; Reeves 
and Bednar, 1994: Public Sector Privatisation Research Unit, 1992, 1997; Trade Union 
Congress, 1992) overtones, including the notion that lower costs usually means lower 
quality 2 . Instead, it favoured an approach which stressed the importance of setting 
service specifications and the monitoring of performance (Colling, 1995b; Freeman-Bell 
and Grover, 1994; Gaster, 1999; Henkel, 1991); an approach which meant that both the 
major political parties now pursued a concept of quality that was particularly suited to 
convincing the taxpayer about their ability to secure service improvements (Pollitt 
1990a, b; Haque, 1998; Erridge, Fee, McIlroy, 1998). Indeed, the local experiments with 
service charters and guarantees that had been conducted by such Labour controlled 
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authorities as York City Council, Leicester City Council and North Tyneside City 
Council (Labour Party, 1991) even predated John Major's Citizen's Charter Initiative, 
introduced in 1991. 
Further convergence between the two main political parties occurred following the 
removal of Clause IV from Labour's Constitution at a special party conference in 1995 
(Labour Party, 1995a; McIlroy, 1998; Thompson, 1996). Thus, this action meant that 
political opposition to private sector involvement in many parts of the public sector 
could no longer be guaranteed from the Labour party (Marquesse, 1997; Ludlam, 2001; 
Freeden, 1999). It also served to further reinforce the emerging political consensus 
between the two parties that if private companies could perform just as well as public 
service providers, and still make a profit, then barriers to their delivery of public 
services should not be placed in their way (Labour Party, 1995b: Brown, Prescott and 
Cook, 1994). The rising logic behind Labour's agenda for the reform of local 
government service delivery was, therefore, that it was performance rather than 
ownership that mattered (Higgins, James and Roper, 2004a). 
For the opposition Labour Party, this more confident and authoritative stance on the 
reform of public services culminated in a proposal to introduce a 'local performance 
programme' (Labour Party, 1995a). This new initiative was replete with references to 
'continuous improvements, target setting, achieving standards and monitoring costs' 
(Rogers, 1996: 36-37) and contained plans also to refocus the Audit Commission into a 
'standards inspectorate'. By increasingly championing the view that Labour would seek 
continuous improvements, and ultimately 'best value', from local authorities, one of the 
more subtle differences between the two main political parties in relation to local 
govenlment reform was just how far they were willing and able to use 'quality' as a 
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means to legitimise (Wilkinson and Wilmott, 1995; Bouckaert, 2001) their respective 
policies. 
Thus, whereas the Conservative's Citizen's Charter initiative (Doem 1993· Lewis , , , 
1993; Lewis and Hartley, 2001; Bellamy and Greenaway, 1995) had been introduced, in 
part, to prove that the cost reductions brought about by such policies as CCT had not 
been at the expense of service quality (DoE, 1991), Labour's more active promotion of 
'quality' involved the pursuit of 'continuous improvements' in local service delivery 
(Labour Party, 1995b). Although, Labour's response to CCT had not, at this point, 
explained in detail how such continuous improvement was to be achieved, it did, 
nonetheless, provide a more positive sounding political agenda than one founded merely 
on reducing costs or on criticising the status quo ante. 
Ironically, however, just as the two main political parties converged around a faith in 
the ability of perfonnance measurement and national standards to stimulate and 
demonstrate improvements in quality it was, in part, owing to the Conservative's failure 
to deliver what the public actually identified as 'improved' local services that Labour 
was given the opportunity to demonstrate what it could do - and this was despite the 
fact that it drew upon many of the same ideas and concepts. Sanderson (1996: 91), for 
example, neatly depicted the stark differences that existed between the formal 
representation of 'quality' as provided in relation to the Conservative's Citizen's 
Charter Initiative and the experience of services as users really experienced them, thus 
leaving a gap of missed promises for Labour to fill: 
'on the one hand, a picture portrayed by the Government's Citizen's Charter 
of public services 'reaching standards of performance that H'ould have been 
unthinkable only a few years ago ',. on the other hand, a totally different picture 
portrayed with newspaper features of public services starved of resources and 
suffering severe problems due to backlogs of maintenance and repairs and 
inadequate resources to provide services to decent services '. 
Given this state of affairs, nonetheless, one was still left to ponder exactly what it was 
that Labour would do to improve the quality of local services so dramatically. Further 
light on this issue was shed followed the election of New Labour in May 1997. 
The development of BV 
The 1997 British Labour Party General Election manifesto proposed a range of 
initiatives to 'modernise' local government (Labour Party, 1997). These included a plan 
to impose a duty upon local authorities to promote the economic, social and 
environmental well being of their areas, a proposal to remove crude and universal rate 
capping and a pledge to consult business over business rates. The most significant of the 
Labour Party's manifesto pledges for local government, however, was its mandate to 
replace CCT with a new BV system. As Labour's General Election manifesto stated: 
'Councils should not be forced to put their services out to tender, but will be 
required to obtain best value. We reject the dogmatic view that services must 
be privatised to be of high quality, but equally we see no reason why a service 
should be delivered directly if other more effiCient means are available. ' 
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The Labour Government's statement of intent was, then, quickly confirmed, when only 
a month following Labour's election victory in May 1997, Hilary Armstrong, Minister 
for Housing, announced: 
'The government intends to replace CCT with a duty of B V; as soon as 
Parliamentary time allows' (DETR, 1997a). 
The resulting policy was developed at a rapid pace and, in tum, entailed four key stages. 
These comprised the setting out of twelve BV principles, the undertaking of a BV pilot 
scheme, the publication of a Green Paper and related consultation and the publication of 
a White Paper and subsequent passing of legislation. Each of these four key stages of 
the development ofBV is described briefly in tum below. 
The principles of BV 
Following its landslide election victory, the Labour government quickly set out to 
clarify its position on BV and did so with the publication of twelve BV principles 
(DETR, 1997b). The content of which can be divided into two broad categories; one 
concerning the creation of a performance management framework; and the other 
concerning the creation of some basic operational rules for BV. 
Firstly, as demonstrated in Figure 3.1, principles seven to twelve were all devoted to 
setting out and defining the properties of what later materialised into a performance 
management framework. Thus, for example, principles seven and eight stressed the 
importance of national and local performance indicators and targets, while principles 
nine and ten proclaimed that auditors should confirm the integrity and comparability of 
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perfonnance indicators and subsequently report on whether targets and plans had been 
achieved in relation to them. The last two of these BY principles, meanwhile, stressed 
the importance of intervention measures to deal with failing services, such as requiring 
'failing' councils to expose services to competition, or to accept external management 
support. 
Figure 3.1 
The 12 principles of Best Value 
1. Councils will owe a duty of best value to local people, both as taxpayers and service 
customers. Performance plans should support local accountability. 
2. BY is about effectiveness and quality, not just economy and efficiency. Target-
setting should underpin BY 
3. The best value duty should apply to a wider range of services than CCT. 
4. There is no presumption that services must be privati sed or delivered directly. What 
matters is what works. 
5. Competition will continue as an important management tool but will not in itself 
demonstrate best value. 
6. Central government will set the basic framework for service provision 
7. Local targets should have regard to national targets and performance indicators to 
support competition between councils. 
8. National and local targets should be built on perfonnance information. 
9. Auditors should confirm the integrity and comparability of perfonnance information. 
10. Auditors will report publicly on whether best value has been achieved and 
contribute to plans for remedial action. 
11. There should be provision for DETR intervention, on Audit Commission advice to 
tackle failing councils 
12. The form of intervention, including requirements to expose services to competition 
and accept external management support, should be appropriate to the nature of the 
failure. 
Source: DETR (1997b) 
The second batch of principles, meanwhile, contained principles one to six, which were 
related in the sense that they were all concerned with laying down some basic 
operational parameters for BY. Notable, amongst these, was the third principle that BY 
should apply to a wider range of services than CCT and the fourth that there should be 
no presumption that services must be 'privatised' or delivered directly since 'what 
matters is what works' (DETR, 1997b; Annstrong, 1997, 1998). The implication being, 
therefore, that, in contrast to the strait-jacket of CCT, BY would offer local authorities 
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the flexibility to deliver servIces III ways that would attain the government's 
perfonnance aspirations. 
The impression given by these early plans for BV, therefore, was that at the same time 
as requiring local authorities to achieve certain centrally defined government targets 
(principles 2, 6, 7 and 8), it would not necessarily demand that they utilised external 
contractors (principle 4) or competition (principle 5) in order to do so. Instead, local 
authorities would be exposed to an audit regime (principles 9 and 10) that would trigger 
Government intervention in the event of 'failing' services (principles 11 and 12). By 
offering rights with responsibilities in these ways Entwistle and Laffin (2005) argue that 
the Labour government sought to gain support from the parts of the Party that the policy 
was designed to control. The Government, therefore, continued to utilise the language 
of freedom and flexibility and this was none more so true than its promotion of a 
Government-initiated BV pilot scheme. 
The BV Pilot scheme 
Shortly following the publication of the twelve BV principles, an initiative to pilot Best 
Value was kick-started during July 1997 when a request for authorities to submit 
documented proposals to pilot the policy was sent out to all local authorities in England 
and Wales (DETR, 1997c). This request required any interested local authority to detail 
how they would conduct BV reviews of some, or all, of their local services over a two to 
three year period, starting in April 1998. The purpose of this pilot scheme was to test the 
practical application of the twelve BV principles and to provide evidence as to whether 
a full scheme was worth introducing (Filkin, 1997; Filkin and Corrigan, 1997). 
.+6 
Despite some uncertainty about the real aims of BV, the pilot scheme met with a 
tremendous response from local authorities, with 150, from roughly 410 principal local 
authorities, including a small number of police authorities and combined fire authorities , 
submitting pilot bids (DETR, 1997d). The degree of this enthusiasm was, perhaps, 
encouraged by the news that the Government would exempt participating local 
authorities from CCT requirements (Audit Commission, 1997). The relative beneficial 
effects of this ruling depended, however, on whether services were internally or 
eternally provided and, thereafter, on the nature of the existing contractual arrangements 
with external contractors. For as Newcastle City Council argued in its pilot submission, 
'Existing contracts have different renewal dates which may make it difficult to integrate 
services into one arrangement' (Newcastle City Council, 1997). 
The submitted bids were evaluated by a 'mixed' panel comprising representatives from 
the then Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, the Local 
Government Association, the Confederation of British Industry, UNISON, the GMB 
and the Audit Commission (DETR, 1997d). In the event, bids from 34 English local 
authorities and two police authorities, as well as two joint bids, were selected for formal 
pilot status and instructed to pilot BV from 1 st April 1998 (see Appendix 3 for a 
summary ofBV pilot approaches). During the announcement of the successful bids, the 
minister for local government was keen to stress that the greatest mix of initiatives, 
rather than the best bids per se, had been chosen (Armstrong, 1998). 
Either intentionally or unintentionally, this approach to selection, however, did not lead 
to the pilot authorities being representative in terms of their political composition and 
their experiences of external contractors under CCT. For example, as Table 3.1 
demonstrates. in terms of political control it was noticeable that twenty-six (70 per cent) 
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of the successful bids derived from Labour-controlled authorities, despite the fact that 
such authorities only constituted 44 per cent of the total (Martin, 1999). Overall, 
therefore, selected pilot authorities were reported as being biased towards southern-
based Labour-controlled councils (Martin, 1999). 
P rr 1 ollca 
Political control 
Labour 
Liberal Democrats 
Conservative 
No Overall Control 
Independent 
Table 3.1 
t 1 fB tV 1 ·1 h .. con ro 0 es a ue pi ot aut onhes 
Bids Pilots 
80 (55%) 26 (70%) 
16(11%) 2 (5.5%) 
5 (3%) 2 (5.50/0) 
43 (300/0) 4 (11 %) 
2 (10/0) 0(0%) 
Source: Martin (1999) 
English 
councils 
44% 
13% 
5% 
34% 
3% 
Meanwhile, in terms of the pilot authorities' experiences of external contractors under 
CCT, the Local Government Management Board's competition (1997) survey data 
concluded that the average percentage of contracts held by DSOs within piloting 
authorities was 59.8 per cent by value, in a range from 0-100 per cent (LGMB, 1997a). 
The figure for the whole population of English local authorities, meanwhile, was 75 per 
cent. This meant that BV pilot authorities currently had a greater experience of private 
contractors than non-pilot authorities. 
Green Paper and related consultation 
Only three months after the selection of the pilot authorities, the government published 
a Green Paper entitled 'Improving local services through best value' (DETR, 1998a) 
which began to detail more explicitly provisions for a formal BV process. In particular, 
the Green Paper was devoted primarily to adding more substance to six of the twelve 
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BV principles outlined earlier regarding the proposed introduction of a performance 
management framework. Moreover, it proposed that this framework would require local 
authorities to establish corporate objectives and perfonnance measures; to agree a 
programme of fundamental perfonnance reviews to be completed over a period of four 
to five years; and to set and publish perfonnance and efficiency targets in a Local 
Perfonnance Plan (DETR, 1998a). In addition, it was further proposed that these 
requirements would be supplemented by an independent audit and inspection of service 
reviews and perfonnance targets together with the certification of monitoring 
infonnation. 
Despite the reasonably enthusiastic response of local government to BV up to this point, 
an examination of the 541 consultation responses to the Green Paper provided the first 
real hard evidence of local authority hostility towards the policy (Jameson, 1999). Thus, 
for example, amongst the 391 responses from local authorities and representative groups 
(DETR, 1998b), the most widely voiced concerns related to the proposed introduction 
of a 'BV perfonnance management framework' and its related auditing, inspection and 
perfonnance monitoring processes. In the words of the Local Government Association, 
these proposals for BV 'ran the risk of repeating the mistakes of CCT' by imposing a 
prescriptive, centralised, regimented and fonnulaic approach to improving local public 
services (DETR, 1998b). 
More specifically, respondents identified proposals to set performance targets for 
efficiency and quality on the basis of the top 50 per cent, or 25 per cent, of authorities as 
the least popular aspect of the proposed performance framework and the reason for this 
was that it was felt to be too challenging for many authorities, especially if the targets 
were applied to each service (DETR, 1998b). Many respondents, therefore, emphasised 
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a preference for a broader perspective to the aUdit/inspection process than one that 
simply checked the authenticity of performance indicators (DETR, 1998b). 
In contrast to the fears of local authorities and representative groups about the proposed 
performance management framework, private sector respondents reacted favourably to 
the proposed use of rigorous performance comparison on a national basis (DETR, 
1998b). In particular, private sector respondents feared that, unless central government 
had the power to intervene, councils with an ideological preference towards in-house 
service delivery would lock out the private sector (DETR, 1998b; Pike, 1998). 
White Paper and subsequent passing of legislation 
The release of the White Paper, 'Modern local Government: In touch with the local 
people', on July 30 1998 did little to reassure those who had concerns with the 
performance overtones of the rapidly developing BV scheme. The reason for this was 
that it simply entrenched and extended the performance management overtones of the 
Green Paper by providing even more detailed provisions on its proposed wide-ranging 
performance management framework (DETR, 1998c). Furthermore, it further implied, 
as the following quote suggests, that local authorities would have to demonstrate their 
superiority over other public and private sectors in terms of both cost and quality 
(DETR, 1998c: 7.1): 
'A modern council - or authority - which puts people first will seek to provide 
services which bear comparison with the best. Not just with the best that other 
authorities provide but with the best that is on offer from both the public and 
private sectors. Continuous imprm'ements in both the quality and cost of 
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services will, therefore, be the hallmark of a modern council, and the test of 
best value '. 
Indeed, by demanding continuous improvements in the cost and quality of local services, 
in the ways outlined in the White Paper, the Labour government clearly demonstrated 
how it shared its predecessor's preoccupation with micro efficiency and appeared to pay 
far less interest, from a social justice perspective, in terms of how such gains were to be 
made. A key concern amongst producer group interests, therefore, was that in order to 
realise the continuous service improvements demanded by the Government, BV policy 
was likely to demand CCT-style practices, albeit through other means (Geddes, 2001; 
Boyne 2002a). 
Despite mounting concern about the employment implications of BV, with some trade 
unions even describing it as 'worse than CCT' (Jameson, 1998), news from Whitehall 
that there was not going to be sufficient Parliamentary time for a comprehensive Local 
Government Bill still managed, nonetheless, to motivate a diverse range of interest 
groups to send a jointly written letter to central government reiterating the need for BY. 
Signatories included the Local Government Association, the Association of Direct 
Labour Organisations, the Trade Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industry 
and the Business Services Association (Pike, 1998). This effort proved to be successful, 
with the publication of a Local Government Bill on 30 November 1998. By 28 July 
1999, the Bill was passed and materialised into the Local Government Act 1999, which 
both removed a number of the clauses governing CCT and created the policy of BV 
(Local Government Act 1999, Part 1 Section 1). 
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Date 
1 May 1997 
2 Jun 1997 
July 1997 
2 Oct 1997 
4 Dec 1997 
3 Mar 1998 
30 Jul1998 
31 Jul1998 
30 Nov 1998 
28 Jul1999 
Figure 3.2 
Policv development of Best Value 
Development 
Labour Government elected with landslide victory. 
Housing Minister announces that the Government will replace CCT with 
BV and twelve BV principles are published. 
BV pilot scheme announced with criteria for selection issued 
BV gets enthusiastic response. Over 150 local authorities submit BV 
pilot proposals. 
Hilary Armstrong announces 40 successful Best value pilots. 
DETR issues BV consultation paper: 'Improving Local Services through 
BV'. 
White paper 'Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People' 
released. 
Select committee report on Implementation of the Best Value 
Framework 
Local Government Bill [Bill 5] introduced into the House of Commons. 
Local Government Bill reaches Royal Assent 
The transition from CCT to a BV system had, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, been 
reasonably swift, therefore, and certainly did not provide time for the BV pilots to yield 
comprehensive information on the likely success of the new framework (Boyne, 1999). 
Equally, however, the degree of 'enthusiasm' for the policy allowed central government 
to proclaim that 'partnership working' was ubiquitous and that local authorities had 
themselves carried the BV agenda forward (Prescott, 1998). Though, as a BV Select 
Committee report acknowledged (DETR, 1998d), because 'B V replaces the previous 
regime of CCT it is bound to be viewed favourably; the proposed policy may have 
attracted such strong initial support partly because, at this stage, it appears to be all 
things to all people '. 
Local Government Act 1999 and related guidance 
The central tenet of BV policy is that local authorities must demonstrate that they are 
obtaining best value for local people. This is a duty that is owed to the local community, 
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rather than to central government, and can be summarised as requiring local authorities 
to: 
' ... make improvements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which 
local authorities functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (Local Government Act 1999, Section 
3.1). 
In detailing the preCIse means by which local authorities are supposed to secure 
continuous improvement in local servIces attention can be turned to a performance 
management framework that the Act created and which was first heralded in the 
provisions of the local government white paper. Drawing upon the work of Boyne, 
Gould-Williams, Law and Walker (2002a), Figure 3.3 redraws this performance 
management framework and identifies the five key elements of it. These elements 
comprise perfonnance plan, audit, review, action plan and inspection and the remainder 
of this section guides the reader through a brief description of each of them. 
1 Annual Performance plan 
Publication of past and 
future targets, 
Figure 3.3 
Best Value Process 
---.. 3 BV review 
Challenge 
Compare 
Consult 
Compete 
4 Action plans 
Production of plan 
of action to improve 
performance 
I 
2 Audited~ ...-----~. 5 Selection of reviews and plans BV inspected 
5-yearly planning-cycle 
Source: Adapted from Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law and Walker (2002a). 
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Performance plan 
The policy of BV requires local authorities to prepare a BV performance plan for each 
financial year (Local Government Act, 1999, Section 6). This document, which is 
subject also to the process of BV audit (stage two), is required to summarise a range of 
information about the objectives and performance of each local authority's services and 
to detail also the programme of BV reviews to which all services must be subjected to 
every five years (stage three). As part of this, the BV performance plan sets out a range 
of general health, service and cross-service performance indicators against which local 
authorities are required to attain year-on-year improvement (DETR, 1999). 
In total, there are 122 BV performance indicators and these can be differentiated in 
terms of eighteen Best Value corporate health indicators which are designed to 'provide 
a snapshot of how well the authority is performing overall' and 104 best value service 
delivery indicators which are designed to 'reflect the national interest in the delivery of 
local services' (DETR, 2000). Whilst the corporate health indicators are designed to 
measure overall performance, the BV service delivery indicators fall into the six service 
areas of education, social services, housing, environment, cultural services, community 
safety and community legal advice. Currently, the most important perfonnance 
indicators in BV policy are those which are also classified as 'upper quartile' targets and 
which local authorities should, where possible, aim to reach within a reasonable period 
of time (DTLR, 2002). 
Audit 
Each year the BV performance plan has to be audited by the Audit Commission's own 
anns length audit agency, District Audit, or an approved management consultancy. The 
process of BV audit, therefore, supplements the Audit Commission's 'financial 
regularity' and 'value for money' (Audit Commission, 1999a; McSweeny, 1988; Kelly, 
2003) responsibilities3, which have been part of its remit since its inception in 1983. 
Described by the government as an important year-on-year role, the BV audit function 
demands auditors to reach a view as to whether local authorities' BV performance plans 
have been prepared and published in accordance with legislation and guidance (Local 
Government Act, 1999, Section 7). In particular, BV auditors are required to provide a 
check on whether the plans have been drawn up, whether the information in them is 
accurate and whether the future plans are realistic, having regard to the resources 
available to the authority (DETR, 1998b: 7.37). In the Audit Commission's (2001a: 2) 
own words, however, these are not particularly demanding tasks and do not, therefore, 
represent a significant audit challenge: 
(The auditor's role in relation to best value is a relatively limited one: it is to 
review an authority's published BVPP and to issue a statutory report on it, 
indicating whether the plan was prepared and published in accordance with 
statutory requirements '. 
The BV Audit process, therefore, regards the performance plans as statements of intent 
rather than accounts of actual delivery (Power, 1997; Pollitt, Xavier, Lonsdale, Mul, 
Summa and Waemess, 1999) to the extent that although a local authority might have 
correctly included all of the relevant performance information required by BV 
legislation (Audit Commission, 1999b and 2000a), there is no means to ascertain the 
validity of such information. Within the confines of these limitations, if a local authority 
fails to publish the correct information - a failure of process - or fails to create 
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sufficiently challenging perfonnance targets - a failure of substance - it faces the risk of 
being referred by Auditors to the Secretary of State for intervention (DETR, 1999). 
BV review 
The third key element of the BV process is the requirement that each and every local 
authority service is reviewed over a four-to-five yearly cycle (DETR, 1999). This 
process involves each local authority service being subjected to an internal assessment 
via what have become known as the 'four Cs'. That is, a service is considered on the 
basis of how well it 'competes' with alternative sources of supply, how well it 
'compares' to current standards of perfonnance, the degree to which the existing 
methods of service delivery are 'challenged' and how well key stakeholders are 
'consulted' over service standards and modes of delivery. A brief description of each of 
the 'four Cs' is provided in Figure 3.4. 
In making sense of the 'four Cs' of BY, there are two key points to be made. Firstly, 
one should note that the 'challenge' element both shapes the entire BY review process -
by requiring local authorities to consider their objectives in relation to each of their 
services - and has a direct impact on the implementation of the other three 'C's' as well. 
Thus, in the case of 'consultation', the challenge element requires local authorities to 
ascertain from the public the level at which it should be exercising its functions. 
Likewise, in the case of the 'comparison' element of BV, local authorities have been 
required to set challenging but realistic perfonnance targets. Finally, in the case of the 
'competition' element of the review process, local authorities have been encouraged to 
challenge the existing basis of service provision and to do so by experimenting with a 
range of contractual arrangements. Secondly, one should also note that the comparison 
element of the BY review process does not really represent a separate function of BY in 
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its own right. Instead, it is rather more concerned with the performance measurement 
elements of BV. 
Figure 3.4 
The four C's of Best Value 
Challenge why and how a service is being provided; 
• consider whether it should be exercising the function; 
• consider the level at which and the way in which it should be exercising the 
function; 
• consider its objectives in relation to the exercise of the function; 
Comparison with the performance of others across a range of relevant indicators: 
• to assess its performance in exercising the function by reference to any 
performance indicator 
• to assess its success in meeting any performance which applies in relation to the 
function; 
• to assess its progress towards meeting any performance standard which has been 
specified but which does not yet apply; 
• to assess its progress towards meeting any relevant performance target 
Consultation with local taxpayers, service users, partners and the wider business 
community: 
• to consult other best value authorities and commercial and other businesses 
about the exercise of its function; 
Competition as a means of securing efficient and effective services. 
• to assess the competitiveness of its performance in exercising the function by 
reference to the exercise of the same function, or similar functions, by other best 
value authorities and by commercial and other businesses 
Source: DETR, 1999: 6 
Thus, with the challenge element running throughout the entire BV process and the 
comparison element residing with the regulatory processes of performance indicators, 
audits and inspections, one is left with the consultation and competition elements of the 
policy. The consultation element is both a general requirement of BV under Section 3 of 
the Local Government Act 1999 and also a specific facet of the review process required 
under Section 5 of the Act, with the former, notably requiring local authorities to: 
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' ... consult with taxpayers, non-domestic rate payers, user of services and those 
who appear to have an interest in any area within which the authority carries 
out functions' (Local Government Act 1999, section 3, 2). 
The competition element of the BV reVIew process, meanwhile, reqUlres local 
authorities to assess the competitiveness of their functions by reference to the exercise 
of the same, or similar functions, by other service providers, including local authorities 
and commercial businesses (DETR, 1999). As will be explained in more detail in the 
next chapter, this is a task which might not in itself involve competitive tendering but 
might instead encompass a variety of more 'flexible' tendering options including the 
development of public-private partnerships. 
Action plans 
The fourth key element of the BV process, meanwhile, is an action plan which local 
authorities are required to create at the end of each BV review (Local Government Act, 
Section 5 and Section 9). The action plan should detail how each reviewed service will 
achieve specified cost, efficiency and quality targets - thus demonstrating the reviewed 
services' commitment to continuous service improvement. The key perfonnance targets 
are as follows: 
'Quality targets that are, as a minimum, consistent with the performance of the 
top 25 per cent of all authorities' (DETR, 1999: 11). 
'Cost and efficiency targets over 5 years that, as a minimum, are consistent 
with the performance of the top 25 per cent of authorities of the type to which 
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they belong and which are consistent with the overall target of 2 per cent p.a. 
efficiency improvement set for local government spending as a whole' (DETR, 
1999: 11). 
This does not imply, however, that each reviewed servIce IS expected to identify 
efficiency improvements of two per cent a year since, as the DETR (1999) has 
maintained, some reviews may identify much greater opportunities for improved 
efficiency, others less so. What the targets do impress upon local authorities, though, is 
the need to attain the prevailing upper quartile quality, cost and efficiency status over a 
given period of time. 
Inspection 
The final element of BV is the BV inspection process (Local Government Act, 1999, 
Section 10). This process is conducted in relation to a number, rather than all, reviewed 
services and, as in the case of the Audit process, is the responsibility of the Audit 
Commission or an approved body (Audit Commission, 1999c, 2000b). Conducted by 
teams of between two and five inspectors, the purpose of each on-site visit, which can 
last up to twenty days in duration 4, is to undertake a series of 'reality checks.' The 
inspection process, therefore, amounts to a cross-examination of the council's stated 
performance levels against inspectors' direct observation and experience of activities5. 
In terms of process, therefore, 'reality checking' may involve unannounced visits to 
service delivery points, interviews with managers, staff and customers, and 'mystery 
shoppers' (Audit Commission, 2000b). 
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In checking the validity of local authorities' perfonnance in this way, the BY 
inspectorate makes two judgements concerning the 'current' and 'likely future' 
perfonnance of the reviewed services. Current perfonnance, for these purposes, is 
assessed as 'poor', 'fair', 'good' or 'excellent' and likely future perfonnance as 'poor', 
'uncertain', 'promising' and 'excellent'. Where an unfavourable inspection judgement 
is made, it is open to the Secretary of State to impose one of a number of sanctions. 
Under section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999, these include, the provision of 
external management help, the requirement that services be put out to competition, the 
seizure of the authority's ability to provide services directly and the transference of 
service responsibility to a third party. The related processes of identifying failure and, 
where necessary, dealing with failure can be seen, therefore, to provide the public with 
safeguards against failing services. This task, along with BY audit, is achieved at an 
estimated net cost of £50 million per year - equivalent to a fee of approximately 
£150,000 for a unitary authority at, 2001102 prices (Audit Commission, 2001c)6. 
Differences between CCT and BV 
It is quite clear from the preceding section that the policy of BY differs from CCT in a 
number of important ways. In seeking to elaborate further upon these differences, the 
purpose of this section is, first, to compare the two policies in tenns of their coverage, 
operation and emphasis and then, secondly, to identify how BY can be seen to represent 
an advance on CCT. 
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Differences in coverage, operation and emphasis 
One of the most obvious differences between BV and CCT relates to the scale of the 
two policies in terms of their service coverage. Thus, for example, whereas CCT 
encapsulated approximately twelve billion pounds worth of specifically defined blue 
and white-collar activities, BV policy embraces all activities. Indeed, it is arguably 
because of this far more extensive service coverage that the policy of BV has, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.5, replaced the rather narrow, and for many services, 
inappropriate competitive tendering mechanism with a wide-ranging perfonnance 
management framework. 
Figure 3.5 Key differences between CCT and BV 
Feature 
Service Coverage 
Operating 
Mechanism 
Emphasis 
CCT 
Defined range of services 
Compulsory competitive tendering 
Contracts every 2-5 years 
Cost, lowest priced bidder, annual 
rate of return on capital employed 
BV 
All services 
Five-yearly review via 4Cs, 
performance indicators 
audits and inspection 
Cost and quality, public 
consultation, attainment of 
key performance targets, 
annual performance plan, 
annual audit, targeted 
inspection 
Consequently, the key operational difference between CCT and BV is that local 
authorities are no longer obliged to put their services out to competitive tendering. They 
must instead review all of their services over a five-year period with competition being 
retained as a management tool for local authorities' discretionary, as opposed to 
obligatory, use and thus this affords them an increased degree of means flexibility. Such 
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flexibility relates not only to the freedom given to local authorities to review services in 
the way that best manages to achieve continuous service improvement but in a way that 
also offers them a broader range of tendering options than mere competitive tendering. 
Noticeably, within this revised adoption of competition, and consistent with Labour's 
joined-up approach to service delivery (Stevens, 2003; see below), BV policy stresses 
the benefits to be had of local authorities encouraging the development of long-tenn 
collaborative partnerships between client and contractors, rather than the previous 
adversarial relationship. Furthermore, in contrast to the rather closed and secretive 
negotiations that pervaded the contract tendering and evaluation process under CCT, 
BV stresses the importance of consulting with the public in order that the local services 
provided more closely match their needs and wants. In being afforded this increased 
means flexibility, nonetheless, BV policy also exposes local authorities to an increased 
range of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the desired improvements of BV are 
being achieved. These regulatory mechanisms of BV take the form, most notably, of 
performance, audit and inspection processes. 
A final difference between the policies of CCT and BV is one of emphasis. In particular, 
whereas the policy of CCT was primarily devoted to the issue of cost and the statutory 
requirement it placed upon each local authority to select the lowest cost-qualifying 
bidder under BV a greater emphasis is placed on the quality of local services. Moreover, 
whereas CCT demanded local authorities achieve a specified rate of return on capital 
employed, BV demands local authorities to continuously improve their perfonnance in 
relation to a range of centrally and locally determined performance indicators, albeit 
these continue to stress the value for money aspirations of economy, efficiency and 
effecti veness. 
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Four positive attributes of BV 
Having thus charted the differences between CCT and BV in tenns of coverage, 
operation and emphasis and identified also the relative ease with which Labour was able 
to pass BV legislation, it is necessary to delve a little further into an examination of the 
policy from the perspective of how well it succeeds as an instrument of public policy 
(Entwistle and Laffin, 2005). That is to say, how far the policy of BV is able to generate 
the desired continuous improvements and more specifically how far it actually 
represents an advance on CCT. In order to do this, it is first necessary to chart the 
specific problems that the Labour Party identified with CCT and then to identify 
precisely how the Labour Government, via BV, proposed to rectify these problems. In 
considering these two elements together, the remainder of this sub-section identifies, for 
further analysis, four key attributes of BV that this study utilises to exemplify a number 
of virtues that overcome certain weaknesses Labour identified with CCT. 
The first positive attribute of BV can be identified primarily in the 'consult' element of 
the review process and which reflects concerns on the part of the Labour Government 
that CCT did not provide the opportunity for the public to have an effective say in the 
local services they fund and use. This concern is, therefore, aligned to the increasingly 
prominent quality critique of CCT, outlined in the first section of the chapter, and which 
reflects the attempt by Labour to ensure that that services provided by local authorities 
are those that the public want, rather than what the producer wishes to provide or for 
cheapest cost. Consequently, as described briefly above, BV requires local authorities to 
provide and collect information from the public about the perfonnance of local services 
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and to more fully to engage them in decisions regarding future service delivery. This 
attribute of BV can, therefore, be defined as 'public involvement'. 
The second alleged virtue ofBV over CCT is to be found in the competition element of 
BV and reflects longstanding concerns that CCT had too heavily constrained local 
authorities in relation to their tendering exercises and, as a result, did not allow them to 
combine and evaluate services in ways functional to continuous service improvement. 
In response to this problem, BV policy offers local authorities greater freedom and 
flexibility by not detailing explicitly the procedures they should follow in relation to 
how they deliver local services. Instead, the policy simply expects local authorities to 
act in a fair and impartial way and to do whatever is necessary to achieve the 
Government's desired service outcomes, and this is why all services are included within 
it. Indeed, as a 1998 Select Committee report on this matter argued (DETR, 1998d: 13) 
'We feel that it would detract from these objectives (improvements in quality, 
performance and accountability) ijparts of local authority services were not included in 
the B V regime '. 
The logic of this freedom leads ultimately to the conclusion that despite conducting 
competition an authority might not be perfonning, or to put it another way, competition 
is not necessary to achieve the Government's continuous service improvement 
objectives and is, therefore, not compulsory. It can also be seen to address concerns of 
private contractors that the markets created by CCT were unattractive owing to their 
low-value adding potential or, similarly, why marginalize 'quality' which is not 
necessarily done in commercial markets. This second attribute of BV is, therefore, to be 
referred to as 'flexibility of means' . 
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Thirdly, where possible, BY policy seeks local authorities to engender collaborative 
working relationships with external contractors and, therefore, to rectify the types of 
adversarial relationships previously created as a result of the former policy of CCT. In 
particular, it is argued that the development of public-private partnerships will allow 
local authorities to draw upon external expertise and capital and to reduce some of the 
transaction and contract monitoring costs formally associated with CCT. In doing so, 
this attribute of BY reflects the Labour Government's wider philosophy of the 'third 
way' (Giddens, 1998) and is referred to as 'public-private partnerships.' 
Fourth and finally, in addition to fashioning the means by which local authorities are 
expected to create continuous service improvements, the policy of BY also introduces a 
range of regulatory mechanisms to confirm and reassure the public that local authorities 
have done so. These mechanisms comprise BY-specific performance indicators, audits 
and inspections and, in their own particular ways, can be seen to reflect an advance over 
the regulatory mechanisms that existed when Labour took power. The most significant 
of these regulatory elements, however, is the BY inspection process which both utilises 
performance indicators to reach its judgements and which provides a far more detailed 
regime of investigation than the rather limited process of BY audit. The fourth attribute 
of BY is, therefore, to be referred to as 'inspection'. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the development and composition of Labour's 
policy of BY. It began by charting Labour's response to CCT throughout its period of 
opposition and explained how its critique of the policy became increasingly founded 
upon the policy's shortfalls in relation to the quality of service provided. Consequently, 
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in the build up to the 1997 general election, Labour had, as part of its annoury, a policy 
devoted to the continuous improvement of local services and, by implication, a far more 
positive outline for the future of local government service delivery than one merely 
based on cutting costs. In accordance with this changing critique, however, it was 
possible to identify a shift from an explicit concern with producer group interests to one 
which insofar as they are taken into account they are mediated through a 'quality 
management' public/private management framework. 
The chapter then moved on to outline the development of BV and argued that the policy 
was able to progress quickly through the legislative process, in part, because of the 
desire amongst all interest groups to remove CCT once and for all. Indeed, an 
examination of the consultation responses to the BV green paper revealed grave doubts 
from a variety of quarters about certain aspects of the new policy. In the event, however, 
concerns that the failure to introduce BV would lead to the retention of CCT was 
enough to inspire widespread support for BV and provided the necessary final catalyst 
for the publication of a Local Government Bill and eventual legislation. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter went on to provide an outline of BV policy and 
described the five key elements of it that capture the entire BV process. These were 
identified as comprising performance plan, audit, review, action plan and inspection and 
a summary of their key properties was provided. In then seeking to provide more 
context and substance to BV policy a brief comparison with CCT was conducted. This 
process led to the identification of four particular attributes of BV, which can be seen to 
embody a number of virtues that represent an advance on some of the limitations of 
CCT. Three of these attributes were identified as relating to the means by which local 
authorities are encouraged to create continuous service improvements in local services 
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and comprised 'public involvement', 'flexibility of means' and 'public private 
partnerships'. The fourth attribute of BV was then identified primarily as the BV 
inspection process, which as part of its remit is intended to confirm and reassure the 
public that the continuous improvements demanded of BV are being achieved. Being at 
the root of the claims made for the superiority of BV an examination of the extent to 
which these identified attributes are, in theory, able to be represent an advance on CCT 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
Notes 
1 Moreover, concerns about the deleterious employment impact of CCT were partly ameliorated, 
following the introduction of the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE) regulations 
- designed to protect the rights of employees involved in a legal transfer of business to a new employer 
(Kerr and Radford, 1994). Such regulations also had their limits, however, with evidence of large-scale 
non-compliance by CCT contractors and also of contractors varying conditions of employment of staff 
taken on by agreement (Adnett, Hardy and Painter, 1995; Adnett and Hardy, 1998a and b). Such actions 
subsequently led to union calls for Government action to address problems arising from the existence of a 
two-tier workforce (Unison, 2002). 
2 The 'traditional' concept of quality is also one which raises doubts about whether contract specifications 
are able to capture all of the important and desired features of service delivery. In this latter regard, 
McIntosh and Broderick's (1996) research of refuse collection rounds suggested that a refuse collector's 
task was typically broader and more varied than that captured by contract specifications and included 
such tasks as checking upon the well being of elderly people in their homes. Similarly, Donahue (1989) 
drawing from US evidence of municipal contracting argued that Public sector garbage hauliers might be 
chosen in part for their powers of observation, to double as an early morning security squad or serve as an 
informal local welfare system. 
3 'Regularity' concerns the legality of significant financial transactions, the authority's financial standing 
and its arrangements for preventing and detecting fraud and corruption (Audit Commission, 1999b). 
'Value for money' concerns the auditor's satisfaction that audited bodies have made proper arrangements 
for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in their use of resources (Audit Commission, 1999b). 
4 The entire period of evaluation in terms of its preparation and aftermath lasts much longer than this, 
however, with, for example, inspectors requesting certain authority documentation at least four weeks 
before the inspection visit (Audit Commission, 2000b: 20). 
5 In many respects, the process of 'reality checking' has been created as a means to rectify a number of 
the problems associated with relying on audited documentation as a means of assessing the real 
performance of local services. In doing this, the coverage of the BV inspection process changed from 
being a proposed targeted approach, triggered as a result of auditor's reservations about an authority's 
BV Performance Plan (section 7 (4) e 1999 Local Government Act), to a systematic process entailing 
'inspections of reviews'. 
6 This figure excludes the indirect and largely hidden costs of compliance by regulatees (Hood, James, 
Jones, Scott and Travers, 2000a, b, c). These include, the establishment of internal systems for data 
collection and analysis, the deployment of specialist staff to manage the interface between the inspecting 
and inspected agencies and the restructuring of policies and practices which are consequent upon reports 
and recommendations. 
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Chapter 4 
An examination of the claims and counter claims made for the four 
identified attributes of best value 
The aim of this chapter is to critically examine the claims and counter claims made for 
each of the four attributes of BV outlined in the previous chapter. In doing this, 
attention is first devoted to outlining the claims made for the attribute, and then 
secondly, to highlighting a number of its potential limitations. 
Public involvement 
The main beneficiaries of the BV reforms are supposed to be the taxpayers and users of 
the services being provided. This has been the intention of the policy from its outset, 
with the first of the twelve principles of BV, launched in 1997, stating The duty of B V 
is one that local authorities owe to local people, both as taxpayers and the customers of 
local authority services. Performance plans should support local accountability' (DETR, 
1997b). 
In 1998, the Government further re-affirmed the emphasis on taxpayers and service 
users when it reported: 
'Councils succeed when they put people first. Successful councils' priorities are 
to lead their local communities. They organise and support partnerships to 
develop a visionfor their locality, and to contribute to achieving it. They strive for 
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continuous improvement in the delivery of local sen'ices. They are committed to 
best value. They involve and respond to local people and local interests. Their 
relationship with local businesses and other local organisations is strong and 
effective. There is trust between them and their local people. It is these councils, 
in partnership with Government and others, which are able to make real 
improvements to the quality of people's lives' (DETR 1998a, 1.1). 
This section discusses the merits of the public involvement attribute of BV. It first 
identifies how this particular attribute is claimed to represent an advance over the 
provisions of the former policy of CCT and then draws out a number of its potential 
limitations. 
The claimed virtues of public involvement 
One of the main criticisms that the Labour Party identified with CCT was that it was 
based on a rather narrow concern with cutting costs in the interests of the local taxpayer, 
rather than with enhancing the quality of service provision for the service user (DETR, 
1997b). By, therefore, being based on the assumption that the public were concerned 
only with cost-cutting rather than service expansion (Carter, 1991), the policy of CCT 
was consequently identified, rather negatively, as entailing the completion of a rather 
closed and narrow tendering process which was conducted behind closed doors between 
senior officers, councillors and managers from external organisations. In response to 
this concern, BV contains a consultation element, which comprises three overlapping 
sub-elements. Firstly, it requires local authorities to provide the public with information 
about the standards and performance expected of and reached of local services 
respectively. Secondly, in complementing this, it requires local authorities to allow the 
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public to express their degree of satisfaction with local services. Finally, in building 
upon these first two, it encourages local authorities to more thoroughly engage the 
public in the determination of local service delivery. Each of these alleged virtues of the 
public involvement attribute ofBV is considered in tum below. 
Provide information to the public about the performance of services 
A key facet of the public involvement attribute of BV is the importance it places on 
local authorities providing the public with information about local services (OSPR, 
2002, Watson, 2001; DETR, 1998e). A statutory requirement ofBV in this regard is that 
local authorities send taxpayers a summary BV performance plan leaflet along with the 
council tax bill (Local Government Act, 1999, Section 6). The summary leaflet is 
intended to provide the taxpayer with information about the services the local authority 
secures and the performance targets that the authority has set and a summary of how the 
authority is performing in comparison to other authorities (DETR, 1999). 
At the root of the information provided in the performance plan is data collated from 
performance indicators, which owing to their statutory and standardised properties 
(Cave, Hanney, Kogan and Trevett, 1988), provide the public with the necessary 
information to compare the performance of the services provided by, or on behalf of, 
their council. To begin with, the statutory requirement that local authorities collect and 
publish performance data ensures universal collection and the possibility of comparator 
groups. Secondly, the standardised nature of the indicators ensures the compilation, 
analysis and presentation of numerical data, thereby providing a basis for quantitative-
based performance comparison (Cuenin, 1987). Indeed, such has been the Labour 
Government's confidence in the reliability of its suite of BV performance indicators, 
70 
that it maintains that they enable robust comparisons to be made between the 
performance levels of different authorities, including different types of authorities, and 
within an authority over time (DETR, 2000). 
Usually in discussions of BV, the local government performance indicators are 
differentiated in terms of whether they measure local authorities' overall corporate 
health or a number of specific service categories. The indicators can also be 
differentiated, however, in terms of whether they are 'internal' indicators of 
performance or whether they are 'external' indicators of performance (Kelly and 
Swindell, 2002). Whilst in the majority of cases, the suite ofBV performance indicators 
can be thought of as 'internal' ones, in that they are monitored by administrators and 
directed at providing an objective measure of progress toward a mission, the 
Government has more recently stressed the importance of 'external measures' of 
performance, the data for which derives from user satisfaction surveys (DTLR, 2002). 
Allow users to express satisfaction with local services 
Although user satisfaction surveys are not the only mechanism that local authorities 
might use to gather the views of the public (see below), they are, nonetheless, statutorily 
required and for this reason singled out for special attention. In particular, BV policy 
requires local authorities to conduct regular user satisfaction surveys with a random 
sample of the population, with the first full rounds of surveys taking place in 2003/2004 
(DTLR, 2002). 
In fact, at the time of the research, fifteen out of a pool of 122 BV performance 
indicators involved local authorities' surveying local people's individual satisfaction 
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with services (DTLR, 2002)1. These indicators are displayed in Figure 4.1 and have 
been differentiated into three categories to reflect the scope of satisfaction being 
measured. 
Figure 4.1 
The scope of user satisfaction indicators in BV policy, 2002/03 
1 Satisfaction with universal or non-excludable services 
1. per cent of citizens satisfied with the overall service provided by their authority 
2. per cent of people satisfied with cleanliness standards 
3. per cent of residents who feel fairly safe or very safe after dark/during the day 
whilst outside in the local authority area 
2 Specific user satisfaction 
1. per cent of people satisfied with recycling facilities, household waste collection and 
civic amenity sites 
2. Satisfaction of i) black and minority ethnic and ii) non-black and minority ethnic 
tenants with the overall service provided by their landlord 
3. Satisfaction of tenants of council housing with opportunities for participation in 
management and decision making in relation to housing services provided by their 
landlord 
4. Benefit user satisfaction with accessibility, staffing Issues and 
communications/information 
5. per cent of users satisfied with local provision of public transport information 
6. per cent of users satisfied with local bus services 
7. per cent of planning applicants satisfied with the service received 
8. per cent of library users who found the books/information they wanted or reserved it, 
and were satisfied with the outcome 
9. per cent of residents, by targeted group, satisfied with the local authority's cultural 
and recreational facilities and activities 
10. Users who said they were satisfied with the help they received from social services. 
3 Complainants 
1. per cent of those making complaints satisfied with the handling of those complaints 
2. Users who said that if they asked for changes to services those changes were made. 
Source: DTLR 2002: 107 
The first category contains three indicators which are all related in that they measure 
users' satisfaction within the context of overall service delivery and, furthennore, 
require respondents to consider their satisfaction with universal or non-excludable 
services2. The second category of indicators, in contrast, contains ten indicators which 
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all linked in the sense of comprising more clearly what can be thought of as 'user' 
satisfaction indicators since they relate to specific users of services. These might be 
tenants of social housing, public transport users or social services recipients, for 
example. The final two indicators measure dissatisfaction with local services and this 
may take the form either of users asking for changes to services or in tenns of users 
making complaints. 
Ascertain the public's views about future service delivery. 
Finally, having provided and collected information from the public about the 
performance of local services in the dual form of performance indicators, the third key 
strand to the public involvement of BV is derived from concerns that CCT had excluded 
the public from being engaged in decisions about the delivery of local services. In 
response to this concern the consultation element of BV recognises that taxpayers and 
service users might want to express their voice in relation to the services that they fund 
and use (Martin and Davis, 2001). In particular, the consultation element ofBV requires 
local authorities to ascertain from taxpayers and service users whether there is a need 
for all of the local services provided for them and, if so, at what level each service 
should be provided (Local Government Act, 1999). These questions draw upon the 
'challenge' element of BV and are intended to encourage local authorities to both 
improve the economy and effectiveness of their services, by reducing expenditure on 
unwanted/unnecessary services, and focusing more directly on the most important 
aspects of them. The expectation of such public consultation is, therefore, that it will 
enable local authorities to select the optimum level of service provision. 
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There are a large number of consultation techniques available to local authorities to 
gather the views of the public, though with the exception of the processes involved in 
gathering and compiling data from perfonnance/user satisfaction indicators, none are 
statutorily required. Local authorities can, therefore, freely engage with the public in a 
variety of ways, spanning from the fairly passive deployment of surveys and suggestion 
cards to the more active techniques of public meetings or even neighbourhood forums. 
Potential problems with public involvement 
Having, therefore, provided an overview of the composition and claimed virtues of the 
public involvement attribute of BV, this sub-section is devoted to outlining a number of 
potential problem areas associated with its operation. These problems are highlighted 
through an exploration of the following three themes, 'the reconciliation of divergent 
interests,' 'the accuracy of internal and external perfonnance indicators' and 'the 
authenticity of public involvement'. 
Reconciliation of dh'ergent interests 
The first key potential difficulty that can be identified with the public involvement 
element of BV relates to the function that it is intended to play in tenns of collecting the 
public's views preferences about future service delivery and using these preferences to 
achie\'e gains in economy and efficiency. The particular problem here is that it assumes 
that a consensus can be reached between different members of the public in relation to 
the allocation of local resources (Curtis, 2002: Bo) ne 2003: Boschken, 1994). In other 
words, there is a presumption that the responses gained from different members of the 
public, via the consultation element of BY, will be sufficiently consistent with one 
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another for local authorities to determine the desired level of service optimality. In 
practice, however, different members of the public are likely to have different interests 
and priorities, thus making it difficult for local authorities to decide how to ration finite 
resources between them. As Martin (1998) suggests, decisions about the weighting of 
competing notions of 'value' are potentially contentious because different groups will 
see different criteria as being of prime importance. It might, therefore, actually be rather 
difficult for a local authority to satisfy all those consulted, with some members of the 
public calling for increased service coverage and others less. 
One key potential source of conflict, in this regard, is that between the taxpayer and 
specific service users, with the former reluctant to see resources devoted to services that 
they do not believe should be publicly provided. This problem stems largely from the 
fact that the users of public services are not, in fact, customers in the normal manner in 
which the term 'customers' is understood: that is an individual who makes choices 
based on a willingness to pay in a discretionary and non-rationed environment. 
Consequently, once the reality of the rationed nature of public services is acknowledged, 
the potential for conflict between different taxpayers and service users becomes all too 
obvious (Roper, Higgins and James, 2005). 
Moreover, problems relating to the reconciliation of taxpayers and service users might 
be further exacerbated when staff and external contractors are also asked their views 
about the optimum level of service provision. In the first instance, what users want may 
well necessitate changes in service delivery that are perceived by workers to have 
undesirable consequences for them, and hence may have the potential to generate a 
clash between user and staff interests (Dibben and Higgins, 2004). In the second 
instance, the emphasis on involving external contractors in the determination of local 
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servIce delivery could entail the public having their demands tempered by the 
commercial interests of the private sector provider (Roper, Higgins and James, 2005). 
This is particularly so given that one obvious consultation question that is not present 
within BV guidance is whether the public has a preference in terms of the actual service 
provider. 
It is nonetheless, noticeable that the policy guidance in relation to how staff and external 
contractors are to be embraced by BV has entailed differential treatment. In particular, 
the involvement of the latter has been viewed largely as consistent and beneficial to the 
public - hence the initial quote emphasising the positive relationship between 
community involvement and partnership with external contractors - and the involvement 
of the former has been viewed largely as problematic to the pUblic. 
Thus, in this latter regard, the Labour Government's stance has, despite the broader 
emphasis on workplace partnership (Richardson, Tailby, Danford, Stewart and 
Upchurch, 2005), been simply to demand that the services local authorities secure are 
those that 'the citizen or customer wants and not what the provider can most easily 
deliver' (DETR, 1999). In doing this, the government has chosen to downplay the role 
of professional groups as the impartial promoters of the public good (Loughlin in 
Gilliatt, Fenwick and Alford, 2000). 
In contrast, in terms of involving external contractors, BV policy guidance has been 
rather more positive in tone, with local authorities being encouraged to draw upon 
external expertise and capacity in terms of how services might be packaged and how 
they might add value or meet different levels of service output (DETR, 1999). In 
particular, local authorities have been encouraged to ascertain whether larger or smaller 
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grouped services would generate more interest from external contractors and to request 
external contractors to bid for alternative levels of service as well as for a specified level 
of service (DETR, 1999). 
The asking of these questions has been promoted on the basis that they ultimately 
provide the public with greater choice in tenns of the availability of increased external 
expertise and the availability of alternative providers (Corrigan, 1997). Though, as 
Elcock (1996) reminds, a consumer or customer - in contrast to a citizen - has only the 
liberty to accept or reject the services on offer by alternative suppliers but does not 
participate in decisions regarding their provision. In practice, therefore, the process of 
asking external contractors to state and bid for their optimum level of service provision 
might conflict with the needs and wants of the public, in tenns of the specifics of the 
service being provided. 
The accuracy of internal and external performance indicators 
A second potential problem with the public involvement element of BV relates to 
doubts about the accuracy, and ultimately usefulness, of the infonnation provided and 
collected via the use of perfonnance and user satisfaction indicators respectively. This 
concern relates, in tum, to doubts about the validity and compatibility of the two sets of 
measures. Indeed, despite the broad claims made for perfonnance/user satisfaction 
indicators, the increasingly vast amount of literature on them is largely illustrative of the 
longstanding problems that exist with them (Neely, 1998). 
One of the reasons why the accurate measurement of user satisfaction has shown itself 
to be a problematic process relates to the construct validity of the concept of 
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'satisfaction' in tenns of the extent to which it measures what it is supposed to measure 
(Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003; Townsend, 2000). In particular, studies ha\'e 
shown that the extent to which users are able to accurately and objectively assess their 
satisfaction depends on the nature of the service for which they are being requested to 
make a judgement (Kelly and Swindell, 2002). In some professional services, for 
example, users may not have the infonnation or knowledge at their disposal to properly 
evaluate whether a satisfactory job has been undertaken (Miller and Miller, 1991). On 
other occasions, the judgements may depend on highly subjective and emotional issues 
with responses not, therefore, wholly reflecting the questions being asked. A recipient's 
satisfaction with the planning application service may, for example, be influenced by 
whether an applicant was successful, rather than on the basis of the actual quality of 
service received (Boyne, 1996b and 1997). 
The level of reported satisfaction might further be influenced by whether one has 
sympathy for the organisation's mission and whether one thinks what the agency is 
doing is good for society (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2003). Equally, respondents 
might feel that a negative response would reflect badly on a service they use and, as a 
result, could lead to a cut in services (Harris, Westerby, Hill, Sellers, and Hutchinson, 
2001), though the opposite is equally true, and a negative response might be perceived 
as increasing the likelihood of a desired service gaining more resources. Responses to 
satisfaction surveys may also reflect a 'courtesy bias', where service users tell the 
provider what they want to hear (Harris, Westerby, Hill, Sellers, and Hutchinson, 2001). 
Finally, it might just be plain difficult for a respondent to accurately know the 
boundaries of their local authority'S jurisdiction, with the result that the satisfaction 
levels expressed relate to a neighbouring authority'S perfonnance or an aspect of a 
service for which the local authority is not responsible (Carter, Day and Klein, 1992). 
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A further set of problems relates to the fact that satisfaction levels are a function of the 
interrelationship between what users expect from services and their perceptions of 
services delivered (Reisig and Chandek 2001; Donnelly and Shiu 1999). Thus, without 
evidence of the relative importance and expectations of various aspects of service, 
misleading conclusions could be reached about where future service priorities, and 
ultimately resources, should be directed (Wisniewski 2001). Alternatively, if asked to 
express their satisfaction about an aspect of service delivery, with which they have little 
or no direct interest in, a user may reply rather disinterestedly. Depending on precisely 
who is asked and for what reason, therefore, different levels of satisfaction might be 
reported, with the exclusion of non-users, by definition, failing to capture such issues as 
access or service quality. Finally, it has been suggested that because user satisfaction 
survey results are usually reported in tenns of mean averages this serves to obscure 
differences in satisfaction levels between certain types of individuals (Townsend, 2000) 
and across different geographical areas (Kelly and Swindell, 2002). One negative 
consequence of this is that particularly localised problems with service quality might go 
unnoticed within the overall picture. In all of these cases, therefore, there are reasons to 
doubt that the level of reported user satisfaction reflects accurately the actual quality of 
the service received. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the infonnation collected from internal indicators 
of perfonnance is necessarily going to be any more accurate. One of the key problems 
here is that the suite of BY perfonnance indicators has not been introduced merely to 
provide local authorities with feedback infonnation on the perfonnance of their services 
but to contribute to a performance comparison agenda, which is replete with the threat 
of remedial actions (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). This has the potential to create 
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incentives for local authorities to focus upon aspects of performance measured rather 
than the overall performance of the organisation concerned (Wrigley, 2003; Boyne, 
2000b, Bache, 2003), otherwise known as 'tunnel vision' (Smith, 1993, 1995) or 
'parochialism' (Jacobs and Manzi, 2000). One danger of this is that things that can be 
measured easily come to be regarded as more important than the things that cannot be 
measured, even if the latter are of considerable significance and importance to the 
public. 
The emphasis on performance comparison might also create perverse incentives for 
local authorities to manipulate their data in order to present their performance in a better 
light (de Bruijn 2002; Grizzle, 2002; Hatry, 2002). Thus, Wiliam (2001) has drawn 
attention to the risk that if you make a particular performance indicator a policy target 
and make the stakes high enough, then the people at the sharp end will do everything 
they can to improve their score, including manipulation and game-playing. In fact, there 
are numerous examples of how local authorities have manipulated or game-played the 
collection, analysis and publication of performance indicators (Boyne 1997, Boyne, 
2002a; Rubenstein, Schwartz and Steifel, 2003). Such examples tend to be based around 
the selective interpretation of the definitions of 'performance' employed and such 
expressions as 'telephones answered', 'completed claim', and, as suggested above, even 
'satisfaction expressed'. 
Finally, the problems of data manipulation and validity are further clouded by 
irregularities in the consistency and reliability of performance indicators (Boyne 1997, 
Plewis, 1998). In the first instance, evidence suggests that different local authorities 
collect perfonnance data using different procedures (Boyne 1997; Rose and Lawton, 
1999). In the second instance, the types and definitions of centrally required 
80 
performance indicators have themselves been subject to change and flux (DETR, 2000, 
DTLR, 2001a~ 2002). This, in tum, has served to raise doubts about their reliability as a 
measure of trends in performance. All of these difficulties are, therefore, likely to make 
the public rather suspicious of local authorities' published claims. 
Indeed, given the widespread doubts about the validity of both performance indicators 
and user satisfaction indicators it seems unlikely that the information they provide will 
be compatible with one another (Poister and Henry, 1994; Poister and Streib, 1999). If 
proven, this incompatibility raises doubts about the usefulness of the data provided, 
particularly when the formal information given to them about service performance does 
not register with their real-life experience of the service. 
The authenticity of public involvement 
The third area of concern with the emphasis on public involvement relates to the more 
general observation that it is expressed in the language of the individualised customer 
and consumer rather than the collectively informed citizen (Sorensen 1997, Hirschman, 
1970; Stewart, 1996a; Ranson and Stewart, 1994). One implication of this use of the 
customer analogy for local service delivery is that it can potentially act to shift 
expectations away from collective, citizen-based, concerns based upon the choices 
offered in manifestos, which are supported by the accountability of elected politicians, 
towards individualised concerns about delivery, which are underlay by a notion of 
managerial accountability (Roper, Higgins and James, 2005). 
To illustrate this, one need only consider the elements of the public involvement 
element of BY that are statutorily required - performance indicators and user 
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satisfaction surveys. Both can be viewed as rather superficial processes (Arnstein, 1969; 
King, Feltey and O'Neill, 1998; Hirst, 1996; Halvorsen, 2003) which embody a tightly 
controlled, top-down method of public involvement, with politicians and administrators, 
rather than the public, being the key determinants of the indicator/satisfaction 
definitions (Sanderson, 1998, 2001). Consequently, the information provided to, or 
requested from, the public might not reflect aspects of service performance that matter 
most to the public or allow them to engage in discussions about service delivery in a 
more meaningful way (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Goss, 1999; Cook, 2002; Rowe 
and Shepherd, 2002). A member of the public may, for example, hold a holistic 
conception of quality, which extends far beyond the standardised notions of quality as 
provided in performance indicators and other documentation (Broderick and McIntosh, 
1996) and this may partly explain the lack of public interest in the performance data 
published by local authorities (Humphrey, 2002; Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law and 
Walker,2002b). 
Finally, the limited depth of engagement inspired by the public involvement attribute of 
BV can be demonstrated by reference to Figure 4.2. This shows how the process of 
providing the public with information about the performance of local services and the 
process of collecting information from the public about their satisfaction with local 
services can be contrasted with more interactive two-way processes of public 
involvement, such as a public meeting or a discussion group (Adams, 2004), which one 
would expect to provide more opportunity for debate and argument3• 
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Figure 4.2 
Conceptualisations of public involvement 
1) One-way passive- A one directional fonn of involvement which entails the local 
authority providing the public with such infonnation as newsletters or infonnation 
sheets 
2) Two-way passive - A non-participation method, which involves the public 
organisation seeking infonnation from the recipient via surveys or suggestion cards. 
3) Two-way active - Involves a dialogue or discussion between public authority 
personnel and service recipients in the fonn of, for example, public meetings or user 
groups. 
4) Participatory, power sharing - Involves the delegation of powers, responsibilities 
from public organisation to local people in the fonn of, for example, Neighbourhood 
forums. 
Source: Arnstein, 1969; Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994 and Gyford, 1994 
In particular, the collection of centrally defined user satisfaction data provides no direct 
mechanism to investigate why people are satisfied - or not - with local services nor does 
it facilitate the examination of the precise criteria users are employing to evaluate their 
satisfaction (Edwards, 1998; McKevitt and Lawton, 1996). Rather, the surveyed 
respondent is requested to detail their level of satisfaction according to a predefined 
survey which means that the infonnation obtained from it might be of dubious value in 
helping identify where perfonnance improvement is most needed (Wisniewski, 2001). 
In summary, therefore, although the emphasis on involving the public can be seen to 
represent an advance on CCT by ensuring that what local authorities provide is what the 
public actually require, this attribute does not provide a means of reconciling between 
different interests. Neither does it facilitate a particularly extensive fonn of public 
involvement but instead embraces a rather superficial process of infonnation giving and 
collection. Moreover, even within the confines of these limitations, the section has 
identified a number of reasons to doubt the validity and compatibility of infonnation 
collected from both user satisfaction surveys and perfonnance indicators. 
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Flexibility of means 
The second attribute of BV identified in the previous chapter is to be found chiefly in 
the competition element of BV and the provision it makes for local authorities to 
complete their BV review processes with a degree of 'freedom and flexibility' absent 
from CCT. This particular attribute can be seen to ascribe to the BV notion that 
provided local authorities 'perform' it matters not how they have managed to do so. 
This section conducts a critical examination of the 'flexibility of means' dimension of 
BV. It first identifies how the flexibility of means attribute is claimed to represent an 
advance over the former tendering mechanism of CCT and then details a number of its 
potential limitations. 
The claimed virtues of flexibility of means 
One of the criticisms the Labour Party made of CCT was that it was focused on the 
rather narrow and singular tendering process local authorities were obliged to employ 
when selecting contractors. As the Government maintained: 
'Real competition is not delivered through the imposition of rules, which invite 
avoidance rather than ownership. CCT made the costs of services more 
transparent. But its detailed prescription of the form and timing of competition 
led to unimaginative tendering, and often frustrated rather than enhanced real 
competition' (DETR, 1998b 7.22). 
In particular, the logic of the competition maximisation model underpinning CCT 
(Abbott, Blackburn, Curran, 1996) required local authorities to do their utmost to 
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remove barriers to entry and, to this end, prohibited them from merging any of the 
defined activities into combined contracts before exposing them to competition. The 
result of this requirement, however, was that that the cost savings achieved on some of 
the smaller contracts exposed to CCT were marginal and in some cases even led to cost 
increases (Austin Mayfield, 1997). Moreover, when considered in the context of the BY 
objective of continuous service improvement, the cost-orientated emphasis of CCT was 
not seen to provide local authorities with sufficient scope to improve the quality of local 
services and was, therefore, considered to be leading to poor service outcomes. 
One of the ways in which BV responds to these criticisms is by providing local 
authorities with the freedom to combine and package services in ways previously 
prohibited under CCT and, furthermore, to not demand that they are subjected to 
competition. Thus, whereas under CCT each of the defined activities had to be prepared 
for separately, under BY local authorities can review combinations of activities and, in 
doing so, seek to remove overlapping functions between them and thus reduce costs. 
This might involve, for example, the creation of contracts that combine more than one 
activity or which encompass elements of different services so that they reflect thematic 
aspirations of the local authority. Local authorities are also encouraged to experiment 
with different contractual lengths so that the costs of re-tendering, if used, do not 
outweigh the potential savings to be made. 
Another more direct way in which BY provides local authorities with more flexible 
means relates to the tendering criteria that they are able to use to select contractors. Here, 
far more emphasis has been placed on increasing the quality component of the contract 
specification. In this way, it can also be anticipated that external contractors will express 
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a greater interest in providing the services secured by local authorities, on the basis that 
there is now more scope for them to add value. 
In all of these ways, therefore, the policy of BV has been shrouded in a language that 
stresses its 'ends-driven' nature, with councils free to decide how they deliver 
continuous service improvement (DETR, 1997b). Thus, two of the twelve principles of 
BVare: 
'There is no presumption that services must be privatised, and once the regime 
is in place there will be no compulsion for councils to put services out to 
tender, but there is no reason why services should be delivered directly if other 
more efficient means are available. What matters is what works '. 
'Competition will continue as an important management tool, a test of BV and 
an important feature in performance plans. But it will not be the only 
management tool and is not in itself enough to demonstrate that B V is being 
achieved'. 
In publishing these two principles, the Government's stance could, therefore, be seen to 
have derived from a qualified critique of CCT, which was consistent with the use of 
competition as one tool amongst many, but a rejection of it as a master principle. In 
particular, the underlying notion of this aspect of BV was that, provided local 
authorities could continuously improve local services, it did not matter whether they 
were provided internally or externally. 
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Potential problems with flexibility of means 
Having outlined a number of the assumed benefits of the 'flexibility of means' 
dimension of BV, this sub-section considers two barriers that might serve to limit their 
achievement in practice. These barriers relate to doubts about the 'degree of discretion 
available to local authorities' and 'the resource limitations of BV contracting'. Both of 
these issues are considered in turn below. 
Degree of discretion available 
In spite of the apparent freedom that BV promised to offer local authorities in tenus of 
their tendering priorities, the Government's stance on the means dimensions of the 
policy has become increasingly dictatorial. Thus, in contrast to the policy 
documentation used to describe the proposals for BV during its development, the first 
piece of BV guidance documentation (DETR, 1999: 12) explained that fair and open' 
competition would be 'expected to play an essential enduring role in ensuring BV ... 
[and} ... that the future for public service provision is one where there is real variety in 
the way services are delivered and genuine plurality among service providers '. 
The same guidance document then moved on to detail seven options for future service 
delivery that local authorities should consider when conducting BV reviews. As 
demonstrated in Figure 4.3, these reveal that, aside from the decision to cease service 
provision entirely, four of the six remaining options emphasise some form of external 
contractor involvement in the delivery of local services, ranging from the outright 
'externalisation of the service' to the 'creation of a public-private partnership.' The 
other two remaining options for future service delivery, meanwhile, comprise 'market 
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testing' and 'the restructuring of in-house service delivery'. The fonner, as Bovaird 
(2000a) notes, does not constitute an 'option' for service delivery in its own right but 
relates, rather more, to the process of contractor selection. 
Figure 4.3 
Best value options for future service delivery 
1. the cessation of the service, in whole or in part 
2. the creation of a public-private partnership, such as a joint venture company 
3. the transfer or externalisation of the service (with no in-house bid) 
4. the re-negotiation of existing arrangements with current providers where this is 
pennissible 
5. the joint commissioning or delivery of the service 
6. the market-testing of all or part of the service 
7. the restructuring or repositioning of the in-house service 
Source: DETR, 1999:15-16 
What this guidance means, therefore, is that 'in-house restructuring' is the only option, 
of seven, which allows local authorities to continue to deliver services directly. 
Moreover, even this option is not without its significant challenges because, in order to 
restructure in-house services, BY demands that the authority demonstrates that it is the 
'best' provider. In tum, this requires the authority to demonstrate 'competitiveness' 
(Bovaird, 1998, 2000a, b; Mullins, 2002) or, in other words, its ability to achieve 
continuous service improvement. Although this requirement seems to be consistent with 
the more general 'continuous service improvement' overtones of the policy, it might 
actually prove to be rather difficult to demonstrate given that the most popular method 
of competitiveness adopted by local authorities, certainly during the pilot phase, was 
benchmarking (Improvement and Development Agency, 1999; Bowennan and Ball, 
2000), a technique which, as the following quote suggests, fell short of the 
Government's desired aspirations for 'competitiveness': 
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'Where benchmarking or non-competitive methods are proposed rather than 
open competition, then authorities should indicate how they intend to mirror 
the rigour and transparency which competition can bring under favourable 
market circumstances' (DETR, 1997c). 
This was a surprising line of policy to take, however, given that one of the stated claims 
of benchmarking is that it is a technique which allows an organisation to identify where 
and how it can do better (Wisniewski 2001; Karkatsoulis, 2000; Halachmi and 
Montgomery, 2000). The problem with the way in which competitiveness is defined in 
BV, therefore, is that competitive tendering/external service provision is in most cases 
viewed as the 'gold standard,' the clearest possible demonstration of 'competitiveness' 
(Entwistle, Martin, Enticott, 2002). This stance can clearly be identified within the 
Government's own interpretation of in-house restructuring: 
'The guidance will emphasise that retaining work in-house without subjecting 
it to real competitive pressure can rarely be justified. Should an authority 
exercise that choice and the service fail to provide best value, continuing in-
house provision would not be sustainable' (DETR 1998: 7.29). 
Very much as the case of CCT before it, therefore, there is still a strong expectation that 
local authorities will engage in competitive tendering, particularly when seeking to 
provide former CCT activities - for which demonstrable markets already exist - directly. 
For other, previously unexposed services, meanwhile, the policy ofBV encourages local 
authorities to 'make' markets (DETR, 1999): 
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'Where the current market is demonstrably weak or poorly developed, and 
there is no credible alternative to in-house delivery, the authority should 
nevertheless consider steps to create the conditions in which new suppliers 
might take root - the objective being not to favour one supplier against 
another but to encourage diversity and innovation '. 
Indeed, Rikowski (2002) argues that the nature of the Government's guidance on BV 
competition is such that it provides an explicit vehicle to advance the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATS) agenda to liberalise local government services. 
In particular, by capturing all local government services and encouraging the 'making of 
markets', Rikowski takes the view that BV has made it possible for any local 
government service to be supplied in competition with other service suppliers thereby 
ensuring that they fall within the category of services subject to the liberalisation 
agenda. That is services supplied on a commercial basis, in competition with one or 
more service suppliers (World Trade Organisation, 2001, in Rikowski, 2002). 
In summary, therefore, while competition is not compulsorily required under BV, it 
seems likely that the Audit Commission, in ensuring conformance to the BV legislation 
and guidance, is likely to exert some disciplining effect on local authorities to embrace 
the competition element of BV more strongly than may have been desired by some of 
them. At the same time, Geddes and Martin, (2000: 388) also argue that the prevalence 
of numerous methods to involve external contractors in the delivery of local services, 
means that the apparent flexibility in BV has consequently made it more difficult for 
councils to oppose external contractors in local service delivery, 'even though the end 
result may well be the same '. 
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Resource limitations of BV contracting 
The second way in which BV policy claims to provide local authorities with more 
flexible means relates to the tendering criteria they are able to use during their selection 
of contractors. Here, far more emphasis has been placed on increasing the quality 
component of the contract specification in order to address concerns that the cost-
orientated emphasis of CCT had deteriorated service quality and was, therefore, leading 
to poor service outcomes. 
Although this opportunity can be viewed as part of a worthy attempt to raise quality, 
especially following the financial constraints imposed by the tendering criteria under 
CCT, such improvement is likely to demand increased resources and will, therefore, be 
limited to what is financially and politically tenable. The increased allocation of 
resources to local services might also exert additional pressures on local authorities to 
engage with external contractors, both as a source of investment, and as a means to 
evade accusations that, following the discipline exerted by CCT, local authorities are 
not prone to waste and bureaucracy. Indeed, the freedom that local authorities have been 
provided with to increase the level of resources devoted to local services, where 
necessary, also addresses one of the key concerns of private contractors, namely that 
CCT did not offer much in the way of value added (BMRB, 1995, 1996). In return for 
being given greater discretion, therefore, local authorities are also expected to act 
responsibly and in such a way that involves them creating their own variant of the 
strategic 'enabling' role (Leach and Davis, 1996; Wilson, 1998). In other words, the 
opportunities created for local authorities by BV policy should also be fully open to 
external contractors. 
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This section has explained that in addition to providing local authorities with the 
opportunity to provide services directly, the 'flexibility of means' championed by BV 
also increases the number of avenues through which external contractors can be utilised 
to deliver local services. Precisely how local authorities strike a balance between 
internal and external provision and the freedom with which they are able to do so is, 
therefore, likely to depend partly on how they perform and whether they can 
demonstrate competitiveness. The section also explained that despite the worthy attempt 
to allow local authorities to raise the quality of local services, such opportunity is likely 
to demand increased resource allocation, which will obviously be limited to what is 
politically and financially viable. As a result only modest, rather than widespread, 
improvements might be achieved by this particular attribute of the policy, with 
increased pressures placed on councils to share them between direct providers and 
contractors alike. 
Public-private partnership 
The third attribute of BY identified in the prevIOUS chapter draws chiefly on the 
competition and challenge elements of the review process in terms of the emphasis the 
policy gives to the development of 'public-private partnerships'. This section examines 
the claims made for this particular attribute of BY and, as before, first identifies how 
public-private partnerships can be seen to represent an advance over the contractual 
relationships created under CCT before moving on to identifying a number of potential 
limitations. 
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The claimed virtues of public private partnerships 
The emphasis Labour has placed on the creation of public-private partnerships in BV 
stems in many respects from concerns that CCT, and the processes of regular 
competition and enforced tendering therein, often resulted in a general hostility between 
the parties and did not always lead to the creation of effective contractual relationships 
(Stewart, 1993, 1996b). Thus, as the BY consultation paper (1997b: 2) clearly explained: 
'Compulsion has also bred antagonism, so that neither local authorities nor 
private sector suppliers have been able to realise the benefits that flow from a 
healthy partnership '. 
The process of competition under CCT was also singled out for involving heavy 
preparation, transaction and monitoring costs and this was in part seen to be a function 
of the lack of trust that existed between those responsible for creating CCT contracts -
local authority personnel - and those encouraged to bid for them - external contractors. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that private sector contractors expressed the hope that 
the tortuous process of contract specification embodied in CCT, along with the mistrust 
it implied, would be replaced by a more collaborative approach towards their 
involvement in local government service provision (BMRB, 1995). 
In response, to these concerns, the Government emphasised the importance of an 
approach based on 'partnership' and the fostering of positive-sum, trust-based, 
relationships between authorities and external contractors (Geddes, 1998; Coulson. 
1998). In doing this, it encouraged a shift in contractual tenus away from 'arms length' 
contractual arrangements towards 'obligational contractual' ones (Sako, 1992) or 
equally a shift from the use of classical contracts to the use of relational ones (Lyons 
and Mehta, 1997). These types of contracting regimes are defined as being long-term, 
less formal and more trusting (Davis and Walker, 1999), with a strengthened focus on 
shared achievements amongst partnering organisations, rather than the traditional and 
problematic blame culture (Baggott, 2004). 
Moreover, in fostering such partnerships, the Government anticipates that the nature of 
the contracts created under the remit of BV will have far fewer detailed contract 
specifications and less rigorous monitoring procedures than was the case under CCT 
and that this will foster the creation, and associated benefits, of a closer working 
relationship between the two parties. In particular, by refusing to make reference to 
formal agreements, as a means of dealing with disputes the partnership nature of 
working favoured in BV heralds the existence of trust between parties - a trust primarily 
built upon a shared commitment to common values, familiarity and the exchange of 
information and personnel between the parties (McQuaid, 2000). This view, therefore, 
resonates with that of the Institute for Public Policy Research (2001: 40) which 
suggested that public-private partnerships can be likened to a 'risk sharing relationship 
between the public and private sectors based upon a shared aspiration to bring about a 
desired public policy outcome '. 
Finally, the Labour Government argues that public-private partnerships also allow local 
authorities to embrace a variety of expertise that does not reside internally (DETR, 
1998a: 4.l8): 
'To the extent that authorities are successful through the review process in 
attracting interest in alternative ways of prm'iding services, they rna}' conclude 
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that there are advantages in providing a service on a partnership basis _ 
through, for example, a joint venture company. The Government is keen to 
encourage such partnerships. They can bring additional private sector 
resources to areas where they are needed, and enable local authorities to plan 
ahead with more confidence '. 
In this last sense, therefore, the utilisation of private contractors in a collaborative way 
can be seen to deliver benefits, or to add value, in such a way that could not have been 
achieved with the local authority working on its own (Huxham, 1996). 
Potential problems with public-private partnerships 
Having provided an outline of the potential virtues to be had from the creation of 
public-private partnerships, this sub-section draws upon the increasing range of 
literature which has served to cast doubt on these claims. Three specific doubts are 
singled out for specific attention here and these relate to concerns with the 'feasibility of 
the desired partnership relationships', the 'potential loss of local authority control' and 
'doubts about the compatibility of public-private partnerships with the other elements of 
BV'. 
Feasibility of the desired partnership relationships 
The first part of this section explained that the characteristics associated with successful 
partnership working include a less formal and more trusting working environment 
where each party has much to gain from working together. Drawing upon the work of 
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Sako (1992), Figure 4.4 exemplifies these attributes by making a distinction between 
arms-length contractual relationships and obligational contractual relationships. It can 
be seen that the features associated with the creation of obligational contractual 
relationships, reflect the aspirations of partnership working, and include a high 
dependence on the other party, a long-term commitment by both parties, the creation of 
loose performance measures, a sharing of risk and multiple channels of communication. 
Figure 4.4 
A I th d bl" I I I . rms- eng1 an 0 IgatlOna contractu a re atIonships 
Arms-length contractual relation Obligational contractual relation 
Low dependence on the other party, High dependence on the other party, 
trading with a large number of partners trading with a small number of partners 
Short-term commitment by both parties, Long-term commitment by both parties, 
specified duration of contract assumption that relations will continue 
Terms and conditions of contract written, Terms and conditions of contract may be 
detailed and specific oral rather than written, loosely specified 
Detailed performance measures laid down Loose performance measures identified 
and monitored, reference to contract if and, whilst monitored, problems resolved 
there are problems by discussion 
Narrow communication channels between Extensive, multiple channels at a variety 
partners. Little contact and no socialising of levels in both organisations. Frequent 
contact and some socialising 
Little sharing of risk between partners, Much sharing of risk, joint initiatives, 
variations in price spelt out and adhered to variations in price dealt with by discussion 
with reference to fairness 
Source: Sako, 1992 
While the literature on CCT has provided numerous examples of what has been 
described as anns-Iength contractual relations between local authorities and external 
contractors (Foster and Scott, 1998b~ Painter, 1990), there does not appear to be the 
requisite evidence to suggest that the environment has changed sufficiently to invoke a 
shift towards the creation of the factors associated with obligational contractual 
relationships. Consequently, it is questionable whether the desired partnership 
relationships identified by Sako (1992) will emerge in the BY context. 
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Taking the issue of risk sharing and joint initiatives, for example, one problem with the 
general advocation of public-private partnerships is that it is situated in a context where 
the potential benefits are invariably illustrated by reference to examples where both 
partner organisations are in the private sector. Yet, the validity of drawing this 
comparison for public-private partnerships is open to challenge. In the private sector, 
collaborative partnerships are conventionally explained through some form of 'synergy' 
existing between organisations whose individual competencies complement each other. 
This is usually a vertical (buyer-supplier) relationship that enables each organisation to 
be able to specialise in its own area and, as a result, be able to offer an enhanced product 
or service. However, this scenario is unlikely to be a good indicator for the outcomes of 
a public-private collaboration because the success of such collaboration - commercial 
success for both organisations - is not available. 
Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott (2002) note, for example, that the straightforward 
indicator of profit for the private sector does not exist for public organisations. There 
are, therefore, no objective criteria available to judge success on equitable terms for 
each party, with differences in organisational goals further leading public and private 
sector to pull in different directions. Indeed, despite the emphasis on 'partnership,' the 
parties still remain distinct, without integration of ownership, so that antagonistic 
interests remain in place as with any other market transaction (Collins, 1997). 
Secondly, in tenns of gaining the long-term commitment of each party, the institutional 
factors that detennine the context in which public-private partnerships can function 
must be taken into consideration as this, in itself, will be a key determinant of success or 
failure (Grimshaw, Marchington, Ruberry and Wilmott, 2005). The institutional factors 
that have governed the introduction of public-private partnerships in the BV context 
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have tended to derive from central government to the possible exclusion of the 
necessary commitment of one of the key parties implicated, local government. 
Consequently, the suggestion of a forced introduction of public-private partnerships 
(Balloch and Taylor, 2001) might simply reproduce the large degree of mistrust 
between local and central government that existed under CCT and this would hardly be 
conducive to the positive-sum contractual relationships emphasised in obligational 
contractual relationships. 
Indeed, evidence that local authorities are not yet ready to embrace the Government's 
general advocation of public-private partnerships voluntarily can be gathered from the 
research findings which suggest that senior managers and elected representatives from 
local authorities believe that public-private partnerships are, in part, directed towards 
the achievement of certain ideological ends - the increased involvement of external 
contractors in the delivery of local services 4. Thus, for example, two-thirds of 
respondents to a survey of almost 3000 senior elected members and officers from more 
than 300 local authorities in England believed that the BV regime would lead to more 
externalisation (Enticott, Walker, Boyne, Martin and Ashworth, 2002). Similarly, the 
formal evaluation of the pilot programme found that: 
'There was a growing concern among front-line staff and trade union 
representation who we interviewed that central government expected B V to 
lead to Widespread outsourcing of services and the term 'partnership' is 
frequently identified as a euphemism for externalisation' (Martin, Davis, 
Bovaird, Downe, Geddes, Hartley, Lewis, Sanderson, Sapwell, 2001: 13). 
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The same research also found that only thirteen per cent of respondents believed that 
'partnership' had been a vital component of their pilot initiatives (Martin, Davis, 
Bovaird, Downe, Geddes, Hartley, Lewis, Sanderson, Sapwell, 2001). The authors of 
the survey, on the basis of their findings, went on to conclude that: 
'Many (pilots) focused on partnership working between local authorities and 
other public sector organisations. Partnerships involving organisations from 
other sectors often proved more difficult to develop. Voluntary agencies and 
business sometimes saw themselves as potentially being in competition with 
each other and in-house services and in some cases this H'as an obstacle to 
collaboration' (Martin, Davis, Bovaird, Downe, Geddes, Hartley, Lewis, 
Sanderson, Sapwell, 2001: 10). 
In all of these ways, therefore, it does not appear to be the case that local authorities 
have warmly embraced the principle of pUblic-private partnership, thus signalling a far 
from committed stance on their part. Indeed, the most striking example of how the 
necessary conditions for a long-term commitment to partnership working might not 
emanate from local government derived from Prime Minister Blair (1998) who, in 
recognition of the reluctance on the part of local government to engage in partnerships 
voluntarily, issued the following warning to local government: 
' .. . people 's needs require you [local government} to change again so that you 
can play your part in helping to modernise Britain, and in partnership H'ith 
others, deliver the policies on which government was elected. If you accept this 
challenge, you will not find us wanting. You can look forvvard to an enhanced 
role and new pOH'crs. Your contribution will be recognised: your status 
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enhanced. If you are unwilling or unable to work to the modern agenda then 
the government will have to look to other partners to take on your role '. 
It is, however, not only the forced introduction of partnerships that might create 
impediments to the smooth creation of obligational contractual relationships but also the 
fact that the surrounding institutional framework, in the form of BV policy, also 
contains within it a demanding performance management framework. For the existence 
of this framework, with national standards of performance and continuing improvement 
aspirations, is likely to render the creation of 'loose performance measures', as a 
necessary condition for obligational contracting, somewhat problematic. Local 
authorities, it can be reasonably assumed, would be keen to ensure that their partner 
achieved the policy objectives of BV and this would include them being required to 
attain centrally defined upper quartile performance targets. 
Potential loss of local authority control 
A second concern with the emphasis on public-private partnerships in BV is that it is 
likely to raise difficulties in terms of the ability of the authority to control the contractor 
and by implication to ensure the delivery of local services in the public interest. A 
useful model that can be used to illustrate this concern is Deakin, Smith, Thomas and 
Walsh's (1997) continuum from 'employment contract and pure hierarchy to spot 
contracting' (see Figure 4.5). This continuum suggests that, prior to the introduction of 
CCT, local government services operated within a straightforward model of 
employment contract and hierarchy, with the task of CCT, thereafter, being to move 
local authorities to the opposite end of the continuum - the heavily competitive domain 
of spot contracts and service level agreements. Under BV, in contrast, the intention, as 
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suggested above, has been to incur a shift back towards hierarchy and, in particular, to 
the new domain of 'joint enterprise' or a 'preferred supplier' partnership. In doing this, 
Labour's approach could be seen to be distinctive from both the centralised bureaucratic 
hierarchies of the command and control of 'Old Labour' and the market mechanisms of 
the Conservatives. 
Figure 4.5 
The dimensions from pure hierarchy to pure markets 
1) Employment contract and pure hierarchy 
2) Decentralised accountability & authority 
3) Devolved budgetary control 
4) Joint enterprise partnership 
5) Preferred suppliers partnership 
6) Trust based contracts 
7) Spot market 
Source: Deakin, Smith, Thomas and Walsh (1997:39) 
While this continuum is logical, it may be misleading in relation to the potential power 
of the external partner and by implication the degree of control that the local authority 
will have over it. The reason for this is that the further down the continuum one 
traverses, the less control the principal (e.g. local authority) exerts over the agent (e.g. 
contractor) and the more that market forces take control. This conclusion is drawn 
because the dimensions are concerned with 'hierarchy to market' distinctions. The 
problem with this conceptualisation, however, is that, arguably, at stages one -
employment contract and pure hierarchy - and stage seven - spot market - the 
principal's control is far greater than at stage four where responsibilities are shared. 
At stage four, the relationship between the authority and the contractor is one of greater 
inter-dependence with the result that the resolution of disagreements over the latter's 
performance is likely to be more problematic than when the authority is the clear client 
101 
party. Consequently, under a public-private relationship, decision-making might be less 
efficient than direct contracting out because much time could be spent on trying to 
resolve conflicts. Moreover, any consensus eventually arrived at might not necessarily 
be the most effective outcome, but rather the most expedient and pragmatic thing to do 
(McQuaid, 2000). For example, central government funding may be lost if a programme 
of action is not agreed on time (Faulkner and Mclaughlin, 2000). Similarly, the 
partnership may draw resources from other mainstream services or confuse the services 
in the minds of users, so reducing their effectiveness (McQuaid, 2000; Teisman, 1998). 
In support of all of these concerns, Klijn and Teisman (2000: 85) distinguish the fairly 
clear process of contracting out with the far less clear process of partnership working: 
'Contracting out is characterised by a principal-agent relationship in which 
the public actor defines the problem and provides the specifications of the 
solution. Contracting out often aims to increase the efficiency of the production 
process. For this contractual transparency is needed. Partnership, on the other 
hand, is based on joint decision-making and production in order to achieve 
effectiveness for both partners. Relational transparency, or in other words 
trust, is crucial in a partnership '. 
Moreover, evidence from private sector partnerships, suggests that contractual forms of 
organisation are rarely conducted between equal partners. Instead, one organisation is 
often in a position to dictate the terms of the contract to the other (Roper, Prabhu, and 
Van Zwanenberg, 1997). This inequality arises from differences in power which mean 
that one of the contracting parties is likely to be able to secure a larger share of the 
benefits accruing from performance improvements or equally alleviate itself from a 
disproportionate share of the risk where problems arise (Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005). 
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Consequently, the attempt by a local authority to negotiate a long-term collaborative 
relationship with an experienced private sector contractor with national (and sometimes 
international) experience in making such deals, may not lead to unambiguous benefits 
for the users of services or staff. This point is also illustrated by Grimshaw, Vincent and 
Willmott (2002), who point out that public sector organisations find themselves at a 
significant disadvantage when negotiating contracts with private sector contractors 
experienced in picking-up such contracts. 
In summary, therefore, whereas in dimension seven of the continuum the principal is 
theorised to behave in the 'classic' consumer (i.e. powerful) position of being able to 
choose amongst a large number of competing providers and in stage one has 
hierarchical control, this is not the case at stages four or five, where the on-going 
relationship has to be negotiated. Moreover, in partnering situations where 
responsibilities are shared, the local authority will have renounced some of its powers to 
control external contractors, thus leading to potential difficulties in ensuring that local 
services are delivered in the public interest (Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005). 
Doubts about compatibility of public-private partnerships with the other elements of B V 
Finally, a more general set of problems with the emphasis on public-private partnership 
in BV is that it has the potential to conflict with some of the policy's other requirements. 
Whilst this accusation can also be applied to a number of the other elements ofBV, with 
one such example being the tension between the top-down determination of 
performance indicator definitions and the bottom-up emphasis on public involvement. 
the public-private partnership approach is particularly distinctive because it implies a 
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shift in the BY agenda away from the neutral 'what matters is what works' position to 
one where 'what works' is expected to be a recommendation for some type of 
partnership arrangement with an external organisation. Indeed, by progressing such 
notions as 'shared aspirations' and 'synergy,' the 'partnership' attribute of BY assumes 
that the contest for the right to provide services has been settled and that external 
contractors have a necessary right to be involved in the delivery of publicly funded 
servIces. 
It could even be argued that much of the policy support for BY amounts to tautology 
with such positive statements as 'co-operation', 'co-ordination' and 'integration' (see, 
for example, Newchurch and Company, 1999) reflecting the 'analytic' description of 
the word 'partnership' rather than the 'synthetic' or empirically derived outcomes of 
real 'partnerships,' which might be somewhat rather less positive. Thus, this expectation 
would, as suggested above, seem likely to result in unwilling authorities being forced 
into employing outside contractors, a situation hardly conducive to high trust 
contractual relationships. 
The imposition of outsourcing on the grounds of principle, rather than reasoned and 
operational rationales, would also seem likely to antagonise internal staff and their 
unions and could in itself, therefore, lead to deteriorating service performance. In fact, 
in this sense, BY provides a more hostile regime for staff and unions than CCT since at 
least under the latter the grounds for competitive tendering, cost, were transparent and it 
was possible for them to concede tenns and conditions of employment in order to retain 
their employments. 
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More generally, the emphasis that the creation of public-private partnerships places on 
the negotiation of long-term collaborative relationships can be also seen to conflict with 
the emphasis that BV policy places on competition. One of the key issues here is that 
under public-private partnerships there will no longer be competitive tendering, except 
at lengthy intervals, when the contract comes up for renewal (Collins, 1997). Moreover, 
in cases where plenty of potential service providers exist for councils to utilise, the 
negotiation of a preferred supplier partner will prevent them from shopping around and 
picking up a better provider elsewhere (Marchington and Vincent, 2001). 
Finally, in spite of the emphasis that BV places on involving the public and informing 
them fully about service performance and 'how their council compares', the existence 
of joint ownership and/or joint provision of services might make it difficult for the 
public to know where service responsibilities reside and who to approach in the event of 
concerns about service delivery. In particular, if, under a partnering relationship, the 
contractor's local day-to-day responsibility is reduced to little more than an arms-length 
monitoring role this arrangement could lead to the prevalence of less than committed 
behaviour on the part of recruited partners (Grimshaw, Willmott and Ruberry, 2005). 
Barely adequate, rather than continuously improving services, might, therefore, result 
from such an arrangement and this outcome would be clearly inconsistent with the key 
aim of BV policy. 
This section has explained that the emphasis placed by BV on public-private partnership 
not only fails to recognise the reluctance on the part of local authorities to engage in 
such partnerships voluntarily but also assumes that the working relationship between the 
public and private parties will be an equitable one. This section challenged these 
premises, however, and did so for three main reasons. Firstly, it doubted whether the 
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underpinning foundations necessary to make a public-private partnership work existed. 
Secondly, it argued that the Government's desired operational arrangements for public-
private partnerships in BV might make it difficult for an authority to control the 
contractor and, by implication, to ensure the delivery of local services in the public 
interest. Finally, it explained that the necessary utilisation of external contractors in the 
delivery of local services via partnerships might contradict some of the other aspirations 
ofBV. 
BV Inspection 
Having critically examined the three attributes of 'public involvement', 'flexibility of 
means' and 'public-private partnerships', this fourth and final section of the chapter 
turns its attention to the elements of BV designed to examine whether local authorities 
are achieving BV. In doing this, it focuses primarily on the role of the Audit 
Commission's inspection service in BV, which both utilises performance indicators to 
reach its judgements about the performance of local services and can also be seen to 
address some of the limitations identified with the process ofBV audit6. 
The introduction of a BV inspection process can be seen to represent an advance over 
the inherited reforms of the Conservatives in terms of actually identifying failing 
services rather than those whose cost is too high and, by implication, in terms of acting 
as the champion for the public. The extent to which the BV inspectorate really is able to 
reliably and robustly assess the performance of local services has, however, been 
strongly doubted in the literature, with concerns being raised not only in relation to 
well-publicised doubts about the ontology and consistency of inspections (Ball, 1997; 
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Wilcox and Gray, 1996) but more senous reservations about its objectivity and 
impartiality. Each of these issues is considered in turn below. 
Ontology 
Inspection processes in health, education, social services and other public services have 
been subjected to a wealth of criticisms and controversies (Ashworth, Boyne and 
Walker, 2002; Boyne, Day, Walker, 2002; Davis, Martin and Downe, 2001; Gray, 1997; 
Timmins, 2004, Winkley, 1999) and these controversies and criticisms apply also to the 
BV inspection process. One of the main concerns with inspection processes is whether a 
snapshot inspection visit, which attempts to capture everything that is salient about an 
inspected entity, is actually up to the task of seeing where the entity has come from, 
where it actually is and where it might be heading (Ball, 1997). This concern relates to 
the ontology of the inspection process and the extent to which the inspected entity is 
knowable and can be represented in a written report form (Wilcox and Gray, 1996). 
One reason for doubting the ontological position of the BV inspection service is that the 
basis upon which the inspected entity is judged is not naturally given but depends on 
certain changing ideas about how the entity should be performing. Consequently, the 
criteria against which local authorities are judged are based on the selection and 
interpretation of data which inevitably reflects prior theoretical perspectives and 
represents, therefore, one model of evaluation amongst an infinite number. One of the 
key examples of this is in the treatment of externalities, or to put it another way, how 
much ownership for resulting perfonnance is to be placed on the regulated entity 
(Orchard, 1994; Radical Statistics Health Group, 1995; Kerrison and Macfarlane, 2000; 
McKee and Sheldon, 1998; Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). 
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Moreover, given the huge number of divergent interests, that have to be considered in 
relation to the inspected entity, doubts must also be raised about the extent to which a 
BV inspection team can act as a proxy of the multifaceted public (Humphrey, 2002; 
Mallie and Hoggett, 2001). As Boyne (2003) further argues, there is no universal set of 
criteria for evaluating whether improvement has occurred with each particular 
constituency using different criteria to judge the standard of public services. 
Consequently, despite claims that the BV inspectorate is playing the role of the people's 
champion by measuring what is important to the public, the inspection process might 
rather more encourage local authorities to satisfy inspectors rather than local electors 
(Jones and Stewart, 2002). It has even been suggested that the constant cycle of 
inspections creates a fear of failure, which stifles experimentation and innovation, 
deterring authorities from developing new approaches which might be beneficial to the 
public (Davis, Downe and Martin, 2004) 
Finally, the ontological premise of the inspection process can also be questioned in 
relation to the perceived depth of investigation it deems necessary to conduct a reliable 
inspection and the information it uses to make this decision. Thus, during the 
preparation stages of the inspection, the inspection guidelines suggest that if an 
authority can prove to the BV inspectorate that it has carried out a comprehensive 
review, the inspection is likely to be 'light touch', with the resulting visit potentially 
lasting only one day as opposed to as many as twenty. Yet, this conclusion is surprising 
because if, as suggested above, BV auditors are not able to trust the contents of local 
authorities' BV documentation to make meaningful auditor judgements, how is the BY 
inspectorate supposed to utilise similar information to determine the necessary depth of 
the resulting inspection visit? 
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Consistency 
A second problem with the BV inspection process relates to the difficulties involved in 
ensuring a consistent and thereby fair interpretation of inspection processes and 
standards by different inspection teams (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999). 
The issue of consistency for the BV inspection process is, therefore, a rather different 
one from that identified earlier with respect to performance indicators because it reflects 
not the consistency of different local authorities but the consistency of different 
inspection teams. As the following quote suggests, the Audit Commission has treated 
seriously the importance of gaining consistency in this latter regard: 
'The inspectorate must also achieve a consistency of approach between 
councils and across inspectoral reports on each individual authority. 
Producing a common methodologv is one of a number of means of achieving 
such consistency' (Audit Commission, 1999a: 8). 
Consistency is purportedly achieved by the production of an inspection handbook, 
entitled 'Seeing is believing' (2000b) which sets out, in considerable detail, the explicit 
procedures and criteria to be followed by inspectors in making their judgements. One of 
the most pressing problems with the production of a common methodology, however, is 
that there can be no certainty that the criteria contained within it is unambiguous and, 
therefore, transparently the same for all readers of it. The explanation for this is that the 
detailed prescriptions contained in inspection handbooks have to be incorporated into 
the practice of inspections via criteria. which can never be so tightly defined, so as to 
expel the act of judgement completely (Gilroy and Wilcox, 1997). 
109 
To illustrate this point, attention can be drawn to the BV inspection handbook's 
treatment of how BV inspection teams are supposed to score the current and future 
quality of services (see Figure 4.6). In tenns of making the judgement about ho\\· good 
the services currently are, this requires inspectors to assess whether the authority's 
review was 'clear and challenging'. These tenns are inevitably ambiguous, however. 
since they are likely to involve different teams of inspectors assigning different 
meanings and emphases to them. 
Figure 4.6 
The Best Value Inspection Scoring system 
A) How good are the services which have been inspected? Rated from 3 stars 
(excellent) to 
o stars (poor) 
1. Are the authority'S aims clear and challenging? 
2. Does the service meet these aims? 
3. How does its perfonnance compare? 
B) Will services improve in the way that best value requires? Rated on a scale that 
runs from 'yes', to 'probably', to 'unlikely', to 'no' 
1. Does the best value review drive improvements? 
2. How good is the improvement plan? 
3. Will the authority deliver the improvements? 
Source: Audit Commission, 2000b 
The inspection handbook does admittedly go on to provide guidance about the meaning 
of the phrase 'clear and challenging.' However, this guidance includes such phrases as 
'fundamentall y challenged' and 'proposed significant changes' . The tenns 
'fundamentally' and 'significant' are not, though, defined thus lending themselyes to 
further SUbjective interpretation. This process of defining criteria for inspection 
purposes, as Gilroy and Wilcox (1997: 29-30) have explained in the context of Ofsted 
inspections, thus demands further criteria for meaning to be explained, and so on, thus 
generating an infinite regress of criterial explanations with no meaning being explained. 
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Moreover, despite the high level of importance attached by the Audit Commission to 
ensuring consistency between different inspection teams, it has also indicated that the 
inspection handbook is likely to change as improved processes and criteria are 
developed: 
'The Audit Commission will continue to develop and refine its inspection 
methodology ... (and} ... as the Inspection service gathers more evidence abolll 
what works, it will develop clearer explanations of what constitutes excellent 
performance that takes account of local diversity' (Audit Commission 2000a: 
11). 
The expectation that the inspection process needs to undergo continual revision can be 
seen to reflect the Audit Commission's mission to ensure that it too is able to deli\'er 
'excellent' inspections, just as authorities should provide excellent services (Audit 
Commission 1999a: 22) and can, therefore, be seen to be consistent with the mantra of 
continuous improvement. Less positively, however, this perspective signifies an implicit 
lack of trust in the current arrangements for inspection since it seems likely that they 
will only be improved upon again in the future. Moreover, constant revisions to the 
definition and coverage of the underpinning elements and processes of the inspection 
regime, in tum, create barriers to longitudinal comparisons within and between 
authorities since like will not be compared with like. Perhaps of even greater concern, 
however, is that the Audit Commission inspection guidance appears to play down the 
need for impartiality and objectivity at all by admitting that: 
1 1 1 
' ... no one style of inspection will suit all circumstances. Whether the inspection 
is more supportive and encouraging, or more challenging, will depend on the 
performance attitudes and capability of both the authority and the services 
being inspected' (Audit Commission 2000b: 6). 
The use of the word 'attitudes' in this statement is, therefore, a rather disquieting one 
given that one of the key purposes of the BY inspection process is to score a selection of 
each local authority's BY reviews according to the dimensions of 'current' and 'likely 
future' performance. With the ramifications of a poor inspection verdict potentially 
quite damaging to the authority concerned, the use of 'attitudes' implies that a rather 
unstable and far from impartial basis of examination is available to inspectors - an issue 
which is explored in greater depth below. 
The questionable impartiality of the inspection process 
While the ramifications of a particular inspection judgement can be quite severe and 
might lead to the transfer of the service to a third party (Local Government Act, 1999, s 
15), the BY inspectorate has been keen to stress that it is not merely operating a penal 
system. Instead, as part of the BY inspection visit, each authority recei\'es 
recommendations that indicate how it might improve future service performance. As the 
Audit Commission (l999a: 17) maintains: 
'Collncils might find it unhelpful if the inspectorate simply questioned the 
quality of a revie)l'. without indicating hmv it expected a council to make 
imprm!cments '. 
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Given this rather more positive role of the inspection process, it is perhaps surprising 
that any local authority should be branded as 'unlikely to improve in the future' since 
the recommendations provided by the BV inspection team should, if they are correct, 
propel each local authority in the desired direction of continuous improvement. 
According to this interpretation, the question of whether a local authority is likely to 
improve in the future would, therefore, reflect a judgement about whether the 
recommendations of the BV inspection will be implemented or not. This is certainly not 
how the BV inspection verdicts have been created, however, and leads one to reach a 
rather different conclusion about their role. 
Rikowski (2002), for example, suggests that the BV scoring system has been partly 
created as a means to justify the increased liberalisation of local government services by 
providing a basis to encourage the increased involvement of external contractors in the 
delivery of local services. As Rikowski (2002), therefore, suggests: 
' ... if no examples of failing services materialised from BV in this way -
providing the opportunity for alternative suppliers, then the regime itself would 
be seen to be a waste of time. Best Value would not be being implemented, as 
intended, if all the Best Value Inspection Reports concluded that all the local 
authorities were providing good services, or at least, a service that could be 
improved whilst remaining in the control of the local authority'. 
According to this argument it can be anticipated that a decision to transfer a failing 
service will, according to the scoring parameters of the BY inspection process, make it 
possible for the local authority to receiYe a positiye inspection score in terms of 'likely 
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future perfonnance' since it is the authority's response to poor 'current perfonnance' 
that is under scrutiny. Moreover, even in the case of a currently high perfonning service. 
a decision to use external contractors is likely to be viewed positively since it 
demonstrates an even greater propensity on the part of the local authority to challenge. 
It might be expected, therefore, that local authorities that increase the role of external 
contractors in the delivery of local services will, by virtue of the context and dimensions 
of the regulatory framework and BV inspection scoring parameters, receive far more 
complimentary inspection verdicts, on average, than those that do not. Admittedly, such 
an outcome has a degree of logic to it given that the increased involvement of external 
contractors in the delivery of local services can be viewed as a potentially useful 
remedial action to deal with current perfonnance failures - though, of course, the actual 
outcome could also lead to further deterioration in service perfonnance. The fear is, 
therefore, that far from providing an objective assessment of external contractor 
perfonnance, the inspectorate might actually express an in-built or ideological belief in 
the superiority of external contractors. 
In reaching this conclusion, however, there is one final and important point to be made 
about the distinction between CCT and BV in tenns of process. This is that whereas 
under CCT local authorities could bypass the prevailing legislation in favour of 
outsourcing, in appealing also to the 'perfonnance not ownership' aspirations of BY 
policy, the regulatory processes of BV encapsulate both internally and externally 
provided services. Consequently, either a decision to outsource a service under BY or to 
maintain external service provision with an outside contractor would require the local 
authority to go through the necessary legislative/review processes. so that the full 
benefits of the transfer can be realised. In this way, perhaps, BV can be viewed as being 
ends driven, with the regulatory framework of inspections encapsulating also the 
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activities of external contractors. In theory, therefore, a similar level of central 
supervision will be exerted on local authorities that directly contract out ser;ices as 
those that retain services in house. 
Nonetheless, given the above concerns with the ontology, consistency and impartiality 
of the BY inspection process, it must be asked whether the process really provides a 
safeguard against failing services and can, therefore, provide a guarantor to the public 
that continuous service improvement is being achieved. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically examined the four BY attributes of 'public involvement', 
'flexibility of means', 'public-private partnerships' and 'inspection'. It began this 
investigation with the attribute of 'public involvement' and first recognised how this 
attribute does indeed have a number of properties that can be seen to represent a 
positive advance on CCT. These include, notably, the desire to engage the public in BY 
decision-making and to provide them also with information about the performance of 
local services. At the same time as providing these potential benefits, however, a 
number of problems were identified with the public involvement attribute, which might 
serve to limit the extent to which it achieves the claims made for it in practice. 
It was noted, for example, that the statutory guidance with respect to this attribute 
amounted to providing and collecting information from the public about the 
peliormance of local services and could for this reason, therefore, be seen to be rather 
superficial in terms of its depth of engagement. The statutory guidance does not. for 
example, encourage the opportunity for debate and argument but rather encourages local 
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authorities to seek optimum service levels. Moreover, even within the confines of these 
limitations, it is still likely that although different preferences amongst different 
members of the public will emerge, no satisfactory mechanism exists to be able to 
reconcile them. Finally, the first section of the chapter also suggested that the 
information provided to the public about the performance of local services might be 
rather confusing, particularly if information collected from user satisfaction surveys did 
not tally with that provided from performance indicators, and there were good reasons 
for expecting this to be the case. 
In the second section of the chapter, attention was turned to the flexibility of means 
dimension of BV. Here, it was explained that the sheer size and variety of management 
tools and processes emphasised in BV allow local authorities to provide their services in 
a much more flexible way than was possible under CCT. In addition, the flexibility of 
means dimension of BV also provides local authorities with much needed discretion to 
raise the quality of local services. However, the ability of local authorities to do this on 
a wide-scale was seen to be limited to what would be politically and financially 
untenable. Likewise, while competition is not compulsorily required under BV and local 
authorities have been provided with the opportunity to deliver services directly, the 
'flexibility of means' championed by BV also increases the number of avenues that 
external contractors can be utilised to deliver local services. It was, therefore, argued 
that certainly for CCT services for which demonstrable markets exist, it was likely to 
remain difficult for local authorities to justify continued in-house provision without 
recourse to competitive tendering. 
The third section of the chapter then turned its attention to the emphasis that BV places 
on the development of public-private partnerships. Again, this attribute was identified 
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positively as providing local authorities with the opportunity to move away from the 
hostile nature of the contracts negotiated under CCT. In doing this, BY was also seen to 
provide local authorities with the opportunity to more effectively embrace external 
expertise and experience and to reduce the contract negotiation, monitoring and 
compliance costs. In spite of these positive claims, however, the chapter explained that 
the underpinning foundations necessary to create obligational contractual relationships 
in the local authority context might not be available for pUblic-private partnerships 
owing to differences in organisational goals, commitment and ways of working between 
the public and private sectors. Indeed, much evidence exists of local authorities being 
reluctant to embrace public-private partnerships voluntarily and one reason for this is 
that the process is considered to be akin to a rather unwanted process of externalisation. 
It was also explained that despite notions of shared responsibilities and joint-working, it 
might actually be quite difficult for the authority to control the contractor and by 
implication to ensure the delivery of local services in the public interest. Indeed, the 
public-private partnership attribute of BY was also identified, more generally, as being 
potentially incompatible with a number of the other aspirations of BY. Foremost 
amongst these was that the emphasis on public-private partnership in BY signifies a 
shift away from the 'what matters is what works' mantra to a preference for certain 
desired outcomes and, in seeking longer-term external collaboration, with the emphasis 
that BY policy places on competition. 
Having critically examined the means by which local authorities are expected to create 
continuous improvements in local services, the fourth section of the chapter moved on 
to examine the role of the BY inspectorate in confirming that local authorities had done 
so. Firstly, in terms of the potential merits of this process, it was revealed that the 
introduction of a systematic inspection process could be viewed as providing a more 
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robust means of ensuring that local authorities are delivering seryices to the highest 
possible standard. In doing this, BY policy was shown to have introduced a new 
addition to the regulatory mechanisms that remained following the Conservative's local 
government reforms and also addressed some of the limitations identified with BY audit. 
Despite the claims made for the BY inspection process, particularly in terms of 
providing a safeguard to the public against failing services, the chapter explained why 
the procedures it introduced could not escape the fairly well established concerns with 
the ontology and consistency of such processes. Consequently, doubts were raised about 
whether local authorities, and their reviewed services, are really being compared on a 
like-for-like basis, with the judgements made in relation to likely future improvement 
being identified as particularly susceptible to error. In addition, the chapter also 
provided evidence of why the BY inspection process, and in particular, the scoring 
parameters used to summarise inspection judgements might favour the use of external 
contractors in the delivery of local services. In particular, it was explained how under 
current arrangements the mere act of changing service provider is likely to be viewed 
positively by the inspectorate on the basis that it physically challenges the existing basis 
of service provision. 
It is in the context of these theoretical concerns with the claims made for BY that the 
attention of the thesis can be directed towards an empirical examination of its operation 
in practice. Before doing so, however, an overview of the research philosophy, strategy 
and method selection needs to be provided. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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Notes 
1 These are not the only types of user satisfaction indicators in circulation in local government. Andrews 
(2004), for example, provides further examples of the types of user satisfaction indicators prevalent in 
local government. 
2 What is particularly striking about the recent stress placed on the utilisation of user satisfaction surveys 
is that it has not been accompanied by anything like the commotion, which met the introduction of 
Citizen's' Charter indicators in 1991 (Doern, 1993; Lewis, 1993; Kingdom, 1996). The former Citizen's 
Charter initiative, it will be remembered, created a minor furore owing largely to the placing of the 
apostrophe on the term citizen, which indicated an individualistic rather than collectivist account of 
performance. The introduction of user satisfaction indicators partly avoids this issue, though this is not 
because it embraces a collectivist notion of public services but because it does not encroach upon the term 
citizen. 
3 As authors of the formal BV pilot programme reaffIrmed (Martin, Davis, Bovaird, Downe, Geddes, 
Hartley, Lewis, Sanderson, Sapwell, 2001) few if any of the pilots have embraced approaches that could 
be described as genuine 'co-production' of services - the direct involvement of local people in the design, 
delivery and monitoring of services. 
4 Thus, as Bach (2002) explains, although when Labour came to power the scope for further privatisation 
was limited, since almost all of the obvious candidates for privatisation had already been privatised, in the 
case of such tangential policies as CCT there was still scope to extend the coverage and depth of external 
contractor involvement and this is precisely what public-private partnerships do. 
5 That BV may significantly increase the involvement of external contractors in the delivery of local 
services has been starkly illustrated by the pressures exerted by public sector unions to gain a 
commitment from the government that externalisation of local authority services would not involve a 
deterioration in staff terms and conditions and hence the creation of a 'two-tier workforce'. This follows 
the experience of CCT and the absence of any real safeguards for new employees taken on after the 
service has been competitively tendered out (Adnett and Hardy, 1998a, b). Union pressure ultimately 
resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on the issue between the unions and the Government (Unison, 
2002) though the resulting code does not resolve the very substantive issues of job security, sick pay, 
workplace practices training and pensions (Higgins and Roper, 2002). 
6 One such reservation is that the process of BV audit is not sufficiently rigorous to examine the 
performance of local authorities as they 'really' are. A reservation that seems to have been borne out by 
the inconsistent results that have emerged from summaries ofBV Audits (Audit Commission, 2000a) and 
summaries of BV inspections (Audit Commission, 2001c). Thus, for example, whereas BV auditors 
confidently reported that 'Targets for 2000/01 indicate a steady overall improvement in many frontline 
services, with the worst peliorming authorities aiming to improve more quickly' (Audit Commission 
2000a: 8), the results of 506 inspected services (Audit Commission, 2001c: 8) concluded that ' ... services 
that scored fairly or poorly were also the least likely to improve (with only 42 per cent given 'probably' 
or 'will' improve ratings, compared with 65 per cent of good or excellent services) '. 
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Chapter 5 
Research philosophy, strategy and method selection 
This chapter details the research philosophy, strategy and method selection processes 
behind this study's investigation of the implementation of BV policy within the context 
of a range of services formerly encapsulated by CCT. It is divided into four sections, the 
first of which charts the research philosophy behind the research undertaken, clarifying 
why a realist approach was necessary to understand the process and properties of BV. 
The chapter then moves on to outline the purpose of the research and explains why a 
case study approach was selected as the chosen research strategy. Following this, the 
third section of the chapter details the criteria governing case selection, while the fourth 
outlines the case methods chosen. 
A realist approach to research philosophy 
Although it is common for books dedicated to social research to focus on the terms 
positivism and phenomenology (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Bryman, 1989; Cooper 
and Emory, 1995; Cresswell, 1994), there is also what could be described as a 'third 
way' between these two broad schools and this is known as the realist approach (Layder, 
1996; Bhaskar, 1989). The realist approach to research philosophy is one that attempts 
to preserve a 'scientific' attitude towards social analysis at the same time as recognising 
the importance of actors' meanings (Layder, 1996). The realist ontological outlook, 
therefore, accepts that a reality exists beyond one's sense perceptions of it but that such 
reality is often intransitive and only relatively enduring (Bhaskar, 1989) with the object 
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of study involving concepts and social structures that are subject to dispute amongst 
various commentators (Williams 2000). 
Despite the complications that are introduced by the recognition and acceptance of 
competing concepts and multiple perspectives, the realist approach still maintains, 
nonetheless, that these objects are real in the sense that they have an impact upon people. 
This marks an ontological distinction from the phenomenological approach and the 
notion that the world and reality are not objective and exterior but are, instead, socially 
constructed and given meaning by people (Eisenhadt, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Silverman, 2000a, b). Although the emphasis on social 
construction in the phenomenological approach is an important one, the realist approach 
differs to it on the basis that it still accepts that reality exists beyond one's sense 
perceptions of it and that this reality has an impact upon people regardless of whether 
they are aware of it or not. Indeed, according to Ackroyd and Fleetwood (2000), part of 
what prevents realists from making the phenomenological mistake that the world is 
merely socially constructed or determined by the concepts people hold about it, is a 
commitment to materialism. Underlying the concept dependent nature of social reality is, 
therefore, an irreducible material substance. 
At the same time as recognising these complications, the realist approach still believes 
that truth can be known because explanation is conceived in terms of revealing the 
mechanisms which connect things and events in causal sequences. These sequences do 
not progress according to simplified one-to-one relationships between objects, however, 
but in complex interactions or mechanisms between objects. This perspective, therefore, 
differs from the conventional, essentially positivist, view that such phenomena as 
performance indicators and inspection regimes actually represent some objective truth 
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and a single tangible reality. Thus, as Humphrey (2001: 23) argues, the Audit 
Commission is reluctant to problematise the meaning of its values and concepts, which 
remain 'primari~l' statistical artefacts' aligned to the views of the 'dominant 
stakeholders H110 OWll and control welfare through resources and regulation ,I. 
Similarly, irrespective of whether the regulatory processes of the Audit Commission are 
consistent and reliable, they can be seen to suffer from 'conceptual empiricism' 
(Higgins, 2005), whereby the concepts used for analysis become defined almost 
exclusively in tenns of the procedures developed for their measurement (Cresswell, 
1994; Bryman, 1989 and 1992). Thus, even if two researchers or inspectors are able to 
follow the same procedures and obtain the same results (Gill and Johnson, 1991) this 
does not, in itself, prove whether the results of research have theoretical relevance or are 
valid. 
Consequently, in seeking to explain why certain outcomes occurred the realist approach 
often finds itself delving inside the 'black box' of an unexamined phenomenon 
simultaneously as it makes linkages to wider influences (Williams, 2000). One 
implication of this is that the relationships and mechanisms that detennine events are 
assessed in addition to the events themselves (Keat and Urry, 1982). Indeed, it is in this 
context that, in taking up an explicitly realist position, Davis and Wright (2004) suggest 
that there is a need for researchers to delve more deeply into the activities of councils to 
examine the degree to which the entire BY process and, in particular, the BY re\'iew 
process achieves its desired outcomes. This calls for an approach that focuses centrally 
on the processes, outcomes and impacts at the service provider level. 
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In summary, the goal of the realist researcher is to find the best explanation for the 
factors that determine certain outcomes and to elaborate upon the contexts, structures, 
mechanisms and relations that explain causal sequences (Bhaskar, 1989). Moreover, by 
pointing out flaws in the social structures that manage and control the way individuals, 
groups and societies operate the realist perspective can be viewed as enlightening or 
even empowering (Bhaskar, 1989). 
Purpose of research and selection of case study research strategy 
At the same time as being realist in philosophy, this research is also exploratory and 
analytical in purpose (see Figure 5.1). It is exploratory in the sense that it illuminates an 
area of research where there is a deficient body of knowledge and where few, if any 
other studies have been conducted (Denscombe, 1998, 2002; Remenyi, WilIams, Money, 
Swartz, 1998). It is also analytical (Denscombe, 1998, 2002; Remenyi, WilIams, Money, 
Swartz, 1998) in the sense that it goes beyond a mere description of events towards a 
fuller explanation and understanding of them. 
More specifically, the analytical properties of the research direct their focus towards an 
examination of the government's espoused goals for BV rather than towards an analysis 
of alternative performance indicators which could be drawn from independent criteria, 
multiple constituents or theory (Boyne, Farrell, Law and Powell, 2003). Although one 
danger of employing a policy-based approach towards the assessment of public 
management reforms in this way is that policy goals can be vague and conflicting 
(Boyne, Farrell, Law and Powell, 2003), the alternative approaches are not without their 
flaws. For example, the adoption of a theory-based approach to the impact of public 
management reforn1 demands that policy is crisply implemented in accordance with the 
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theory being tested. However, the origins of BV based as they are on an amalgamation 
of remnants of CCT objectives, specific responses to identified failings with CCT, new 
management practices and increased regulation means that the policy lacks a coherent 
theoretical underpinning. Consequently, the adoption of a policy-based approach to the 
impact of BV was seen to have the important virtue of being able to incorporate these 
various influences, theoretical and otherwise, in its assessment of whether the 
Government's claims for the policy were actually realised. In this sense, the research 
deliberately aims to incorporate the vagueness and conflicting aims, where they exist, in 
the policy outcomes. 
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Figure 5.1 
Purposes of research 
1 Exploratory research - investigates a deficient body of knowledge where few or no 
other studies have been conducted. A key issue concerns which existing theories and 
concepts can be applied to the problem or whether new ones should be developed. In 
exploratory research the focus is on gaining insights and familiarity with the subject 
area for more rigorous investigation at a later stage. 
2 Illustrative or descriptive research - a form of research which describes phenomena 
as it exists. The approach is often quantitative with the use of summary statistics to 
provide information. This methodology goes further than exploratory research since it is 
undertaken to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the pertinent issues. 
3 Analytical or explanatory research - goes beyond describing the characteristics, to 
analysing and explaining why or how it is happening. This type of research forecasts the 
likelihood of a similar situation occurring elsewhere. 
4 Experimental research - this method may employ the null hypothesis; context is 
played down, because one attempts to replicate the laboratory experiment or the 
replication model. To answer such questions as what will occur as a result of this 
phenomenon. Who will be affected and in what ways? 
5 Predictive research - establishes an explanation for what is happening in a particular 
situation, it predicts certain phenomena on the basis of hypothesised, general 
relationships. This research is often considered to be the most advanced form of 
research, which emulates the scientific paradigm and has generalisable capability. It 
intends to predict outcomes of the phenomenon, to forecast the events and behaviours 
resulting from the phenomenon. 
6 New paradigm research - stresses the importance of establishing collaboration 
between researcher and researched, leading to the development of shared 
understandings. Action research, open-ended questionnaires, and other 'emic' 
investigations are stressed to play down the distinction between researcher (expert) and 
researched (non-expert) distinctions. One might employ the term 'co-researcher'. 
Sources: Denscombe, 2002; Yin (1989, 1994); Remenyi, Wiliams, l\loney, Swartz, 
1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Marshall and Rossman, 1999. 
The combined use of an exploratory and analytical approach in the way described above 
thus marks a distinct contrast to much of the research evidence on BV, at present, \\"hich 
has been based predominantly on the BV pilot programme (Bo\"aird, 1998; Martin, 1998 
and 2000; Martin, Davis, Bovaird, Downe, Geddes, Hartley and Lewis, Sanderson and 
Sapwell, 2001; Martin and Sanderson, 1999; Martin and Hartley. 2000) and concerns 
about \\"heth~r th~ fonnal scheme has performed or not. Of the latter, one of the main 
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studies was published by the polling organisation MORl on behalf of the Audit 
Commission (2001e) and another by the Centre for Local and Regional Government 
Research at Cardiff University on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(Enticott, Walker, Boyne, Martin, and Ashworth, 2002, see appendix 4 for a summary 
of key findings). Whilst both of these accounts are important and useful and provide a 
good overview of the outcome of BV, they do not reveal how the formally reported 
outcomes were reached or state the wider impact of standardised reported effects on 
wider outcomes. In particular, they remain closely aligned to the aims and objectives of 
the original policy with the findings largely reported in terms of, for example, formal 
improvement or deterioration. 
In contrast, this study delves more deeply into the questions of how and why were BV 
outcomes arrived at, what were the key processes behind them and how do they differ to 
the experiences of CCT. It also draws upon a different time frame than that which is 
utilised in many accounts ofBV and does so because it recognises the close relationship 
with CCT and how the evaluation of the success of the policy need not be confined to a 
formal assessment of the performance of the service but how it differs also to the impact 
of CCT. These specific demands of the research enquiry are, therefore, particularly well 
suited to the adoption of a case study approach, which is able to be pursued 
longitudinally and can accommodate such attributes of social research as goal diversity, 
conflict, ideological disputation and control. 
Adoption of case study research strategy 
Formally, the case study is defined as an umbrella term for a family of research methods 
which have in common a focus of enquiry around a single process, relationship, event or 
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experience occurring at a particular instance (s) in time that is representatiye in some 
way of a research topic (Yin 1994). In particular, case studies tend to focus upon a fairly 
self-contained entity, with fairly distinct boundaries (Denscombe 2002:38) and are 
usually conducted within natural settings rather than artificial ones (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). This may not necessarily be a physical space such as an office block 
or a school classroom, for example, but might focus on the activities, processes and 
relationships that go on within those physically defined boundaries (Denscombe, 2002). 
In doing so, the case study approach calls for intensive amounts of data that may be 
analysed from either a quantitative or qualitative approach and subsequently synthesised 
in such a way as to produce a theoretical conjecture or even be used as eyidence to 
support or contradict an established theory (Yin, 1989). 
The case study approach is also a useful method of providing a basis for both initial 
exploration (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001) and for more detailed analysis later on (Yin, 
1989, 1993, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). It is a particularly appropriate research 
strategy when one is trying to attribute causal relations - and not just wanting to explore 
or describe a situation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Thus, case study research can be 
used to show hoft' and H'hl' something happened rather than simply whether something 
happened (Stake, 1995). As Miles and Huberman (1994:1..J.7) argue 'seeing that an 
experimental group had effect X and that the controls tells us nothing about H1w[ 'we11l 
011 ill the 'black box'. We dOll 't understand how or 1\11)' it happened, and can only guess 
at the mechanisms involved. ' 
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Case selection criteria 
Having chosen to utilise the case study approach to research, the next decision that a 
researcher has to make is whether to conduct a single case or multiple cases (Yin, 1989). 
Single case studies are usually employed when they contribute to a 'classic case' that is 
to say when an event or process suddenly becomes available, such as a take-oyer bid of 
a company, and are selected purposefully on the basis they haye some special 
contribution to make that cannot be got as well from other choices (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). Multiple case studies, on the other hand, involve the study of independent events 
occurring at different sites and may be chosen on the basis of generalisability, typicality 
or for comparative purposes (Maxwell, 1996; Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, Tindall, 
1994)2. 
This research adopts a multiple case study approach for two mam reasons. Firstly, 
because it seeks to cross-examine the implementation of BV policy within a small 
number of different tendering contexts and secondly because it wishes to capture, in 
depth, the workings of the four identified attributes of BV. In tum, these aims led to the 
utilisation of three main selection factors, as detailed below. 
Selection factors 
There are numerous selection factors that could be used to select cases for this research. 
These include, for example, the political control, type and geographical location of the 
authority within which BV reyiews are being conducted (Deakin, Smith, Thomas. and 
\Valsh, 1997). For this study. how eyer, three other criteria were used to select cases and 
in different ways these reflected the exploratory and analytic purposes of the research. 
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The first selection factor reflected the exploratory properties of the study and the fact 
that during the commencement of the primary research thirty-four local authorities were 
embroiled in the BY pilot scheme. Given that these authorities had advanced most the 
principles of BY, they were also more likely at this stage to shed most light on the 
subject matter under investigation. It was, therefore, decided to select the cases from the 
population of English best value pilot authorities.' Admittedly, as Davis and \Vright 
(2004) argue, by drawing upon authorities which piloted BV, there is the potential 
problem that these authorities may be subject to significant 'Hawthorne effects' and are, 
therefore, likely to be atypical of local government's response to BV more generally. At 
the same time, however, this selection factor also enables the research to display the 
characteristics associated with a 'critical case' scenario, in that if problems identified 
with BY arise amongst some of the most enthusiastic authorities then one could 
envisage greater difficulties being experienced by non-pilot authorities. Moreover, by 
virtue of their former pilot status, the selected cases also have an additional historical 
property that can provide important insights into the development of the policy. 
Against this backdrop, the second selection factor reflected the analytical properties of 
the research in terms of how far the claimed virtues ofBV appear, in practice, to resolve 
the difficulties identified with CCT. In recognition of this feature, each of the chosen 
case reviews was purposefully selected on the basis that it contained services that had 
previously been subjected to CCT (see appendix 5, outlining coverage of CCT sen ices 
within BV pilot bid submissions). In this way it would be possible to compare the 
experiences of CCT and BV and to highlight the differences in terms of process and 
impact between them. One possible limitation of this is that scnices \vith prior 
experience of CCT might be more accustomed to the types of processes demanded of 
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BY because there are some overlapping elements between the two policies and, 
therefore, will experience a smaller impact. However, statistical survey e\"idence bv 
~ -
Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law and Walker (2001) of the experience of\Yelsh authorities 
revealed no variations in the perceived impact of BV as a result of prior experience of 
CCT. Indeed, a possible advantage of examining the impact of BV on former CCT 
activities during the early stages of the policy is that such actiyities are already 
experienced in using some of the systems required of BV and thus do not 'hm'e to 
'struggle'to implement these systems during review' (Boyne, Gould-Williams, La\\" and 
Walker 2001: 61). 
Given the decision to focus on CCT activities it might have also been worth\vhile to 
make like-for-like comparisons of the impact of BV upon exactly the same actiYities. 
This was not possible, however, owing to the diverse nature of the BV pilot and review 
scheme. For example, a number of the piloting authorities decided not to review any of 
their former CCT activities during the early stages of the policy and of those that did 
some decided to combine various activities into distinct packages. Thus, in one 
authority street cleansing was packaged with grounds maintenance and in another 
authority street cleansing was packaged with refuse collection. Given the wide range of 
variability in the pilot bids and the resultant review approaches adopted, the priority of 
the service composition element of case selection remained with the examination of 
former CCT activity rather than with identical CCT activity. 
The third and final case selection factor, meanwhile, reflected the decision to examine 
the implementation of BV within a range of local authorities that yaried in tenns of the 
degree to which they had utilised external contractors as a result of CCT. This selection 
factor was chosen to acknowledge the scope of the policy in tenns of the ownership and 
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control of the service provider and, in particular, to provide a basis from \\-hich to 
analyse the response of the BV inspectorate to the BV review process by service 
ownership. Drawing upon the Local Government Management Board's database of 
CCT contracts, an attempt was, therefore, made to select one authority that had much 
experience of external contractors, one that had little or no experience of external 
contractors and one that was somewhere in between these two extremes (see appendix 6 
for summary of Local Government Management Board findings in this regard). :-\ 
summary of the three selection criteria is as follows: 
1. Case authorities were former BV pilot authorities 
2. Case authorities have either undertaken a BV review in a former CCT acti\-ity 
(e.g. in pilot) or are currently doing so. 
3. Case authorities were purposefully selected in terms of the level of blue collar 
CCT activity retained in house following CCT. 
In accordance with the selection criteria, three cases studies were conducted and their 
key properties are detailed in Figure 5.2. A fourth case, comprising London-based 
leisure provision was also initially selected for study, with two exploratory interviews 
having been carried out. The case was eventually discontinued, howeyer, owing to the 
imminent commencement of a major reorganisation of the respective leisure department 
which was not only expected to prolong quite extensiyely the period of the BY review 
but was also likely to introduce additional externalities. Moreover, by this stage of the 
study, a wealth of primary research evidence, sufficient to satisfy the research objecti\-es 
of the study, had already been accumulated from the other three cases and. therefore, it 
was decided that the fourth case study should be dropped. 
In elaborating a little further upon each of the three completed cases. it can be explained 
that the first inyoh-ed the examination of a revic\\ of an il1te,.,/(/I~\' prm'ided street 
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cleansing and grounds maintenance servlce. This reVIew was conducted \\'ithin a 
southern coastal-based Unitary Authority, which covered a population of 214,900 and 
had an unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent compared to the then national average of 3.1 
per cent. In terms of political make-up, the authority within which the revie\v was 
conducted comprised forty-five councillors with no political party having overall 
control. The Labour party held twenty-two seats, the Liberal Democrats sixteen and the 
Conservatives seven. 
Figure 5.2 
Case contextualisation summary profile 
Authority 0/0 of services Review CCT BV 
in-house in or out in or out 
Southampton 89.34 Grounds maintenance In In 
Street cleaning 
Newham 100 Leisure centres In Out 
Brighton 7.47 Street cleansing and Refuse Out Out 
Collection 
The second case study, meanwhile, involved the examination of a leisure centres review, 
which following the experiences of CCT, was provided directly by the local authority 
but which during the course of research transferred to an external provider. This case 
review was conducted within the context of a London Borough Authority with a 
population of 230,000 and an unemployment rate of eight per cent, compared to a 4.5 
per cent London average. In terms of political make-up, the authority \\'as a Labour 
stronghold, with fifty-nine Labour councillors and an Independent one. 
The final case study involved the examination of an exterllal~r provided refuse 
collection and street cleansing service. This case \vas conducted \\'ithin the context of a 
southern coastal-based Unitary Authority. which covered a population of 259.000 and 
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had an unemployment rate of 3.9 per cent. In terms of the political make-up of the 
Authority within which this final case review was conducted, the Council comprised 
seventy-eight councillors, with the Labour party having control of forty-six seats, the 
Conservatives twenty-three seats and the remaining nine shared between the Liberal 
Democrats, the Green Party and one independent. 
Selection of case methods 
It was explained earlier that the case study approach is not considered to be a 
methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied, with multiple resources and 
multiple methods (Bell, 1993). For the completion of social research, the methods used 
might involve asking people for information about experiences or attitudes (Silverman, 
2000a, b), observing or participating in what people do (Jorgensen, 1989; Waddington, 
1999) and examining documents and other archival information written by people 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Moreover, in each of these different scenarios, the 
resulting evidence can be analysed either qualitatively (Patton, 1987; Reason and 
Rowan, 1981; Silverman, 1993; Platt, 1981; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Hakim, 1987) 
or quantitatively (Bryman and Cramer, 1999; De Vaus, 1996; Marsh, 1982). 
In choosing precisely how to collect and analyse information about a particular research 
phenomenon, however, Yin (1993) argues that, in terms of exemplary case study 
research, the evidence should be considered from as many perspectiYes as possible. In 
doing so, he effectively suggests that the approach embody adherence to methodological 
triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Easterby-Smith and Thorpe and Lowe. 1991). 
the key to which is to first to ask the same question of different sources of eyidence and 
then to confim1 that the responses obtained from them point in the same direction. In 
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terms of gaining methodological triangulation in this study, the case methods utilised 
involved semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and direct and passive 
observations. Precisely why and how these techniques were used is explained in more 
detail below. 
Semi-structured interviews 
In terms of asking people for information the two main techniques available to the 
researcher are the survey (De Vaus, 1996) and the interview (Cassell and Symon, 1994). 
In the first instance, the researcher adopts an 'etic,3 approach where much of the 'work' 
is done in advance and control of the respondent is tight. The survey technique, 
therefore, entails a structured and preparatory research strategy, which maintains a high 
degree of control over the nature of the responses and the length of the answers allowed 
by the respondent (Denscombe, 2002). The theory behind the technique is that each 
person is asked the same question in the same way so that any differences between 
answers are taken to be real ones and not the result of the interview situation itself 
(Denscombe, 2002). Data also tends to be collected from a non-biased and randomly 
representative sample of the population for the purpose of generalisation and statistical 
inference (Robson, 1998; Bryman, 1996). 
In contrast, the semi-structured interview technique embodies the 'ernie' 4 approach, 
where categories emerge from the investigation, rather than being imposed upon the 
respondents externally (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 1985: Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). In particular, the technique allows the researcher to 
probe for inforn1ation that might not otherwise have been forthcoming or anticipated 
from the outset. It also facilitates the gaining of access to informants' real knowledge 
and meanings (Easterby-Smith and Thorpe and Lowe, 1991) and can be used to 
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encourage them to elaborate upon points of interest (Denscombe, 2002). This provides 
validity because the interviewer should be more confident that the interviewee has been 
more fully able to develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised. Thus, 
whereas surveys tend to be employed when questions of 'how much' are being asked, 
interviews are used to when the researcher is asking about 'how' or 'why' (Bryman, 
1992 and 1994; De Vaus, 1996, 2001). For this and other reasons, people are often 
chosen deliberately because they have some special contribution to make (Banister, 
Burman, Parker, Taylor, Tindall, 1994). 
Rationale for conducting semi-structured interviews 
Although the analytical properties of the research point to the creation of a research 
question or hypothesis and thus suggests the utilisation of a deductiye and well 
structured approach, in reflection also of the exploratory nature of the research and the 
fact that, at this stage, only tentative conclusions can be reached, a large dose of 
induction is also necessary. This allows new theories and concepts to emerge from the 
empirical investigation. Consequently, the research contains elements of both deduction 
and induction with efforts made to go backwards and forwards between the evidence 
collected and the process of conceptualisation, to make sense of the data throughout the 
period of data collection, and, thereafter, to inform understanding of the processes 
involved (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This approach can, therefore, be seen as being 
consistent with the 'grounded' approach to realist method as described by Layder 
(1996). 
More specifically, given the exploratory and analytical character of the study and the 
fact that the content of its subject is not yet ready for standardisation and quantification 
the main research teclmique employed in the study was the semi-structured interyiew. 
This technique was chosen on the basis that it is sufficiently flexible to handle 
developing concepts and ideas - to aid the exploratory requirements of the study _ 
whilst at the same time as being sufficiently robust to ensure a focused and structured 
approach to enquiry - thus facilitating an analytical approach to the study as well. It is 
also able to delve into a discussion of contested concepts or at least not be restricted to 
single operationalised definitions. 
Interviewees 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, a cross-section of people were interviewed and these 
included authors of the respective authorities' BV pilot bid document, former client and 
contracting staff, local councillors, personnel from the service review team, the directors 
of the services being reviewed, trade union officials, corporate BV officers, personnel 
from external contractors and other personnel. Interviewees were selected, therefore, not 
only on the basis that they would have good knowledge of the review process under 
investigation, but that they could also be used to match the longitudinal nature of the 
study, spanning back as it did to interviewees' reflections of CCT processes. The 
selection of a cross-sectional approach to the case study interviews also acknowledged a 
pertinent methodological point from previous CCT research, namely that the perceived 
success or failure of local government policy depends very much on who is probed for 
information (Painter, 1992). On some occasions it was necessary to conduct more than 
one interview with the same respondent. This was particularly true in terms of gathering 
respondents' opinions and experiences of the BV inspection visit towards the end of the 
research. though care was obviously taken to avoid key informant bias (Philips. 1987; 
Kumar, Stem and Anderson 1993). In total, twenty-seven interviews were conducted 
with twenty-two respondents from the grounds maintenance and street cleansing review. 
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twenty-nine interviews were conducted with twenty-four respondents from the leisure 
centres review and twenty-eight interviews were conducted with twenty-four 
respondents from the refuse collection and street cleansing review. Typically, interviews 
lasted between 1-2 hours in length with additional time usually taken to request, browse. 
collect and photocopy supporting documentation. 
Following the gaining of informed consent (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003) the 
researcher began by explaining a number of the key properties of the research and by 
asking the interviewee about themselves and their role in relation to BV and CCT. Such 
introductory questions allowed the researcher to collect valuable background 
information about informants and to let them start proceedings by covering familiar 
territory. Then, depending on respondent type, the types of themes identified for 
analysis included the historical legacy of CCT, the BV pilot process, the BV review 
process and the BV inspection. In the first instance, the relevant interviewees were 
asked to reflect on the impact of CCT in the authority, particularly in terms of the 
specific services of investigation. Thus, for example, interviewees were asked to explain 
the impact of CCT on the cost and quality of selected services, to identify the positive 
and negative attributes of CCT and to detail the authority's response to it. In doing these 
things, a distinction between the impact of the first round and second round of tendering 
was also made. 
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L' t f IS 0 
Job title Grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing 
Authors of BV 1. Best Value Pilot 
bid document Manager 
2. Executive Director of 
support services 
Former 'client' 3. Parks and streets 
or 'contracting' cleansing manager 
staff 4. Area grounds officer 
5. Street Cleaning team 
leader 
6. Parks and Street 
Cleaning Services 
Senior Operations 
Manager 
7. Grounds maintenance 
monitoring officer 
Councillors 8. Executive Member for 
Leisure and Tourism; 
9. Executive Member for 
Environment and 
Transport 
Personnel from 10. Environmental Services 
the service Group Manager 
review team. 11. Grounds, Cleansing and 
Waste Manager 
12. Open Spaces Manager 
13. Landscape and 
Development Officer 
Director of 14. Head of neighbourhood 
service services division 
Trade union 15. Trade union side 
officials secretary, TGWU 
BV core team 16. First Performance 
members Review Officers 
17. Second Performance 
Review Officer 
18. Corporate competition 
officer 
Personnel from 
-
external 
contractors. 
Other personnel 19. Local services 
department Accountant 
20. Neighbourhood services 
department Accountant 
21. Programme Manager 
Environment and 
Transport 
22 Programme Manager 
Figure 5.3 
t d case s U ly Interviewees 
Leisure 
1. First Best Value Consultant 
2. Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager 
3. Sport and Health Manager 
4. Cabinet member for leisure 
5. BV sub-committee member 
6. Senior Health and Leisure 
Project Officer 
7. Leisure centres Service 
Development officer 
8. Client manager 
(benchmarking) 
9. First Leisure Centre 
Manager 
10. Second Leisure Centre 
Manager 
11. Divisional Director, 
Recreation 
12. Divisional Director, support 
services 
13. Branch Secretary, Unison 
14. First officers from corporate 
contracts unit 
15. Second Officer from 
corporate contracts unit 
16. BV procurement officer 
17. Second BV Consultant 
18. Corporate Policy Manager 
19. Chair of Leisure provider 
20. Deputy head of operations 
21. Head of financial services 
22. First BV inspector 
23. Second BV inspector 
24. Personnel officer 
Refuse Collection and Street 
Cleansing 
1. Senior Consultant (l3est 
Value) 
2. Project officer, waste 
, 
management team 
3. Waste manager 
4. Procurement Officer 
5. Client Contracts Manager 
6. Leader of the council 
7. Executive Councillor 
Environment 
8. Scrutiny board member for 
environment, transport, 
regeneration, leisure and 
tourism 
9. Head of Contract Services, 
Environment 
10. Operations manager for 
Street Cleansing 
11. Waste Local Plan Project 
Manager 
12. Head of City Cleansing 
13. Director of Environmental 
Services 
14. Assistant Director of 
Environmental Services 
15. GMB Regional Officer 
16. GMB Branch Secretary 
17. Head of Performance and 
Accountability 
18. Corporate finance officers 
19. Regional Manager 
20. HRM manager 
21. Operations Manager 
22. Policy and Communications 
officer 
23. Corporate personnel officer 
24. BV research Officer 
Leisure .J 
Against this backdrop, the second section of interview questions related to developing 
BY policy and, in particular, the authority's response to it in terms of the BY pilot 
scheme. Again questions about the positive and negative attributes of the de\'eloping 
U8 
policy were asked and supplemented with questions on how the authority proposed to 
pilot the policy in terms of, for example, organisational arrangements and the use of 
competi ti on. 
The third main theme identified for interviews related to the actual BY review process. 
Here, interviewees were asked to comment on the various components of the process. 
its organisation, the key issues raised, the impact of the process and resulting outcomes. 
This tended to be the most detailed section of the interview schedule and occasionally 
required repeat interviews to capture events across the entire review period. Finally, 
attention could be turned to the BY inspection process. Initially, this focused on the BY 
inspection process in general but, as time passed and the actual reviews were subj ected 
to inspection, direct questions about the impact of inspection and the type of issues 
raised could also be asked. 
It should be reiterated, however, that despite the adoption of this general framework. 
and in recognition of the variety of respondents and their likely differing expertise and 
knowledge about the above themes, the researcher created a number of different 
interview schedules, each directed towards the type of respondent questioned and their 
likely experience of the enquired issue (see appendix 7 of examples of intervie\\ 
schedules and other access information). There was, nonetheless, a large degree of 
overlap between the different interview schedules. with information tending to be built 
up over time as more evidence was collected and examined. 
In all instances it was made clear to interviewees that they had a right to decline to 
respond to any question and \\"hilst an interview schedule was created in advance of the 
interview, the researcher was willing to be drawn into any direction that promised to 
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shed light on the research objectives, pennitting respondents themselves to identify 
pertinent issues and in their own language. During the time of the interview therefore , , 
the researcher probed for infonnation and requested supporting evidence as part of the 
means of attaining triangulation. All but one of the interviews, and this on the grounds 
of commercial confidentiality, were tape-recorded and transcribed and interviewees 
were offered copies of their transcribed interviews upon completion. 
Analysis of interview scripts 
The transcripts were typed up as quickly as possible after each interview and read and 
re-read thoroughly in order for the researcher to get a feel for them. The infonnation 
was then organised into a combination of fairly broad themes, such as first round and 
second round CCT, and specific infonnation, such as precise contract values or key 
dates. In conjunction with infonnation collected from other sources (see below), a 
picture of events was built up and this both facilitated the gaining of methodological 
triangulation, and unearthed infonnation about the different value positions taken in 
relation to similar phenomena such as 'service quality'. 
In organising the interview infonnation in this way, an interactive process of data 
collection was enacted, one which allowed the researcher to recognise important themes, 
patterns and relationships at the same time as collecting data and thus permitting 
adj llstments to the nature of the questions asked as more infonnation was gathered. This 
meant that the interviews were conducted over a long period of time, with nearly every 
interview transcribed and interpreted before the next was carried out. This interactive 
approach also meant that some interviewees were interviewed more than once to ensure 
that they too were probed about emerging issues. 
Despite this apparent fluidity, the parameters of the interview content remained 
confined to a starting point of CCT and an end point of the BV inspection process. 
Indeed, by confining the study to these chronologically based parameters, the case 
studies can be treated as distinct piece of research in their own right and over a given 
period of time, even though the surrounding context has since moved on (see final 
chapter). For the purpose of this study, therefore, the research was conducted in real 
time between the years 2000-2003 though the description and analysis of events sought 
spanned back also into the experiences of CCT. 
Documents 
The research also drew quite heavily upon documentary evidence which, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.4, included the collection and analysis of such standard 
documents as the BV pilot bid, the BV performance plan and the BV inspection report. 
This facilitated the process of cross-case comparison with respect to, for example, the 
context within which the reviews were conducted in terms of the respective authorities' 
official approach to the BV pilot scheme and resulting formal policy. These documents 
also contained within them key performance data and information on the organisation of 
the three respective reviews. The most important document in terms of the analytical 
properties of the research, however, was the BV inspection report which allowed the 
researcher to examine the responses of the inspectorate to each of the three reviews and 
to identify, for example, respective inspection scores and key points. 
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Figure 5.4 
Documents collected from all three case studies 
i. BV Pilot Bid 1997 
I 
• BV Perfonnance Plan 1999/2000 
• BV Perfonnance Plan 2000/2001 
• External Auditor Statutory Report on Best Value Perfonnance Plan 1999/2000 
• Best Value Review (BVR) 
• BV Inspection Report 
• DSO accounts 
• Council minutes 
In addition to these commonly collected documents, Figure 5.5 details a number of the 
more authority-specific pieces of documentation which were obtained for the purpose of 
analysis. These provided more specific infonnation about how the reviews were 
undertaken and in doing so facilitated a greater understanding of context and assisted in 
the attainment of methodological triangulation. 
Figure 5.5 
Documents specific to each of the three case studies 
Grounds maintenance and Leisure Refuse collection and street 
street cleansing cleansing 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Review specific consultation 
document 
Validation reports 
Standards and Guidance 
document 
Section 14 notice 
Examples of work orders 
Responses to invitation to 
tender letters 
Strategic working papers 
Comparative benchmarking 
data 
A way day event 
documentation 
Service improvement plan 
Swot analysis of services 
Policy and Baseline review 
BV review scoping 
document 
EPA guide 
Results from Citizen's panel 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Corporate Consultation 
document 
BV Procurement Toolkit 
Strategic Decision matrix 
BV toolkit for leisure 
Local community plan 2000 
Leisure development 
strategy 1998-2001 
Personnel documentation 
Corporate employment 
contracts 
Leisure contract 
Performance bonus 
payments data 
Customer satisfaction 
survey data 
Benchmarking report from 
Sports England 
In House performance 
reports 2001 
• Review specific consultation 
document 
• Refuse Collection Service 
Business Plan 2000/01; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Street Cleaning Service 
Business Plan 2000/01 
Integrated Waste Contract 
1999 
In House performance 
reports 2001 
Waste Management 
Employee Consultation 
report May 2002 
Newspaper clippings 
Waste survey report 
Guide to best value renews I 
Residents Survey March 
2002 
Call centre statistics 
Waste Service - Service 
Improvement Plan 2002 03 
Improving the City's 
Appearance Best \< alue 
Reyie\\< 
1\ ew refuse collection street 
cleansing rounds newsletter 
Employment contracts 
Gradin(l and salary structure I ~ < I 
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Again, there are both quantitative and qualitative ways to analyse documentary evidence. 
The quantitative approach can be referred to as content analysis (Weber, 1990; Holsti, 
1969; Berelson, 1952) and the qualitative approach can be referred to as documentary or 
textual analysis (Platt, 1981; Kracauer, 1953; Scott, 1989; Rickman, 1961). Content 
analysis usually proceeds by measuring the relative salience of a theme by the 
frequency of its occurrence (Weber, 1990; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980; Todd, 
McKeen and Gallupe, 1995) and, in doing so, tends to focus on the manifest content and 
surface meaning, rather than the deeper layers of meaning. In contrast, documentary and 
textual analysis are concerned with the deeper underlying message of the text (Rickman, 
1961) and in some cases even the role that documents play in the maintenance of social 
order (Foucault, 1980: Giroux, 1983). In both instances, however, documents are a 
'given' source, which means that there is very little danger that the act of measurement 
itself will act as an influence to confound the data (Webb, Cambell, Schwartz and 
Sechrist, 1981). Documents also have replicable properties in that they provide a 
permanent record that can be revisited and re-examined by another researcher (Plummer, 
2001). 
More generally, the documents in this study were used for three main purposes. Firstly, 
they were used to provide a commentary of the events undertaken in each of the three 
cases and, therefore, to supplement and confirm other data in the pursuit of 
methodological triangulation. In doing this it was recognised that, although consistent 
with documentary textual analysis, documents provide evidence for the 'official' 
presentation of policy to be compared to other sources, they cannot always be taken at 
face value but should instead be seen to construct particular kinds of representations 
with their own conventions (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill. 
1.+3 
2003)5. One cannot for instance learn through documents alone how an organisation 
actually operates on a day-to-day basis (Plummer, 2001). Secondly, and more 
practically, the documents were also used to provide a context for interviews and thus to 
confirm the names, titles and other details of people (Plummer, 2001). Thirdly, and 
where relevant and possible, the documents were used for direct cross-case comparison 
purposes. This was particularly true in terms of comparing approaches to the BY pilot 
scheme and the responses of the BY inspectorate. 
Observations 
The literature suggests that by making a field visit to a case study, one automatically 
creates the opportunity for direct observation (Yin, 1994). The degree to which such 
observations are prepared, conducted and analysed can be subjected to either a 
quantitative or qualitative approach. The three most usual types of observations are 
passive observation (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), participant observation (Jorgensen, 
1989; Waddington, 1999) and ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1992; Taylor 
1996; Cooper and Emory, 1995). 
In this research, there were two particular occasions in which specific observations were 
conducted and they both had degrees of participation and passiveness. Firstly, an 
observation of a BV inspection feedback session in the leisure centres case was 
conducted. This involved the researcher sitting in the audience and taking notes of 
proceedings and, in particular, capturing the inspectors' explanations for reaching its 
judgements about the reviewed service in the way they did. It also enabled one to cross-
check and to confirm the information contained within the BY inspection report. 
Secondly, an observation of a public consultation event in the grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing review was conducted. During this event, members of the public and 
other stakeholders had been encouraged to share their views on the reviewed services 
and to engage in a number of participatory exercises. In doing so, they provided the 
researcher with a deeper understanding of the means by which the authority had set and 
agreed its future BV performance targets. In both cases, the observations were arranged 
following discussion with councillors and managers, although the degree to which the 
researcher was known as a researcher as opposed to a member of the general public. for 
example, could not be fully ascertained. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of how the empirical research for this study was 
conducted and, in doing so, drew attention to the philosophy, strategy and method 
selection processes behind it. It began by explaining why a realist approach to research 
is better able to contemplate and understand the underlying mechanisms involved in the 
determination ofBV outcomes and, in particular, to the issue of how far it represents an 
improvement on CCT. The first section did this by contrasting the realist approach to 
research philosophy with both the positivistic approach and the phenomenological 
approach. In particular, it was argued that the realist approach is better able to 
contemplate and get to grips with the underlying processes or causal mechanisms that 
account for BV outcomes and does this by recognising the importance of context. depth 
and the material reality of social phenomena. 
The chapter then moved onto explain that the purpose of the research was both 
exploratory and analytical in orientation. The exploratory aspect of the research 
14) 
reflected the fact that the study was concerned partly at an important aspect of B\' that 
has had few studies devoted to it previously and partly at detailing the factors and 
underlying mechanisms involved in the implementation of BV. The analy1ical 
properties of the research, meanwhile, related to the decision to examine the four 
identified attributes of BV within a number of conceptually distinct contexts. 
Accordingly, the case study approach was considered to be the most appropriate method 
of research for this thesis with the resulting cases being selected according to a 
purposeful sampling framework. This embodied the three key criteria of former pilot 
status, former CCT activities and degree of external contractor involvement and led to 
the selection of three specific cases. 
The final section of the chapter then outlined the research methods chosen and 
explained that semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and paSSIve 
observations were all used on the basis of their relevance and depth and to ensure that as 
a whole they achieved methodological triangulation. Having, therefore, detailed both 
the method involved in conducting this study and the processes of BV against which 
they were concerned, the chapter concluded by detailing how these nvo elements were 
combined to reach robust conclusions on issue of the extent to which the claims and 
limitations of the four key attributes ofBV materialised empirically. 
Notes 
1 Likewise, as Davis and Wright (2004: 425) have maintained, while the Audit Commission appraises the 
success of local authorities' attempts in terms of linkages between local goals set for the BV revie\\s and 
outputs achieved, such approaches are 'bedevilled by problems of causal attribution. ' 
2 The multiple case study approach does not, therefore, seek representation III the usual statistical sense to 
render its 'generalisations' worthy and \"alid but can instead be representatiw in some way of a research 
topic (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In place of generalisability (Hamel 1993), the case study researcher 
might stress authenticity, representatiwness and conformance to reality (Denzin and Lincoln, 199.+; 
t\laxwell 1996). Instead of seeking certainty in the observed findings from the sample dra\\TI apply to the 
population from \\"hich it is dra\\ll, the case study researcher might seek to ascertain the degree of 
transferability from one studied case to another possible case (Lincoln and Guba, I%S). The. teml 
transferability in this regard can be traded for 'fittingness'. which is a direct function of the smulanty 
between two or more contexts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
3 The 'etic' approach is usually associated with the positivistic perspective and the notion that the belief 
in a world 'out there' that can be recorded and analysed independently of people's interpretations of it 
(May, 1993). This involves the categories or concepts of research being developed outside the 
observational group and used for all observed groups in the same way. 
4 The 'emic' approach is associated with the phenomenological perspective and the notion that the 
researcher is an insider, or part of what is observed (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). It, therefore, involves the 
researcher finding out how the group itself sees and categorises its world (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
5 This was particularly true of the examination of such documentation as the BV pilot bids, performance 
data and the BV performance plan, which had been written by a few senior officers and, therefore, 
represented a particular view of the policy in terms of its constitution, its purpose and its corporate values. 
Chapter 6 
Southampton City Council's BV review of Grounds Maintenance and 
Street Cleansing 
The first case study is of a unitary authority's BY review of grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing services. The two services employed approximately 180 front-line and 
support staff and had a combined service budget of £6.5 million in 2000101, of which 
£4.6 million was allocated to grounds maintenance and £1.9 million to street cleansing. 
Under the jurisdiction of Southampton Borough Council (SBC), both services had been 
subjected to two rounds of CCT and, with the exception of a small aboriculture (trees) 
contract, had been retained by the authority's own direct workforce. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Initially, a retrospective overview of the impact of 
CCT on the grounds maintenance and street cleansing services is provided. This is then 
followed in the second section by an outline of the BY pilot scheme conducted by the 
unitary authority in preparation for the grounds maintenance and street cleansing review. 
The third and more substantial section of the chapter then details how the BY review 
was actually conducted before a final section details the response of the BY inspectorate 
to it. 
l"+S 
The historical legacy of CCT 
Throughout the policy of CCT, SBC succeeded in retaining nearly all of its grounds 
maintenance and street cleansing contracts. This outcome was attributed to the 'politics 
of the Council and its support for in-house bids and resources' (Executive Councillor 
for Environment and Transport). 
Interviewees explained that, in the light of this policy of in-house provISIOn, 
responsibility for the implementation of CCT policy was handed to a core team of 
senior officers whose remit was to establish an effective contract tendering strategy in 
an attempt to prevent the competitive tendering out of services. In particular, the 
Executive Councillor for Environment and Transport described the contract strategy as 
having two key elements. Firstly, it entailed the preparation of highly detailed and 
prescriptive contract specifications, the intention of which was to increase the bid 
preparation workload of interested external contractors. Secondly, it entailed the core 
team of senior officers obtaining the rates of work schedules for grounds maintenance 
and street cleansing from some 'fifty or so other Labour controlled local authorities '. 
This allowed the core team to create a carefully crafted pricing structure that would 
ensure the authority priced its own bid for the tender competitively. 
Interviewees explained that the Council's first strategy of attempting to deter 
contractors from bidding failed because approximately seven expressions of interest and 
two competitive bids were received for the street cleansing contract and approximately 
seven expressions of interest and five competitive bids were received for each of the six 
grounds maintenance contracts (CIPFA data, 1999). In terms of raw tendering outcome, 
however, the authority could claim to have been reasonably successful, with all first 
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round grounds maintenance and street cleansing contracts having been retained in-house' , 
an outcome that owed much to the second tendering strategy of ascertaining cost 
competitiveness. 
Despite this apparent success, however, interviewees from across the authority reflected 
upon how, owing to such high levels of competition, the first round of CCT for street 
cleansing and ground maintenance had been 'catastrophic' in terms of jobs and service 
quality. On average, interviewees estimated that services had to be operated with 
approximately a third less grounds maintenance staff and a fifth less street cleansing 
staff. When probed about the impact of such employment reduction on service quality, 
respondents consistently explained that it had not been so much a matter of 'trimming 
waste and inefficiency' but rather a 'real deterioration in service quality' (Grounds, 
Cleansing and Waste Manager), with the outlying estate areas of the city suffering most. 
The problems respondents identified with service quality did not reside solely with the 
level of real competition received, however, but related also to the preparation of 
meticulously detailed contract specifications, brought about by the first of the 
authority's two key tendering strategies. This problem was then further exacerbated by 
the practical creation of a client-contractor split that demanded work orders were passed 
from one party to the other. Thus, both of these elements were described as encouraging 
a rather 'cumbersome and mechanical approach to service delivery' (Open Spaces 
Manager), with one respondent even able to provide evidence of how one grounds 
maintenance work schedule contained 'twenty-one stages of activity between the request 
for work from a council tenant to its completion' (Potential stages for procuring work by 
contractor following a request from a council tenant, sec, undated). This same 
respondent also explained how the deciphering of client and contractor responsibilities 
led to delays and frustrations on the front-line: 
'Nothing was done unless there was an order. It could be two or three ·weeks 
before things were done and in this way you were not getting very' good 
quality for the customer. Whereas before CCT, they just got on with it. the 
job was done' (The Area Grounds Officer). 
Other respondents from the contracting side of the organisation explained that one of 
the most noticeable changes in post-CCT employment for grounds maintenance was 
that 'a lot of the skilled staff left because they did not want to chase the earnings, for 
what in their view was an incomplete job' (Parks and Street Cleansing Manager). 
Consequently, the composition of the grounds maintenance staff became younger and 
less skilled, with fewer on apprenticeship schemes. As the parks and streets cleansing 
manager further explained: 
'/n the old days, gardeners would look after an area and do what needed to 
be done, but now it is to cut it is as quickly as you can. This reflected the 
nature of the contract specifications that were very much input-based' 
(Parks and Streets Cleansing Manager). 
Despite the existence of detailed contract specifications, interviewees explained that a 
fairly 'soft' and amicable client-contractor relationship was, howeyer, maintained, 
primarily because a number of the client-side officers were 'ex-DSO' staff and the 
politics of the Council remained committed to the front line. Consequently, failures in 
service perfom1ance were not as seyerely penalised as they might have been had the 
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contractor been an external body, with one client-based officer describing as follows the 
relative ease with which the DSO was able to avoid penalties for failing to complete 
tasks specified in the contract: 
'Specifications were never fulfilled ... because it was in-house, we did not 
really default and they got away with murder. The work they should have 
done, they did not do. Each year was split up into 13 months and for each 
month they had the work that they had to do, but if it was not done and I did 
not notice it, and they declared it, then they got away with it' (Area Grounds 
Officer). 
The changes introduced as a result of CCT were not considered to be entirely 
deleterious, however, with many client side officers in particular, explaining that the 
introduction of CCT eventually furnished them with an improved knowledge of service 
requirements and service composition. As the Grounds Maintenance Monitoring Officer 
explained: 
'Pre-CCT days we did not know what we managed, we were not clear about 
how mall)' acres of stuff we dealt with and what standards we were aiming 
at' (Grounds Maintenance Monitoring Officer). 
Client side officers also revealed that, as the policy of CCT matured, they increasingly 
learnt more about contract management and, in particular, how to remove from the 
contract items that had been specified but not actually provided. Although this tactic 
was at first reported to have been successful in that it led to 'painless cost reductions', 
the Programme Manager for Environment and Transport pointed out that there were 
limits to its use and it was not long, therefore, before the opportunities for such 
reductions had been exhausted: 
'You may be asked to visit a flower bed every week during the winter period, 
but in the winter period there is nothing going on, so that was a vel}' easy 
budget cut. They stopped us visiting and now we visit say once a month 
rather than once a week. There is no deterioration in service standards and 
that was an easy Cllt but of course once you get past that easy budget cut, 
then you have to start looking for cuts that are going to be much more 
difficult. That was when the grass cutting frequencies got cut down from 16 
times a year to 13/14 times a year. That is the real noticeable stuff' 
(Programme Manager, Environment and Transport). 
What these findings revealed, therefore, was a variety of interpretations of CCT, from 
producer group concerns with real service quality to client management staff concerned 
with making savings from activities they considered wasteful. 
Second round tendering 
In preparation for second round CCT, client side officers explained how increased 
knowledge about the two servIces encouraged them to combine the grounds 
maintenance and street cleansing services into one contract. The Council recognised that 
'both sen'ices were provided on a city-wide basis, 'within virtually the same areas' 
(Landscape and Development Officer) and for the same purpose - to maintain the 
appearance of the city's streets and open areas. In particular, it \\'as recognised that 
service integration \\'ould 'eliminate duplicated "vork. facilitate joint working alld lead 
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to a much better co-ordination of such tasks as litter picking and sweeping' (Corporate 
Competi ti on Report, 1991). 
In the event, however, objections from smaller contractors that they lacked the 
necessary capacity to provide the authority's proposed combined activities were 
accepted by the Department of the Environment which ruled that service intelITation b 
would be anti-competitive (Department of the Environment, Notice from Local 
Government Competition Division, 1996). As a result of the Government's ruling, the 
two services were consequently competed for separately (CIPFA data, 1999). Although, 
the authority successfully managed to retain the entire street cleansing service, in the 
face of 'three competitively priced external bids' (Corporate Competition Officer), it 
was only able to retain five of the six grounds maintenance contracts (CIPFA data, 
1999). Of the latter, the contract loss it did incur, however, was described as a 
'relative(v minor' trees contract and this only followed 'Secretary of State intervention 
via a Section 14 notice' (Corporate Competition Officer). This involved are-tendering 
exercise under Government Direction which followed a local specialist trees company 
complaint that the tendering process 'had been flawed' (Corporate Competition Officer). 
Despite the reasonably hostile nature in which the trees contract had been lost, however, 
when probed about the resulting monitoring arrangements, respondents pointed out that 
this service had 'only employed six staff H'hen it was council provided' and given the 
nature of the work involved 'did not incur undue problems' (Grounds Maintenance 
Monitoring Officer). 
Meanwhile, for the serVIces retained by the authority the situation was generally 
described as one of 'ensuring stability and maintaining competitiveness' (Corporate 
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Competition Officer). The level of competition incurred did, nonetheless, demand a 
further reduction of approximately five to ten per cent of front-line staff and further 
reductions in the frequency with which such functions as grass cutting and street 
cleaning were carried out. Some respondents explained that, at times, these second 
round revisions were simply unsustainable, particular during peak periods, when agency 
workers had to be recruited. Finally, according to union sources, the overall description 
of the long-term effect of CCT in terms of employment and service quality was one of a 
'des killing of grounds maintenance' and a 'loss of pride' in the work of staff more 
generally (Trade Union Side Secretary). 
The BV pilot scheme 
Both officers and staff alike indicated that they welcomed the incoming Labour 
Government's proposal to replace CCT with a BV system and believed that it would 
lead to a more wholesome, engaging and involved process of service delivery. Indeed, 
the authority'S successful BV pilot application had spoken of a positive shift away from 
the mentality of writing contracts, conducting market-testing exercises and monitoring 
contracts, towards more positive initiatives that would rectify and undo the problems 
brought about by CCT (SCC, Pilot Bid, 1997). 
In thus seeking to move away from the market led approach of CCT. SCC's BV pilot 
bid, entitled Older People in Southampton: Housing and Communi(1' Care, was a 
thematically arranged three-year investigation into the housing conditions of older 
people in the city. The pilot was very crosscutting in orientation and promised to dra\\ 
upon the experiences of a large number of indiyiduals, partner organisations and 
stakeholders. SCC's inclusiye stance reflected the Council's \\-ider philosophy of Ci(r 
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Governance and the notion that the future success of the city was not solely dependent 
on the perfonnance of the local authority but also on 'the actions of a whole range of 
organisations' (SCC, BV Pilot Bid, 1997). Within this vision, SCC viewed the private 
sector not as a domain to 'outsource services but as a genuine source of job creation 
and a potential sponsor of public projects' (SCC, BV Pilot Bid, 1997). 
One of the most important components of the authority's corporate BV review process 
was a Standards and Guidance document which provided an authority-wide blueprint 
for each individual BV review. The Standards and Guidance document explained how 
the authority would address each of the 'four Cs' of BV and, in doing so, foster a 
formulaic approach to the BV review process. It also reflected the authority's wider BY 
philosophy that the policy should be foremost concerned with the improvement of direct 
service provision, with competition only to be used in cases of 'failing' in-house 
services. Consequently, the difference between CCT and BV, as explained by one of the 
authors of the Standards and Guidance document, was that: 
'CCT prejudged that there would be competition, a reVlew of 
competitiveness doesn't' (First Perfonnance Review Officer). 
Consistent with this view, a competitive tendering exercise would, according to the 
Standards and Guidance document, only be enacted if the in-house team failed to 
identify a level of in-house improvement consistent with BV legislation: 
'Where the performance of a service is in line with the top ]5~o ofnalional 
indicators and / or local indicators for both quality alld cost alld the service 
matches the best alternati\'e supplier, then an ill-hollse service delil'en' 
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improvement plan should be prepared and implemented' (SeC, Standards 
and Guidance, 2000). 
Otherwise: 
'Where performance falls below the top 25% for either quality or cost, or 
does not match the best alternative supplier, an estimate of the costs of 
securing improvement of the in-house service is required. Evaluation must 
be made between this cost and the benefit to be gained from improvement. 
Where the pursuit of continuous improvement would not be cost effective or 
where, after implementing improvements, the in-house service fails to match 
the best alternative then competition should be fully considered as an 
option' (SeC, Standards and Guidance, 2000). 
Even if services failed and were, therefore, exposed to competitive pressures, the 
Standards and Guidance document explained that comparisons would be conducted in a 
manner that accurately estimated the respective transaction and monitoring costs. Such 
an approach, therefore, effectively embodied the view that competitive tendering and 
external contractor provision did not provide a panacea for the failings of in-house 
provision. The Standards and Guidance document had, therefore, been written with the 
view that in-house failure was not to be automatically met by the default transfer of the 
service to an external contractor. Rather, any potential alternative would also have to 
demonstrate that upper quartile status could be achieved within the relevant time scale. 
In effect, therefore, the authority had, VIa its Standards and Guidance document. 
demonstrated a continuing concern that external contractors might, as a result of 
developing BY policy, acquire responsibility for service provision. It, therefore, chose 
to utilise the 'restructure or reposition in-house service provision' option amongst the 
seven options for future service delivery as later provided in official BY guidance 
(DETR, 1999, see chapter 4). 
The grounds maintenance and street cleansing review 
Having chosen to restructure its in-house provision, the competition element of the 
authority's BY review process was siphoned from the other three C's outlined in BY 
guidance. Consequently, in reflection of this, this section examines how the review of 
grounds maintenance and street cleansing was conducted by recourse to the three 
remaining Cs of challenge, compare and consult and how the authority used them to 
create a service improvement plan detailing how it would continuously improve in-
house performance. 
Challenge 
Devised by corporate BY officers in a range of functional departments (SCC, BY 
Performance Plan, 2000-2001), the authority'S largely formulaic BY review of parks 
and streets services was steered by two Programme Managers who worked under the 
direction of the cabinet members with budgetary responsibility for the street cleansing 
and grounds maintenance services respectively. In their role as the steering group, the 
t\\'o programme managers were required to initiate the review and this began in the 
context of challenge. 
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The challenge element of the authority's review required the steering group to stress the 
importance of the two services to the authority's strategic outlook. In doing this, 
reference was made in the authority's BV performance plan to seventeen strategic 
)\'Orking papers that had been written by a BV core team to justify the range of services 
secured on behalf of the public by the Council and to reflect the crosscutting aspirations 
of the city (SCC, The Renaissance of the City, City Strategy Working Papers, 2000). 
Within this context, the continued provision of street cleansing and grounds 
maintenance activity was justified by the Council on the basis of the vital contribution 
that they made to the 'vibrancy', 'culture' and 'sustainability' of the city (SeC, The 
Renaissance of the City, City Strategy Working Papers, 2000). 
Having justified the provision of the two services at taxpayers' expense, the next stage 
of the process involved setting the objectives for the review. This process was 
conducted by a Project Team, which comprised seven supervisors and managers from 
the street cleansing and grounds maintenance services, in close collaboration with the 
steering group. Freed from the constraints of CCT and feeling 'empowered' by BV pilot 
status, the project team explained how they set out to reverse a number of the problems 
incurred by the former policy of CCT. The most demanding of which was identified as 
taking forward the previously prohibited plan to integrate grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing activity and therein remove the problematic client-contractor split. As 
the Grounds, Waste and Cleansing Manager explained: 
'One main objective )l'ill be to replace the cumbersome operation H'hereby 
the client tells the contractor lt1wt to do and rhus improve and streamline 
the process of getting H'Ork completed from the point of order rhrough to 
payment' (Grounds, \Vaste and Cleansing manager). 
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It was, therefore, proposed that an 'open spaces' team would be created comprising both 
grounds maintenance and street cleansing operations, as well as client and contracting 
staff. This, it was planned, would unleash operatives from the contract bureaucracy 
brought about by CCT in favour of a neighbourhood approach to service delivery. More 
specifically, under the proposed method of working, between six to ten area teams 
would be designated to specific areas thus enabling each to '/mOH' their patch' and to 
interact more flexibly with the local community (Open Spaces Manager). 
In particular, the proposed open spaces method of working was intended to incorporate 
a shift away from fixed frequency task allocation to a needs-driven, neighbourhood 
approach to service delivery that would 'empower' staff to feed off user concerns and 
trust them to do what needed to be done. It was further proposed that area managers, 
comprising ex-client personnel, would supervise each of the area teams to ensure 
effective co-ordinated working between grounds maintenance and street cleansing staff. 
The feasibility of the authority's open spaces proposal depended very much, howe\'Cr, 
on the freedom with which it would be able to pursue these plans without recourse to 
competitive tendering. Officers believed, for example, that if the competition element of 
BV was sanctioned too heavily in the legislation, it might prohibit the long-term 
removal of the client-contractor split and possibly even the authority'S desired proposal 
to integrate services. Many interviewees did not believe, therefore, that a competitive 
tendering exercise could be appropriately accommodated into the proposed changes to 
improve the service. As the Grounds Maintenance Monitoring Officer further explained: 
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'It would be more difficult for private sector organisations to cross cut 
across the authority in the way that we propose to, with staff interfacing 
with service llsers. So the actual comparison shown on competitil'eness is 
not that easy in this particular area' (Grounds Maintenance Monitorinu 
b 
Officer). 
Opposition to competitive tendering as a route to improvement was not ubiquitous 
throughout the review team, however, and actually angered some of the more pro-active 
client side officers who felt unable to manage contracts, as they would ideally have 
liked to: 
'The difficllI(v within the Council is that it is very protective of its DSOs, so 
you can point Ollt what the problems are but it is another problem dealing 
with that. If it is an outside contractor, you can cancel the contract [or} 
H'hatever. When it is your own team it is far more difficult to actllal(v 
address those issues effectiveZ-l' and it is the case that as a Council you 
cannot take it to court. You have got to work around how YOli get the best 
out of the contracting team, witholtt them feeling they are being victimised' 
(Environmental Services Group Manager). 
Compare 
The authority's rationale for the comparison element of the review was that it would 
fumish the review team with information detailing the necessary imprO\'ement required 
to achieve an upper-quartile standard of performance. The detem1ination of the baseline 
position for this entailed the project team conducting an analysis of available 
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perfonnance measurement infonnation, supplemented with a number of benchmarking 
exerCIses. 
According to many of the interviewees, the accurate establishment of the baseline 
position was problematicised by the inconsistent, unreliable and invalid nature of many 
of the existing statutory perfonnance measures. In the case of street cleansing, for 
example, project team officers explained that local authorities applied varying degrees 
of 'randomness of inspection,' in tenns of how often and when streets were inspected, 
and that numerous perceptions resided amongst inspectors with respect to what 
constituted 'a clean street'. As the Street Cleansing Team Leader further elucidated: 
The dodgiest thing to me about the whole exercise is I don't think anyone 
has real~1' grasped the need to lay out incredib~I' clear and precise 
guidelines about how you actually arrive at each performance indicator. 
The fear is that every authority is arriving at the figures in their own way 
and so are you real~r comparing like with like?' (Street Cleansing Team 
Leader). 
Interviewees also spoke of how their attempts to improve upon the accuracy of the 
methods and indicators used were equally fruitless since they only served to further 
differentiate their authority from other authorities which had not undertaken such efforts. 
As the Street Cleansing Team Leader explained in more detail: 
'We do it (performance monitoring) completely randomly with a computer 
generated programme that throws out the roads and away WE' go. 1 know of 
other authorities' that 1'l"rtual~v follmt· the teams' (Street Cleansing Team 
Leader). 
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Members of the proj ect team further called into question the reliability of the statutory 
performance measures and spoke of a constant flux of changing definitions and 
guidelines. Thus, officers pointed out that of the seven available grounds maintenance 
and street cleansing performance indicators, two were entirely new, one was no longer 
required for external evaluation purposes and three were subject to change as part of the 
wider transition from Audit Commission to DETR indicators. These alterations are, 
furthermore, borne out by the information provided in Table 6.1. Thus, this shows that 
of the seven prevailing performance indicators in the two case services only one, the 
'Net cost per km2 of keeping relevant land clean, for which local authority is 
responsible. clear of litter and refuse', remained unchanged during the period of the 
reView. All of the others either faced changes in their definition, were new or ceased to 
exist. 
Table 6.1 Performance Indicators or f G roun d s mamtenance an d St t I ree c eanslOg 
No. SERVICE AND INDICATOR SOURCE/ DESTINY 
Street cleansing 
1 Percentage of streets randomly inspected meeting Audit Commission - subject 
acceptable or high standards of cleanliness - category to change 
2 Level of satisfaction with the cleanliness New BY Performance 
indicator 
3 Net cost per km2 of keeping relevant land clean, for which BY performance indicator 
local authority is responsible, clear of litter and refuse 
4 The time taken to remove fly-tipping Audit Commission - subject 
to change 
5 The net spend per head on street cleansing Audit Commission - subject 
to change 
Parks and open spaces 
6 Cost per hectare Ceased in 1998 9 
7 Spending per head of population on cultural and New BY Performance 
recreational facilities and actiyities indicator 
, Source: SCC, Appendix 4, Parks and Cleansing Best \ alue Renew, 2001 
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Concerned by this lack of reliability and validity of the existing suite of national BV 
performance indicators, whilst being aware also of the continuous need to demonstrate 
'competitiveness', the project team supplemented the performance comparison 
component of the baseline review with benchmarking exercises held with a number of 
comparator authorities in its 'core cities' benchmarking group (Second Performance 
Review Officer). This process too was described as being riddled with difficulties, since 
the sheer amount of information obtained was identified as being difficult to digest and 
to analyse effectively. In particular, officers explained how various benchmarking 
measures could be combined, regressed and correlated in numerous ways so as to 
provide an almost infinite array of information. Indeed, personal examination of this 
performance data information revealed how SCC's relatiye street cleansing performance 
differed tremendously depending on whether the 'cost per km', 'cost per household', 
'cost per head of population' or 'km cleaned per full-time employee' was used as the 
unit of measurement. 
Likewise, although interviewees felt that the vanous measures and dimensions of 
performance did provide a more 'rounded' view of performance they did so at the 
expense of clarity and rendered it almost impossible for the local authority to succeed 
on all of the new measures created. As a result, the more the local authority made 
attempts to provide a fuller picture of performance, the cloudier the picture became. 
Thus, the grounds, cleansing and waste manager explained how it was actually \'ery 
difficult to demonstrate competitiveness by way of comparison: 
'Its actualh quite difficult proving hoH' we will be in the top 25% by 
reference to statuto!)! peljormance indicators, of which there are not many. 
This leal'cs aile lvifh the task of den:loping local ones alld thell YOll hm'c 
~ 
difficulties of comparing like for like' (Grounds, Cleansing and Waste 
Manager). 
He then moved on to talk of the more general ambiguities of BV and the uncertainty 
associated with it: 
'BV is more difficult because it is not close(r specified. It is going to be \'elY 
difficult for councils to know whether they are doing it right or not' 
(Grounds, Cleansing and Waste Manager). 
Meanwhile, interviewees explained how their attempts to demonstrate competitiveness 
via additional benchmarking exercises with external contractors also failed owing to a 
lack of interest on the part of those approached on the grounds of 'commercial 
sensitivity' (Head of the Neighbourhood Service Department). Even if external 
contractors had been willing to provide information, the head of the neighbourhood 
service department did not believe that the resulting information would have provided 
an officially accepted proxy for competitiveness, anyway, since it would not have been 
a real market comparison: 
There is on(r one 1my to compare yourself against the private sector and 
that is to conduct a competiti1'e tendering exercise but that beats the 
principle of doing a best value reviell" (Head of the Neighbourhood Sen"ice 
Department). 
In contrast, more locally inspired attempts at benchmarking, such as process 
benchmarking. which involved officers visiting other authorities to 'see holt' things arc 
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done' was described as being more useful in terms of actually improving services, even 
if it was not directly aimed at improving stated performance levels (First Performance 
Review Officer). 
Consultation 
Having rather unsatisfactorily compared the existing performance of the grounds 
maintenance and streets cleansing services, the project team progressed onto the second 
main strand of its review, which it entitled 'improvement options. ' This stage involved 
the project team conducting three consultation exercises with a variety of producer and 
user interests in order to find out what, in their view, the sources of the current fai lings 
with the service were and to identify ways in which the service might be practically 
improved in the future. 
In doing so, the producer and user group interests were first consulted with separately to 
gather their specific concerns about the two reviewed activities. They were then brought 
together for two away day consultation events to share ideas and to agree the substance 
of the statutorily required 'action plan'. Each of these consultation processes are 
considered in more detail below. 
Producer group consultation 
In terms of the producer group consultation, this initially, involved representatives from 
the two major trade unions in the two reviewed services being approached for their 
views. This union-based consultation \vas then supplemented by making all employees, 
both operatives and management a,,'are that the review was taking place \'ia the 
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dispersal of infonnation about the review during seven parks and streets review briefing 
sessions and the circulation of two BV -specific newsletters (SCC, Appendix 3, Parks 
and Cleansing Best Value Review, 2001). Meanwhile, a questionnaire was distributed to 
all parks and streets employees which asked them to rate the quality of the services they 
provided and to identify how much 'value for money they provided for the customer'. 
Only 20% of the questionnaires were returned, however, and the responses were not 
considered to be very infonnative or representative (SCC, Parks and Streets Review, 
Questionnaire to Employees, Summary Report, 2000). 
In contrast, interviewees revealed how a more detailed and enlightening fonn of 
analysis proceeded by way of consultation with a specifically created service 
improvement group comprising nine employees that met with the project team on two 
occasions for infonnal discussions and 'brainstonning'. During these discussions, 
employees were asked such questions as 'what are the majori~l' of compliments and 
complaints about? . and 'Are there any processes, systems or procedures that prevent a 
fast and efficient service?' Such questions allowed the project team to tap into the 
special knowledge held by staff with respect to their day-to-day experience of the 
service and their knowledge of user needs. As the Corporate Consultation Officer 
maintained: 
'Front line staff knOy\' what the public think, they receive the grief or the 
praises, day in day out, it would be foolish not to tap into that' (Corporate 
Consultation Officer). 
Union officials, nevertheless, explained that a number of employees expressed fear at 
these investigative questions as they effectively required them to make promises about 
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how they would work harder in the future, thus reflecting debates in the literature 
linking employee involvement initiatives with work intensification (Wood, 1991). A 
corporate BY officer did not dispute this rather pessimistic perspective but rather 
admitted that: 
'The staff clear~1' want to keep the service in-house but the1' need to 
demonstrate Whl' and what more they can do, In terms of continuous 
improvement, if they 'want to keep in house what more could they offer, what 
good ideas have they got that we could actually build into the future' 
(Second Performance Review Officer). 
Table 6.2 summarises the key points raised by the producer group interests during this 
initial phase of consultation and shows that they related primarily to organisational 
issues and implied a return back to the methods of organisation that had been in place 
prior to the introduction of CCT. Notable in this regard, was the request that the chain of 
command should be reduced and that front line employees should be provided with 
greater discretion to 'do what needed to be done and 110t necessariZl' was ill the contract 
specification' (SCC, Service Improvement Group, Session 1 and 2 Summary, 2000). 
Table 6.2 Summary of first phase of consultation with producer group interests 
Composition 
1 Parks and Streets employees 
2 Supervisors and Management 
3 Trade Union Representatives 
Consultation processes 
Two Newsletters 
Staff survey 
Seryice Improvement Groups 
Two series of road shows 
Key findings 
Reduce chain of command, 
introduce area based working 
Let those working in the area talk to 
customers direct 
Empower front line to decide what 
needs to be done. 
Litter pick before mowing 
Different standards between centre 
and neighbourhood areas 
More staff and resources to be I 
directed to frontline prOVision i 
I ~ lore enforcement 
1 
Source: SCC. Appendix 3. Parks and Cleansing Best \ alue Review. 2001 
User group consultation 
Although, the project team had conducted consultation with grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing staff, in part on the basis that they were' closer to the customer', it was 
also felt necessary to conduct a range of user consultation exercises to gain a more 
'rounded' view of the user's experience. The consultation with the user group interests 
first entailed the circulation of a random street survey administered across fourteen 
areas of the city, which obtained 130 responses, and a short ten-minute questionnaire 
that was sent out to 99 special interest groups, which received a fourteen per cent 
response rate (SCC, Appendix 3, Parks and Cleansing Best Value Review, 2001). 
These surveys were then followed by a series of open door discussion group sessions. 
These sessions, which were attended by six of the 99 invited special interest groups 
mentioned above, proceeded in a manner that was very similar to the service 
improvement groups held with staff (SCC, Appendix 3, Parks and Cleansing Best Value 
Review, 2001). The key findings to emerge from the first phase of consultation with 
user groups are summarised in Table 6.3. As can be seen they show that users wanted to 
be consulted more about the service, felt the need for more staff and resources and 
believed that greater enforcement measures should be utilised to prevent people from 
throwing litter on the streets and damaging public facilities. 
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Table 6.3 Summary of first phase of consultation with user group interests 
Composition Consultation processes Key findings 
1 Organised local groups 
Community Action 
Forums 
Random street survey 
10-minute Special Interest Group 
questionnaire 
Consult users more about the service 
'\10re enforcement 
More litter bins 
Tenants and Residents 
Associations 
Open Door Sessions 
Existing City Council consultative 
mechanisms including community 
action forum and Citizens Panel 
Different standards between centre 
and neighbourhood areas 
Litter is mown with grass 2 Special interest groups 
Clean is Better 
Parks and Commons 
Protection Society 
Traders need to look after frontages 
More staff and resources to be 
directed to frontline provision 
3 Individuals 
Citizens 
I'isitors 
Source: SCC, Appendix 3, Parks and Cleansing Best Value Review, 2001 
These findings did not really surpnse project team officers because 'established 
complaints lines and customer satisfaction monitoring mechanisms already existed' 
(Grounds Cleaning and Waste Manager). In particular, it was noted that the Council 
regularly obtained information from users via elected ward councillors and had a 1500 
strong citizen's panel in place (BV performance Plan, 2001102). To some interviewees. 
therefore, the consultation was viewed as little other than a BV requirement to be 
addressed for audit and inspection purposes. As the Parks and Street Cleaning Services 
Senior Operations Manager further elucidated: 
'To be honest, this sounds a bit arrogant I knOH', but I think most of us could 
have sat down and written H1zat was going to come out of this consultation 
before it happened really. But do not get the impression that we framed the 
questions in a certain 1my to get these results, but 1t'e hm'e been working in 
the industly for years and we know what bugs people. And there was 
nothin o reall,' shockin o to come out. I think people had to be seen to be 0, 0 
asked' (Parks and Street Cleaning Seryices Senior Operations ~lanager). 
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Nonetheless, in terms of seeking to provide a harmonious and grounded future direction 
for the service, a number of common strands and agreements between the user and 
producer groups to emerge out of this initial phase of consultation were published in the 
authority's BV consultation documentation (SeC, Appendix 3, Parks and Cleansing 
Best Value Review, 2001). In particular, this revealed that both of the two consultation 
groups stressed the need for more staff to be employed in the service and that greater 
enforcement powers should be enacted to prevent people from, for example, thro\\·ing 
litter in the first place. 
On the contrary, there were also examples of how difficult it is to reconcile different 
interests. This was notably true of concerns with the different standards of quality 
between the city centre and outlying neighbourhood areas. Thus, whilst the majority of 
the producer group interests and local tenants complained at the deteriorating standards 
of the outlying neighbourhood areas, it was simultaneously reported, that some of the 
special interest groups within the user group contingent expressed the need to retain the 
quality of prestigious royal parks. This concern was likened to 'keeping up 
appearances' and of the need to attract visitors. 
First awav dav 
In partly seeking to rectify such differences, the third stage of consultation comprised 
two 'away-day' events during which the project team brought members of the two 
consultation groups together to discuss their concerns and to create priorities for the 
future. Twelve employees, two union officials and fifteen delegates, representing a 
variety of tenant and local interest groups, attended the first a\\'ay day (Parks and Streets 
Review, Away-day Documentation. sce, 2000). Authority documentation revealed that 
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this adopted a workshop style approach which sought to get attendees to actively 
participate in the activities devised by the project team. For example, a 'post bag' 
activity required delegates to list complaints, compliments and comments on key issues 
affecting the service and a related questionnaire required participants to rate the top ten 
identified problem areas out of a list of twenty (SCC, Parks and Streets Review, Away-
day Documentation, 2000). 
In addition to allowing participants to prioritise their concerns for the future, the away 
day also allowed delegates to share their grievances with one another and to better 
understand the perceptions of each other. According to many respondents, this process 
was a 'very intense affair' and represented one of the most significant e\"ents of the 
entire BY review (Programme Manager, Leisure). In particular, interviewees reflected 
upon how, during the first away day, a number of the more vocal delegates accused 
other delegates of being directly responsible for service failings and such accusations 
roughly materialised into an argument between staff and users. Thus, for example, 
interviewees reported how frontline staff argued that users did not fully appreciate the 
pressures that they worked under and argued that many of the highlighted problems, 
such as unclean streets, stemmed from the behaviour of the public and their reluctance 
to be responsible for their litter. In contrast, users argued that the town was too dirty and 
that if existing staff could not provide a better service, then perhaps someone else 
should be given the opportunity to do so. 
Despite not reaching any solid conclusions, the main findings of this away day exercise 
were compiled in a summary document and sent out to all participants with a thank you 
letter (Parks and Streets Reyiew, First Away-day Documentation, SCC, 2000). This 
letter explained that the away day had been a productive event that has generated ideas 
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for further investigation'. It also invited previous participants to a second away day that 
would, in part, involve the authority reporting back on the service improvements it was 
proposing for the parks and streets services. 
Consequently, having conducted a reasonably demanding process of consultation, 
supplemented by regularly collected corporate infonnation and the away day event, the 
project team began to create a series of service delivery options. These were fused out 
of the infonnation gathered from the consultation and comparison exercises and led to 
the creation of specific targets for improvement. The appropriateness of these targets 
fonned the core subject matter for the second away day. 
Second away day 
The project team's rationale for conducting the second away day event was to gain 
support, and ultimately to demonstrate accountability, for its proposals for BY and, in 
particular, those relating to the gaining of future service improvement. The gaining of 
such legitimacy foremost entailed away day attendees 'setting targets for three key 
performance measllres' that had been chosen by the project team to justify and endorse 
the authority'S commitment to continuous service perfonnance improvement (SCC, 
Parks and Streets Review, Second Away-day Documentation, 2000). As demonstrated 
below, the first two of these indicators derived from the more general national suite of 
BY perfonnance indicators and were, therefore, statutory, while the third, a public 
satisfaction indicator, was created locally in response to concerns about the 
discrepancies in quality between royal parks and estate areas: 
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1. Actual level of cleanliness of the city for grade A+B (national indicator) 
2. Public satisfaction with the standard of cleanliness (national indicator) 
3. Public satisfaction with standard of maintenance on housing estate greens (local 
indicator) 
At the start of the second away day, it was observed how the project team provided an 
explanation of the composition of the three performance indicators and followed this 
with a group debate concerning the desired future performance targets for each of them. 
During this debate, a number of the away day participants were observed to express 
scepticism about both the authority's stated account of 'current' service performance 
and also its proposed performance targets. In particular, participants were seen to 
complain that published accounts of service performance could be manipulated to 
managers' own ends and did not always tally with user experience. For example, 
participants mocked heavily the authority's claim that, according to the procedures 
outlined in the Environmental Protection Act (1990), 92% of the city's streets were 
currently of a 'grade A or B' standard of cleanliness. 
The notion that formal and internal assessments of performance did not tally with user 
experience was further borne out by documentary evidence which claimed that although 
90 per cent of the authority's highways were, according to the procedures outlined in 
the Environmental Protection Act, assessed as meeting a 'high' or 'acceptable' standard 
of cleanliness, only 24.1 per cent of respondents asked, as part of a 1500 wide citizens 
panel, were 'satisfied' with such cleanliness. 
Not only did users complain about the authenticity of internal performance indicators, 
but the project team expressed scepticism about the accuracy of the external measures 
of perfornlance. Thus, during interviews, members of the project team pointed out the 
types of flaws that also resided in measures of consumer satisfaction. For example, a 
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number of project team members explained how users' perceptions might be based on 
such unstable premises as 'the weather', 'people's moods' and 'visibility of service 
activity'. As a Street Cleansing Team Leader later elucidated: 
'We get a lot of different views depending on various triggers, how often 
they think they see the bloke coming down the street to clean it, rather than 
the amount of litter' (Street Cleansing Team Leader). 
Wishing not to downplay all three indicators and by implication, the entire consultation 
and comparison processes, however, the project team reiterated the importance of 
entering into the spirit of BV and of providing future performance targets. Such targets, 
the project team maintained, would form the basis of auditors' and inspectors' 
judgements of the service and should therefore be taken seriously. 
Subsequently, during the ensuing debate, the project team ensured that the future target 
for the 'actual' level of cleanliness would meet the statutorily required top 25% and, in 
doing so, entail an increase in the level of cleanliness of the city from 92 per cent to 
97.1 per cent. Away day attendees signed up to this target, if only on the basis that it 
signalled the authority's commitment to improve services, but simultaneously were 
observed to express the concern that it represented yet another dubious figure. 
The two public satisfaction measures, by way of contrast, did not have to reach the 
upper quartile position because they were not 'upper quartile' indicators. Tvlembers of 
the project team, therefore, chose to ensure that away-day participants created 
reasonably demanding local targets, thus demonstrating the authority'S commitment to 
continuous service improvement. Consequently, the 'le\-el of satisfaction with the 
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standard of maintenance on housing estate greens' was targeted to increase from 1 7.1 % 
to over 45% by 2005 while the 'level of public satisfaction with the cleanliness of 
Southampton' was targeted to increase from 24.1 % to over 50% by 2006. The le\'el of 
improvement demanded on these two locally derived satisfaction indicators \\'as , 
therefore, quite dramatic, with a two and half fold increase required on the first indicator 
and a doubling of performance improvement on the second indicator. In contrast, the far 
smaller targeted improvement on the upper quartile performance indicator reflected the 
fact that the existing level of performance was much higher, with less room for 
improvement. 
Service Improvement Plan 
Following a laborious year-long BV review process, the project team, had identified a 
range of service improvements that, if achieved, would be sufficient, in its view, to 
propel the integrated parks and streets service into the upper quartile performance 
position and thus achieve continuous in-house improvement. The project team's 
proposals were written up in a glossy service improvement plan that contained within it 
an impressive array of charts and referenced material. Despite these rather ambitious 
plans it was still the case, nonetheless, that at the reporting stage of the service 
improvement plan, 'the most pressing matter J of integrating street cleansing and 
grounds maintenance operations was still III the process of negotiation between 
management and staff. 
The reason for this, according to trade union representatives. \\'as that the proj ect team's 
preoccupation \\'ith making sure that the stated accounts of performance \\'ere consistent 
with statutory requirements had diverted much time away from the substantive 
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objectives of the review. Thus, when members of the project team were asked the more 
difficult question of how the local authority might actually achie\"e such a large 
improvement in performance across these three indicators, they admitted that this area 
needed more work and commitment. 
This last statement was understandable given that it was clear that the merging of the 
street cleansing and grounds maintenance activities faced difficulties. The Trade Union 
Side Secretary noted, for example, that street cleaners were reluctant to pick litter from 
grass while grounds maintenance staff felt that service integration would reduce their 
responsibilities. In a similar vein, the head of the neighbourhood services diyision, with 
ultimate officer responsibility for the two services, observed that: 
'If we co-ordinate at the lowest level, total front-line, they ·will probably be 
against it, they have taken the view that someone who cuts grass is superior 
to someone that sweeps up. There is little chance that a grass cutter will 
have a brush in their hand. They agreed in principle but felt that it should be 
co-ordinated at supervisory level' (Head of the Neighbourhood Services 
Division). 
Against this background, one respondent somewhat cynically suggested that there was a 
much simpler solution to the problem of how to improve service performance. This was 
to remove the 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' response category from the consumer 
satisfaction survey since in his view such a change would provide a potential 3.+ per 
cent further satisfied respondents! 
Whatever the exact direction of the two services, however, responsibility for ensuring 
that the changes identified in the service improvement plan were achieyed, was handed 
to a change management team. This comprised senior officers from the open spaces 
team, with additionally support coming from the corporate personnel function. The 
necessary revisions identified in the service improvement plan were scheduled for a 
five-year period commencing in April 2001. Notably, in identifying the key step 
changes required, the service improvement plan also acknowledged that additional 
resources would be required to attain some of the necessary improvements. Otherwise: 
'If resource levels remain at the current levels or are reduced further then 
adjustments to the targets will be required' (Executive Summary, Service 
Improvement Plan, sec, 2001). 
Finally, in recognition also that it had not directly competed during the review, the 
project team made a rather telling revision to the executive summary of its service 
improvement plan. This revision involved the project team making an even greater 
commitment to the involvement of external contractors in the delivery of the two 
services and further suggested that, to date, the authority had only determined the 
changes to service delivery and not who might be best placed to provide them: 
'After reorganisation changes have settled dOlt'll the situation will be 
reassessed to evaluate whether or not the in-house provision is the most 
cost-effectil-e method of delivering specific elements of the sen-ice' 
(Executive Summary, Service Improvement Plan, sec, 2001). 
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Interviewees later explained how this erroneous statement effectively, in the eyes of the 
BY inspectorate, amounted to a promise to conduct a competitive tendering exercise 
once the proposed changes had time to settle down. Consequently, despite all the efforts 
of the project team to demonstrate competitiveness, in the event, the key difference 
between a BV review and a CCT exercise, in terms of competition, effecti\'ely related to 
the amount of preparatory work involved prior to the tendering of services. 
The BV Inspection 
Having taken approximately a year to conduct the BV review of grounds maintenance 
and street cleansing activity, the project team created a final version of the BY service 
improvement plan that it hoped contained within it sufficient measures to propel the 
combined street cleansing and grounds maintenance activity into the upper quartile 
position. Although the desired improvement in performance it had promised had been 
rather dubiously arrived at, the project team still believed, nonetheless, that the key step 
changes it had proposed would deliver real improvement to services. The final task of 
the project team with respect to the BV process was to convince the impending 
inspection team of this. 
A three-person team conducted the week-long BV inspection of SCC's parks and streets. 
Following analysis of the authority'S BY review documentation and a series of 'reality 
checks,' the inspection team 'scored' the current performance of the parks and streets 
service and provided an estimate of the likelihood that it would 'imprO\'e in the futurc', 
In temlS of the first judgment, the BY inspection team reached the \'crdict that the 
current quality of the combined grounds maintenance and street cleansing sen'ice \\'as 
'fair', an assessment that did not really surprise project team members. most of whom 
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had predicted this score before hand anyway. Thus, as the Open Spaces Manager 
explained: 
'It does not take them (the inspectorate) to tell us where we are at the end of 
the day, if you looked at Southampton we are pretty poor, but we do have the 
ability to improve, and so we want to improve in the future' (Open Spaces 
Manager). 
More generally, the inspection team fully accepted the project team's rationale for 
conducting the review in the way that it had done so, and this was particularly true in 
terms of the attempts SCC had made to undo the problems brought about by the 
previous policy of CCT. In particular, the BV inspection team welcomed the 
introduction of the open spaces team and believed that the approach should be 
'developed so that all staff have opportunities to fully apply their skills' (Audit 
Commission, 2002a: 72). 
The inspection team also believed, along with the project team, that the grounds 
maintenance and street cleansing services had the ability to improve and consequently 
made the judgement that the 'prospects for service improvement were promising '. This 
verdict had, however, been strongly influenced by the fact, that during its visit, the 
inspection team learnt that the authority had managed to attain additional resources from 
the Council's budget for the two services. As the inspection report maintained: 
'Initially we had concerns about the resources that 'were available to delin?r 
improvements and what sources of funding had been identified and were 
being pursued. Much of the improvement plan \\'as to be funded by 
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reallocating existing resources. However, some actions did not have funding 
identified. While we were on site we learnt that councillors had approved 
funding for two years for a programme called 'improving the visible quality 
of the environment '. This will allow the implementation of the rest of the 
actions in the improvement plan' (Audit Commission, 2002a: 27). 
This response perhaps, influenced by the knowledge that the authority had explicitly 
documented that it spent approximately £1.20 per head (equivalent to an annual 
difference of £256,000) less on street cleansing than the average upper quartile authority 
in terms of a 'high' or 'adequate' standard of cleanliness (Audit Commission data, as 
reported by SCC, June 2000) and that there was, therefore, more scope for justified 
increased resources. 
If the inspection team was fairly upbeat about the future improvement prospects of the 
street cleansing service it had rather more concerns with the likely future performance 
of parks maintenance. As the BV inspection report (Audit Commission, 2002a: 21) 
maintained: 
'In conclusion, Southampton's performance on street cleaning is above 
average when compared with other councils, and we consider that the 
Council 'will be able to achie\'e best 25 per cent performance. However, the 
COllncil compares less well in regards to parks 'fith higher spending and 
falling satisfaction levels' (Audit Commission, 2002a: 21). 
In addition, despite reaching the yerdict that the parks and streets SerYICe would 
'probably improye in the future,' the inspection team did raise a number of concerns 
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about the way in which the review had been conducted and expressed related concerns 
that not all of the desired means of BV had been adhered to. In terms of the challenge 
element, for example, the BV inspection team recommended that the integrated service 
should 'contribute to achieving the broad strategic themes, such as 'the healthy City' 
and 'safe City '. For their part, interviewees expressed annoyance at this 
recommendation since it seemed to ignore the efforts that the project team had made to 
link each review to the authority's strategic framework. Indeed, they believed that had 
the project team 'not bothered to link the review to the strategic working papers', in the 
elaborate manner in which it had done so, 'the inspection team It'ould probably not have 
raised the issue at all' (Area Grounds Officer). 
It was, however, the local authority's lack of competitive tendering that caused the 
greatest concern amongst inspectors. In particular, the BV inspectors strongly disputed 
the authority'S promise to 'rigorously and independently compare' the competitiveness 
of the in-house provider (Audit Commission, 2002a: 24) and stated in no uncertain 
terms that: 
'(Rigorous and independent comparison) was not done ... The Council took 
the view that it would be better to wait until the present reorganisation was 
completed. It decided to review the effectiveness of the restructured service 
at a later date, seeking evidence of improved service efficiency and economy. 
We consider this a weakness of the review' (Audit Commission, 2002: 25). 
The BV inspection report went on to state that: 
The opportunity had been missed to go out to the market alld also (0 
consider partnership and tnlst options as part of the rel'iew. This is 
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important because of the need to explore a range of options in order to be 
able to demonstrate that sen;ices are being delivered efficiently and 
effectively to meet the needs of local people' (Audit Commission, 2002a: 25). 
The resulting inspection recommendation, 'to prepare and carry out a market testing 
exercise for grounds maintenance and street cleaning sen;ices, ' was later described as 
having been 'met with uproar and dismay amongst members of the project team' (Area 
Grounds Officer). One of the strongest objections to competition was that it would 
involve the authority undoing much of the hard work it had undertaken to arrive at the 
key step changes. In particular, the undertaking of a fresh competitive tendering 
exercise would entail the re-introduction of the client-contractor split, the removal of 
which had been at the forefront of the authority'S practical aims for the revie\v. As the 
service improvement plan had previously stated: 
'It H'ould not be possible at this time to procure sen;ices from the market-
place that match the integrated sen'ice provision developed by see H'itholit 
reinventing the 'client' to let and el'alllate tenders, appoint contractors and 
administer the contract' (SCC, Service Improvement Plan, 2001). 
Indeed, while the inspection report recognised that the 'client-contractor split' had a 
deleterious impact on service perfonnance and staff morale, it still recommended 
competitive tendering: 
'Staff have been H'orking to a specification drawn up under the compulsory 
competitil'e tendering arrangements. Under the terms of this specification, 
the range of maintenance permitted was restricted and limited. Staff hm'e 
been unable to rectify damage. due to prescriptive schedules of work and 
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tight timescales for routine maintenance. This has meant that staff hm'e been 
unable to deal with the range of problems and damage' (Audit Commission, 
2002a: 16). 
It was almost as if, therefore, the recommendations provided by the inspection team 
derived from some predetermined check-list that paid scant regard to the particular 
findings that had been unearthed during the visit. Indeed, in many respects the BV 
inspection team appeared to be far more hostile to the authority's corporate BV review 
process than even the then DETR. For example, a DETR produced procurement 
publication had praised the authority's corporate approach to continuous improvement 
and warmly embraced the link between compare and consult: 
'Southampton Cit)' Council's policy for competitiveness deals H'ith the 
'make or buy' part of B V Every service is measured against the public and 
private sectors in terms of competitiveness to see whether the)' are achieving 
the top :: 5~ o. If a service area is not achieving this they must set out a plan 
detailing how they intend to achie\'e this. If it is decided that the service area 
cannot realisticalh' achie\'e the top quartile, in terms either of cost or 
quality, then other service delivery options (as set out in the Statutory 
Guidance) must be considered' (DETR, Organisation and profile of 
Procurement: 23, 2001). 
The inspection team, operating from within a different regulatory context, however. 
disputed the worthiness of the authority'S approach to continuous service improvement 
and appeared to be more preoccupied with the authority'S \veak efforts to conduct a 
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competitive tendering exercise. For this case at least, it seemed that the means rather 
than ends took priority in the inspectors' judgements. 
Conclusions 
This case study has demonstrated how SCC conducted a BY review of t\\·o services 
previously subject to CCT and the response to this review by the BV inspectorate. It 
began by detailing the impact of CCT on the two services and revealed that following 
two full rounds of tendering, the authority managed to retain all services. with the 
exception of a rather minor trees contract, in-house. Despite this apparent success, 
however, the first section of the chapter also noted that the exposure to competition had 
exerted a major disciplining effect on the authority and led to substantial reductions in 
employment and service quality within the two services. In addition, problems were 
found to have arisen as a result of the way in which the two services had to be operated 
in a post-CCT environment and, in particular, by the complications brought about by the 
introduction of a contract bureaucracy. 
Against the backdrop of this unsatisfactory experience, the second section of the chapter 
explained that personnel from across the authority warmly embraced the incoming 
Labour Government's proposed BY pilot scheme, not least because it promised to 
pro\-ide participating local authorities with a greater degree of freedom and flexibility 
than was the case with CCT. The resulting BY pilot project created in the authority was 
shown to reflect this view, with proposals to remove a\\·ay from the inflexible and 
bureaucratic practices of CCT being given much prominence in the bid submission. 
With BY having replaced CCT, and SCC having been selected as a pilot, the chapter 
moved on to describe how the authority proposed to take the opportunity to reverse the 
problems brought about by CCT and how it had planned to do so without recourse to 
competitive tendering. In the local authority'S view, the process and impact of 
competitive tendering had created a number of obstacles to the effective provision of 
quality services and such an approach would not, therefore, be voluntarily utilised by it 
under BY. 
In line with this approach, the third section of the chapter moved on to provide a 
detailed overview of how the review of grounds maintenance and street cleansing was 
conducted by recourse to the three Cs of challenge, compare and consult, with 
competition being purposefully siphoned off by the authority as a fall back measure in 
the event of service failings. Although the authority's aspirations for BY were not too 
dissimilar from the Government's desired outcomes, based as they were on the 
continuous improvement of local service, the findings from the review demonstrated 
how difficult the authority found it to demonstrate 'competitiveness,' without recourse 
to competitive tendering. It was revealed, nonetheless, that whilst the project team had 
no doubt that the proposed changes it had planned for the reviewed services, primarily 
in the form of the creation of an open spaces team, would lead to improvements in 
service perfom1ance, the key issue of whether they would formally be measured as 
having done so was doubted. 
In the event, the final section of the chapter revealed that although the BV inspectorate 
reached the judgement that the authority had 'promising prospects for improvement', it 
still recommended that the authority should conduct a competitive tendering exercise. 
This was a recommendation, ho\vever, \vhich not only had the potential to reverse some 
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of the key initiatives that the authority had planned and which had justified the need for 
a BV review initially but also served to question the extent to which BV truly allo\\"s 
authorities to 'restructure their [former CCT} in-house services' without resorting to 
competitive tendering. 
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Chapter 7 
Newham's London Borough's BV review of leisure centres 
This chapter takes as its case a London borough authority's BV review of leisure centres. 
At the start of the review in 1999, the authority directly provided three leisure centres, at 
an annual budgeted cost of £3.13 million. The authority was also in the process of 
completing the construction of a fourth, lottery-funded, leisure centre, which was due to 
open two years after the commencement of the review. The existing leisure centres 
employed approximately 100 full-time equivalent staff and it was anticipated that a 
further forty employees would be required for the new centre. 
This chapter broadly follows the structure of the previous one in examining the impact 
of the BV review on Newham's leisure centres provision. Thus, initially, it details the 
impact of CCT on the authority's leisure centres provision. It then goes on to provide an 
outline of the authority's aspirations for the BV pilot scheme by detailing the most 
salient elements of it. Following this, the chapter moves on to detail how the BV review 
of leisure centres was conducted and, subsequently, examines the resulting partnership 
that was established with an outside provider. Finally, the fifth section of the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the response to the review by the BV inspectorate. 
The historical legacy of CCT 
Throughout the policy of CCT Ne\vhanl London borough council (NLBC) succeeded in 
retainino responsibility for its leisure centres provision. though its' grip' on them was 
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not merely the outcome of political considerations but rather a product of the efforts of 
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DSO managers fighting hard in the face of mounting competition. Initially, there had 
been no fight because the implementation of the first round of CCT proceeded in the 
context set out for it by the authority's strong Labour leadership and its policy of 
'seeking to win and retain all of the services subjected to CCT' (First Corporate 
Contract Officer). This policy reflected the view amongst leading councillors that CCT 
legislation was 'akin to privatisation and bad for local democracy' (NLBC, Council 
Minutes, 1990). Thus, as a Corporate Policy Manager explained, throughout the early 
days of CCT the Council expressed 'Ve}~1' strong support for local employment to 
support the local economy'. In adopting a hostile attitude to CCT and, more specifically. 
in seeking to retain all services without making reductions to jobs or service quality, 
interviewees revealed that a highly centralised approach to CCT was adopted which 
entailed the creation of a core CCT team to implement the policy and to present a 
Jocl/sed and coherent opposition' (Second Corporate Contracts Officer). 
Despite the undeveloped nature of the leisure service market, however, former members 
of the core team explained how, against this background, they still decided not to take 
any risks with the preparation of the first leisure management contract. One explained, 
for example, how he and his colleagues had been instructed to prepare the leisure 
contract in such a way as to increase the time, costs and risks incurred by competing 
contractors. Consequently, it was explained that not only did the core CCT team write, 
as it had done for all CCT contracts, meticulously detailed and prescripti\'e 
specifications, but it also prepared separate contracts for each of the authority's three 
leisure centres. These efforts had the desired effect since no external contractors 
'expressed an interest' for any of the three leisure centres contracts (CIPFA data, 1992), 
with the authority, therefore. being able to retain responsibility for all of them. 
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The second round of CCT 
The second round of leisure centres CCT occurred in 1997. Respondents explained that 
by this relatively late stage in the life of CCT the politics of the Council were moving 
keenly in favour of BV policy and as a consequence took a more pragmatic approach to 
competition and to the potential involvement of external contractors in the delivery of 
local services. In line with this new, 'less defensive approach' (BV Procurement 
Officer), interviewees explained that responsibility for the preparation of second round 
CCT was devolved to separate service departments and the message cascaded to them 
by the Council's political leadership was that they should adopt a more 'even handed' 
(Second Corporate Contracts Officer) approach to CCT. The policy of CCT was hence 
now no longer conceptualised by leading officers and councillors in the authority as a 
threat to local service provision but rather as a 'rigorous and necessary test of the 
econonn' and efficiency of local services' (NLBC, Leisure Service Division's 
Evaluation of the performance of Leisure, 1997). A former Core Contracts Officer 
explained this new policy context in the following terms: 
'Whilst DSO's were encouraged to prepare tenders in a bid to retain 
servIces, they were also expected to facilitate a more even-handed contest 
than the rather biased approach adopted to CCT in the first round. If 
contractors were better 011 price and l'alue then the H'ork was expected to go 
to them. Othent'ise, if DSO could do it and was as good as anybody else 
then it could canT 011 ' (Corporate Policy Manager). 
At departmental level, meanwhile, officers from the leisure service department (LSD) 
reported how, in accordance \\"ith the Council leadership's ne\\ approach, they began 
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the second round of CCT with a view to learning more about the private leisure sen-ices 
market. Interviewees explained that this involved the LSD consulting with six external 
contractors to ascertain their thoughts on the authority's existing contract documentation 
and subsequently led to the conclusion that external contractors "would express more 
interest in operating the leisure service if the three existing leisure contracts were 
repackaged and competed for as one' (First Leisure Centre Manager)_ This conclusion, 
moreover, proved to be correct since when the LSD tendered the second round leisure 
centres contract as one, a previously dormant local leisure service market erupted and 
four 'expressions of interest' eventually materialised into two external bids, a figure 
later confirmed by LGMB statistics (LGMB, 1997a). 
The two competing external bids were reported to have been \'e,}' '.t'ell priced and 
targeted' (Service Development Officer), with only £100,000 per annum on the 
submitted contract value separating the lowest externally priced bid with that of the 
DSO. Officers from the LSD revealed, however, that in preparing the in-house bid they 
used the special discretion afforded to them by the nature of the leisure service 
tendering arrangements to 'assess favourably' (Second Leisure Centres Manager) the 
DSO's planned membership scheme to provide unlimited access to users for £30 per 
month. Multiplied against the predicted take-up of the membership scheme, the DSO 
bid submission was calculated to amount to a lower operational subsidy than the two 
competing alternatives and for this reason was chosen. At a more senior level, the 
Divisional Director of Recreation agreed that the resulting figures for the leisure 
sen-ices tendering had not been created in the most objective or scientific way: 
'If YOli en'r hal'e a DSO bid coming in and a DSO manager is bidding 
against exrernal contractors and they don't want to transfer Ol'er, then YOll 
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think well, if they project high levels of income, H110 carries the risk and 
with the private companies its them, but with us its the Council. 
Subsequent~v there is a lot of leeway for a DSO manager to transfer that risk 
back to the Council in their bidding strategy' (Divisional Director of 
Recreation) . 
The financial repercussions of the authority retaining continued in-house provision \\'as 
that it necessitated a £550,000 (20%) reduction on the existing per annum subsidy le\'el, 
In discussing this figure, however, the leisure development and operations manager 
explained that a reduced subsidy allowance did not immediately 'pose a threat to jobs 
or service quality' since the evaluation of tenders was predominantly based upon 
'competitors' income projections', which in tum, reflected predicted user numbers and 
user charges 'and almost anything could be put dowll here'. 
The lasting impact of second round leisure centres CCT for the leisure centres had been, 
therefore, to increase the emphasis 'placed upon marketing existing and new sen'ices 
rather than making cuts to existing service levels' (Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager). Nonetheless, one respondent explained that this revised focus had 
the effect of diverting attention away from the core function of the service, namely that 
of providing leisure services (Service Development Officer). 
The BV pilot scheme 
Shortly follO\ving the retention of leisure centres provision NLBC learnt that it had 
successfully applied for BV pilot status. In the eyes of the authority'S leadership, the 
introduction of BY 'wiped rhe slate clean' \vith respect to previous tendering 
19~ 
experiences and provided it with the opportunity to demonstrate 'just how much it could 
do' with the emerging BV philosophy and the twelve BV principles (Second Corporate 
Contracts Officer). Thus, as part of its pilot bid, Newham LBC emphasised its overall 
philosophy for the future development of the borough as follows: 
'The Council wants to rebuild east London and foster a prosperous 
community in which people enjoy a better quali~v of life, with safe and 
attractive neighbourhoods, good housing and local services, a community in 
which people are empowered to take responsibili~v for themselves and one 
another. By 2010 Newham will be a major business location and a place 
where people will choose to live, work and slav' (NLBC, Pilot Bid 
Application, 1997). 
Respondents agreed that the policy of BV was driven relentlessly from the top of the 
authority, with leading councillors and officers seeking to exert a major influence on the 
development of BV legislation (Evening Standard, 22 June, 2000:24-25). Personal 
examination of the authority's BV pilot application also revealed that, in the context of 
the other thirty four pilot bids, it was highly ambitious in nature and foremost based 
around 'challenging' the current status of service delivery with a view to embracing 
external contractors in the delivery of local services (NLBC, Pilot Bid Application, 
1997). This approach was further exemplified by the inclusion of the three following 
high profile corporate BV review targets: 
1. to achieve overall cost savings of five per cent 
1 to achieve an improvement in service quality of ten per cent . 
3. to move over five years from 10% to 35% of services externally supplIed 
(NLBC, BV Pilot Application, 1997) 
The three targets clearly demonstrated the authority's seriousness about shaking up the 
existing service and to do so firstly by targeting both cost savings and improvements in 
service quality and then more controversially by moving 'over five years from 1 m (-; to 
35% of services externally supplied' (Second BV Consultant). This third target, then. 
seemed to embrace a degree of ideological opposition to direct service provision. a vie\\· 
not dispelled in the authority's BV pilot application: 
'Nel-vliam has in the past relied almost wholly on Council provided services. 
This reflected both political preferences and an often inadequate local 
supply. This approach will change lvith the Council's commitment to a 
diversity of suppliers' (NLBC, BV Pilot Application, 1997). 
What was particularly controversial about the third target was that it seemed to 
contradict the then widely supported BV mantra of 'what matters is what works' by 
assuming that only external provision could achieve improved performance. A senior 
officer, partly responsible for creating the authority's BV performance plan and the 
three performance targets therein, admitted that the 'third (target) in particular' had not 
been: 
I ••• a sensible objective because, we could find and we are finding that we 
are better at providing some services and lre do not want to externalise 
them. The arbitrary target of 35% might not be the appropriate level 
therefore. You know it could be that 20%, is the correct level, or 65%. We 
)t'il! just see ·what happens' (First Best Value Consultant). 
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Officers explained how the Council's leadership ignored these concerns, howe\"er, and, 
in anticipation of the controversy that would greet its plans, created a high profile core 
BY team, comprising the chief executive, deputy chief executive and eight other senior 
officers, (NLBC, Brief Outline of Year One Reviews, 1998). The task of this team was 
to assert discipline over recalcitrant departmental based officers unwilling to conform to 
the leadership's blueprint for BV. 
In some respects, the core BV team was not unlike the core CCT team before it since it 
too had sought to ensure a coherent and authority-wide approach to policy. A noticeable 
difference between the two respective core teams, however, was that, in contrast to the 
core CCT team, the BV one had not been established to oppose and confront national 
policy but to champion and further it. 
The leisure centres review 
Although, NLBC's review of leisure centres began during the piloting stages of BY 
policy and, therefore, in advance of the pUblication of the four Cs, the authority did 
effectively carry out activities which one could later equate to the 'challenge,' 
'compete' and 'compare' elements of BV. In addition, a high profile corporate 
consultation event had also been created in the authority and used to inform the public's 
view of council services across the board, including leisure. Consequently, this section 
of the chapter is organised in relation to how the leisure centres review embraced all of 
the 'four C's' and begins first with 'challenge'. 
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Challenge 
The authority's challenge element of the review of leisure was primarily operationalised 
via an internally created BV toolkit that effectively demanded an analysis of whether 
activities were 'needed at all', and if so, 'whether the1' necessarilr had to be direcTlv 
. . 
provided' (NLBC, BV Procurement Toolkit, 1998). In doing so, the toolkit effectively 
expanded the scope of competitive tendering by requiring officers to investigate 
whether external contractors might more effectively provide services than the local 
authority. A senior BV officer duly summarised the authority's approach to the BV pilot 
as follows: 
'There is no point in providing a service if you have no purpose to provide 
it. Does it strategicalZl' fit in with our Corporate Plan and Corporate 
Priorities? Does the local community H'aJzt it? Does the local cOmmlllli(I' 
value it? By and large if the public don't see the need for it and there's no 
legal reason to do it, then YOll have to question 'why do we do this'? And if 
it is not required, then you can spend the money and resources somewhere 
else. These are all important stages and once you've established that you 
are going to fund a service, you then begin to look at hmt' you are going to 
provide it' (Divisional Director of Support Seryices). 
Perhaps the most important section \vithin the authority's BV toolkit in this regard, was 
that entitled the strategic decision matrix. This contained ele\'en criteria that every 
reviewed service would be evaluated against in terms of whether they had the potential 
to be provided externally. As the authority's BV pilot bid had previously stated: 
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'All service areas in the first year pilot will be assessed using a systematic 
strategic decision matrix. The presumption is that services will be subjected 
to open tendering unless they have been tested within the last .1'ear or are 
assessed as providing a strategically important service' (NLBC, BV Pilot 
Application, 1997). 
Each of the eleven dimensions were weighted by a factor of between one and four. 
depending on their perceived importance to the 'make or buy decision' and the risk that 
would be associated with external contractors taking responsibility for their provision. 
Then, in tenns of evaluation, the strategic decision matrix awarded between one and 
three points to each local authority service depending on the extent to which each of the 
specific criteria indicated that the service should remain in-house. Notable within the 
eleven dimensions of the matrix was a 'local economic benefit' dimension which 
implicitly exemplified the shift within the authority from a producer concerned body, as 
in the early days of CCT, to a more user orientated one. Thus, as the strategic decision 
matrix document was at pains to state, 'contracting out' need not necessarily lead to a 
loss of jobs since: 
'A firm could locate in Nelt'ham to deliver a contracted service and expand 
into other local authorities lt1zile keeping its headquarters in Newham or 
close by in a neighbouring borough. This outcome would be beneficial and 
outsourcing would hm'e little impact J (NLBC, Strategic Decision !vlatrix. 
Procurement Toolkit, 1998). 
The maximum score that could be achieved under the strategic decision matrix scoring 
system was 63. with the potential scores being interpreted as follows: 
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'A high score (46-63) points to retaining services in-house, a middling score 
(28-45) points to a mixed economy of provision and a lmv score (1 J -2 J 
points to the application of a more traditional approach to competition 
based on tendering' (NLBC, Strategic Decision Matrix, Procurement 
Toolkit, 1998). 
During interviews, departmental officers explained how it was felt that the authority's 
approach to BV went 'far beyond that required statutorily' (Client Manager, 
Benchmarking) and, in doing so, represented a very real threat to the continued direct 
service provision of leisure services. In particular, interviewees commented that they 
did not really believe that the authority's BV pilot process would add much to the actual 
improvement of the authority's leisure centres, which they saw as the real objective of 
BY, since it was located primarily in the context of 'compete'. 
Compete 
Day-to-day responsibility for the leisure centres revie\v was handed to a specifically 
constituted service review team. This comprised five officers from the LSD, which in 
tum, reported to the cabinet member for leisure. To ensure that the service review team 
properly traversed the BV review process in the spirit set out in the BY toolkit 
documentation, a core BV team officer was also assigned to the team (NLBC, The 
Newham Process - Roles and Responsibilities, 1998). 
Personnel \vithin the service revie\\ team explained how they did not take happily to the 
task placed upon them to examine the leisure sen'ice in the context of the BV Toolkit 
and, in particular, the strategic decision matrix. One key explanation offered for this 
unhappiness was that review team members had only 'one year previously taken the 
service through a CCT exercise' and were also embroiled in the delicate process of 
'completing the construction of a fourth, lottery-funded leisure centre' (Service 
Development Officer). In particular, service review team members pointed out that 
having fought hard to obtain £ 15 million from the sports lottery to construct the fourth 
leisure centre, they were 'now hardly going to challenge its existence' (Leisure 
Development and Operations Manager). 
The reservations of the leisure centres review team concerning the appropriateness of 
having to go through with the BV toolkit so shortly after CCT appeared to be justified 
when, upon completion of the strategic decision matrix, a score of 47 out of 63 points 
was achieved (see Table 7.1). In particular, associated documentation reported that the 
DSO had operated fully within the terms of the contract specification, met the income 
projection targets created as part of the second round of CCT and was registering 
improved service performance (NLBC, BV Toolkit for Leisure, 1999). The service 
review team responsible for evaluating the eleven criteria was also able to document 
that the DSO 'provided a reasonab~I' good level of service for a relatively low cost' (BY 
Toolkit for Leisure, NLBC, 1998); a conclusion which accorded with the observation 
that it was 'basically doing a good job under difficult conditions' (Second Leisure 
Centre Manager). 
More specifically, the elements on which the servIce reVIew team rated the leisure 
centres provision most highly resided within the' current perforn1ance' dimension of the 
sen'ice, as expressed in terms of quality, price and performance track record. These 
elements all received maximum points. The service did less \\'ell, how eyer, in tem1S of 
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the 'structural composition of the service', a dimension which encapsulated six elements 
that captured such given and unchangeable characteristics of the service as contract 
specificity, size and development of the market place. 
Table 7.1 Strate~ic DecIsIOn Matrix For Leisure centres 
Element Description 
Quality / Price 
Balance 
Perfonnance 
Track Record 
Nature of 
Service 
Specification 
Supplier 
Quality 
Supplier 
Market Place 
Current performance 
Most heavily weighted factor, measures balance 
between cost and quality. 
Current success in meeting service standards, 
contractual specifications or statutory requirements, 
Structural as~ects of the service 
Ease of specifying service to manage contractor by 
ability to accurately describe requirements. 
Judgement on the availability of reputable alternative 
suppliers with regard to entry barriers, trade association 
and code of conduct. 
Measures the quantity of competition in the 
marketplace. 
Control of Judgement on the centrality of the service to the 
Service Council's core functions, 
Capital Needs Measures degree of capital required by service on 
assumption that an external provider can access 
investment. 
Gross Budget Measures size of the gross budget on basis that larger 
valued services have more scope for costs savings 
Local Community Interest 
Local Measures impact of proposed course of action on local 
Economic 
Benefits 
Community 
Impact 
Public Interest 
Total 
economy. 
Measurement of the relevance of service in terms of 
achieving council's vision and the visibility of the 
service to the community. 
Judgement of the sensitivity of the service with respect 
to damage arising from failure. 
Source: NLBC, BV Toolkit for Leisure, 1998 
"'eight Total 
Score 
-+ 12 
3 9 
1 1 
2 2 
1 
3 6 
1 3 
1 
1 3 
3 6 
1 
21 47 
Despite these obstacles and according to pre-established criteria, the -+7 score still fell 
into the highest scoring category which not only pointed to in-house retention but also 
raised doubts as to whether the sen'ice should have previously been subjected to a 
competitive tendering exercise. In fact, it was also noted in the r~\'ie\\' that 'left to 
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market forces, many activities would not be provided that are currently available at the 
leisure centres, particularly minority activities and opportunities H'ould be aimed 
primarily at the affluent population' (NLBC, BY Toolkit for Leisure, 1998). 
Compare 
At the time of the research two national performance indicators existed for leisure 
centres service provision. These can be defined simply as the 'net cost per swim\'isit' 
and 'net cost per head of population.' The first indicator calculates the operational cost 
per swim and 'tends to reduce with increased usage,' owing to economies of scale 
(Leisure Development and Operations Manager). The second indicator, in contrast. 
reflects the average cost of the service to the local taxpayer in terms of the level of 
subsidy provided. 
In the authority's leisure centres review documentation the service was calculated as 
being equivalent to London's fifth most expensive leisure service provider in tenns of 
the 'net cost per swim' and London's sixth most expensive leisure service provider in 
terms of the net cost per head of population (NLBC, Management of Sport and Leisure 
Facilities, Annual Report, 1999). Interviewees explained that this reasonably 'poor' 
comparative performance had not previously troubled the authority because it reflected 
the structural context and in particular the 'relatil'e deprivation of the authority' (8\' 
Sub-Committee Councillor). 
Moreover the service review team's assessment of the 'Local Community Interest' , 
dimension of the strategic decision matrix had actually praised this le\"el of performance 
on the basis that it represented a 'commitment to social programming' and 'subsidised 
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access. ' There was, therefore, something of an inconsistency between how the authority 
had viewed its leisure service provision performance, as outlined in the strategic 
decision matrix, and the emphasis being placed nationally on achieving high standards 
of performance. A number of respondents also pointed out how these different priorities 
were further exacerbated by the 'time and effort they had to devote to measuring, 
assessing and ultimately comparing performance' (Second Leisure Centre Manager) 
because this served to divert even further attention away from the key objective of 
actually delivering services. As one service review team member further elucidated: 
'When we had the pressure of dealing with the BV review, which was 
coming on very heavily, people like myself could no longer focus on the 
DSO and this proved to be disastrous for management performance' 
(Service Development Officer). 
Service review team officers explained how these concerns were further exacerbated by 
the aforementioned corporate BV pilot targets which demanded that services attain a 
cost-saving reduction of five per cent and an increase in service quality of ten per cent 
over three years. Far from attaining these two targets, service review team officers 
explained that the pressures of completing the review became so much that they began 
to lose a grip on the subscription targets for the membership scheme that had been so 
influential in enabling the authority to retain the leisure service during the second round 
ofCCT (NLBC, LSD's Evaluation of the performance ofNLBC's Leisure, 1998). 
Having successfully got the user base up to 1500 people for the first year of the scheme, 
following the onset of BV, officers explained that the DSO failed to maintain the target, 
and this led to resultant losses on the DSO aCCollnt' (Second Leisure Centre i\lanager). 
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Consequently, the financial dilemma faced by the service review team was summarised 
by the Head of Financial Services as follows: 
'Moving through the BV review process, the service found itself with £250-
300,000 budgetary problem plus a five per cent efficiency saving required 
on the overall budget and no further access to capital resources' (Head of 
Financial Services). 
One respondent even went as far as to suggest that had the service 'not been required to 
go through with BV', it could have focused more carefully on overseeing the 
construction of the fourth leisure centre, thus more quickly enabling it to have a new 
resource at its disposal to attract users (Sport and Health Manager). The strains and 
stresses involved in conducting the BV review were, therefore, identified as being a key 
contributing factor to the rapid deterioration in actual service delivery. As the first 
leisure centre manager explained, one major difference between CCT and the BV 
toolkit requirement was that under the latter an 'immense all/ount of work was involved 
ill just getting to the tendering stage. ' 
One indication of just how far the quality levels had deteriorated SInce the 
commencement of the review could be obtained from statistics detailing the number of 
default points received per monitoring visit (NLBC, BV Sub-Committee Minutes, 
September, 1998). These indicated an average increase of 22 per cent default points 
across the authority'S three leisure centres. Similarly, customer satisfaction SUf\'ey 
documentation also reported an increase of 39% default points per visit during the sixth 
months from the commencement of the BV review (NLBC, BV Sub-Committee 
Minutes, September, 1998), Just as had been the situation in the pre\'ious case study, 
therefore, the sheer level of effort required to complete the BY review and to attain all 
the desired local and national targets had diverted the authority from key operational 
issues and actual service delivery. 
The rapid deterioration in service and financial performance also meant that no sooner 
had the praiseworthy documentary accounts of service and financial performance been 
published in the BY toolkit, they became outdated. As a result, the deterioration in 
performance made the justification for continued in-house provision increasingly 
fragile. As the Service Development Officer somewhat ominously explained: 
'At that point I was able to say to all of the DSO management team, look this 
is our position, this is what we've got to do. Do any of us believe here that 
we can, as an in-house team, make this five per cent efficiency saving on top 
of what we are experiencing at the moment? There was total unanimity that 
it could not be done' (Service Development Officer). 
Consultation 
Despite not undertaking a specific leisure centres reVIew consultation, the servIce 
review team did draw upon information collected from such established corporate 
consultation mechanisms as the authority'S annually conducted community consultation 
event, entitled Newham 2010, and the regularly collected user satisfaction surveys. 
Although service review team respondents spoke fondly of the community consultation 
event in terms of getting people together to discuss a range of local issues. at the same 
time they doubted its direct relevance to the leisure centres rc\'icw. The reason for this 
was that the event chiefly sought to ascertain the relative importance attendees attached 
to local services in terms of needs and wants rather than, for example, engaging them in 
debates and discussions about the future direction of the reviewed service in the way 
that the previous case review had. Consequently, rather than discussing with attendees 
their ideas and aspirations for future leisure service provision, they were instead 
effectively asked to compare the relevant importance of the service in relation to other 
services. Given these limitations, service review team officers spoke more frequently of 
their quarterly conducted user satisfaction survey which measured a range of factors 
including 'cleanliness of water, changing rooms, showers and toilets', 'helpfulness of 
staff', 'speed of service at reception' and 'quality of information and publicity. ' 
Officers were keen to point out the limitations of this survey, however. One such 
limitation was that its findings did not always coincide with technical assessments of 
service quality. As the Senior Health and Leisure Project Officer explained, this was 
particularly true in terms of the assessment of water quality: 
'We have done a lot of H'ork on water quality, and from a technical point of 
view, water quality is excellent. Yet one of the biggest areas of complaints is 
water quali(I' - and it is very, vel)' interesting. We chose these targets from a 
clistomer point of view, as these seemed to be the issues that mattered most, 
but there is an inconsistency between what our water analysis reveals about 
)l'ater qua/i(v and customer satisfaction' (Senior Health and Leisure Project 
Officer). 
Respondents from the servIce reVIew team also pointed out the limitations the 
satisfaction survey had in terms of not being able to capture the thoughts and opinions 
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of non-users. Consequently, the leisure centres service development officer admitted 
how the service review team was unable to ascertain why a particular person or range of 
people did not use a service and this was quite an important consideration gi\'en the 
target to increase membership levels. There was, however, no evidence of the service 
review team attempting to reverse this situation. 
Likewise, when asked about staff consultation, officers from the service review team 
admitted that this had been 'practically non-existent '. One of the explanations given for 
the lack of staff consultation was that there was a 'high proportion of temporary staff 
working limited hours' which 'made meaningful and lasting consultation difficult to 
come by' (Service Development Officer). Officers further explained that there was a 
very low level of trade union representation in the service and this had served to stifle 
the usual source of pressure for the types of staff consultation experienced in some of 
the authority's more highly represented services. In practice, however, although the 
service review team had not directly consulted with staff, the views of staff still, 
somewhat inadvertently, manifested themselves in terms of data showing the levels of 
sickness absences and staff resignations (NLBC, Sickness Absence Statistics, 1998-
1999). 
These two sets of data were shown to have increased quite substantially when news 
filtered through to the front line that the authority's leadership was considering, as a 
demonstration of its ability to attain its high profile BV pilot targets (Corporate Policy 
Manager), to transfer the leisure centres provision to an external contractor. The 
rumours about an imminent transfer continued to gather pace and led to further 
deterioration in service performance levels (NLBC, Leisure Committee Minutes, 1999) 
which could not easily be halted with extra recruitment because at this stage the Council 
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was unable 'to tell applicants who their future employer would be' (Personnel Officer). 
The process of meltdown occurring on the front-line was summarised by the Divisional 
Director of Recreation Services as follows: 
'Once you start talking about externalisation, and the further you go down 
that route, service quality and all sorts of things start to drop. So we had 
service quality dropping, levels of sickness going up, staff leat'lng, 
recruitment becoming an issue and the longer this goes on for and the point 
you let the contract, the more problems you create for yourself We had a 
real nose-dive ill all those areas, people not wanting to work for a private 
contractor' (Divisional Director of Recreation). 
By December 1999, the fears of employees were confirmed when a cabinet decision to 
transfer leisure centres provision was finally made. The continuing deterioration in 
service and financial performance levels provided a central justification in this decision 
(NLBC, Leisure Committee Minutes, 2000). However, the Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager observed there also seemed a 'large dose of politics' to it: 
'It H'as disappointing because the allthori(v had only just gone through CCT 
and won but given the wider corporate agenda and, as a year one pilot, we 
were almost being earmarked for externalisation. Over here there has been 
a political will to keep services in-house, but the BV review changed this' 
(Leisure Development and Operations Manager). 
Having decided to transfer out the leisure service, the remainder of the authority's B\" 
review process was directed exclusively towards the completion of a competitive 
tendering exercise, one that would both attain the 'BV position', by reaching a balance 
between cost and quality, and embody the principles of 'partnership'. 
Creation of a partnership 
What was immediately striking about the preparation for the BV tendering exercise of 
leisure services was that having only recently defended the direct provision of leisure 
centres in the face of second round CCT and in the face of the BV pilot's strategic 
decision matrix, service review team members now no longer talked about the benefits 
of in-house provision and municipal employment practices, but of how to marry: 
'the contractors' expertise on operational issues and the Council's expertise 
on ascertaining local needs and how to access them' (Leisure Centres 
Contract Specification, NLBC, 2000). 
Departmental officers from within the service review team were able to speak in such 
tenns because they had been reconstituted into a new sport and physical activity section 
that was immediately charged by the relevant cabinet members with setting about the 
process of preparing the tendering exercise for the impending leisure centres transfer. 
An OlEC advertisement, seeking a partner to 'deliver four high quality leisure centres, 
best value savings and £1.8 million capital investment into the authority over the 
jolloH'ing three years, ' was duly displayed in relevant trade journals (NLBC. OlEC 
Advertisement, 2000). As a previous Leisure Committee Report (2000) explained, the 
advertisement made clear the authority's intention to appoint externally since \\"as seen 
as a way of beginning a process of de\'eloping a partnership: 
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'Commercial operators will focus resources towards councils who seek to 
develop a partnership with a commercial leisure operator. This is most 
clearly expressed through a commitment to contract out a service' (0.'LBC, 
Leisure Committee Report 2000). 
The emphasis placed by the sport and physical activity section on partnership \Vas 
further apparent in the contractual documentation it created in preparation for the ne\\'ly 
recruited contractor. Thus, the documentation was laced with pleas for 'shared 
aspirations' and 'joint working' (NLBC, Leisure Centres Contract Specification, 2000) 
and, according to officers from the sport and physical activity section, contained 
sufficient flexibility within it to encourage the newly recruited contractor to identify 
improvements and more generally to 'get on with the job' (Service Development 
Officer). Thus, as documentation further revealed, at the same time as the authority 
would 'retain control of prices' and 'stipulate minimum opening hours', the contractor 
would still be entitled to submit 'annual proposals for price, timetable and membership 
changes '. As the Director of Recreation, also somewhat hopefully maintained, both 
would also be subjected to 'annual review': 
'At the end of the day we know what we want from the contract and they 
know what they want from the contract. We must ensure that the two marry, 
We must work together, it is ear~1' days, but 1 hope, in years to come we are 
still talking but not via our solicitors' (Director of Recreation). 
20Q 
Tendering and evaluation 
The sport and physical activity section's tendering evaluation model \\<as based on a 
weighting of 60 points for price and 40 points for quality. The relatively large emphasis 
given to the quality component of the evaluation was strongly promoted by the sport 
and physical activity section according to the mantra of 'reaching the BV position' and 
contained four different levels of assessment. A summary of the quality component of 
the evaluation framework and in particular the relative importance attached to each of 
the four sub-components is provided in figure 7.1. 
Evaluation 
19 method 
statements 
Site visits 
Capital 
investment 
proposals 
Client ratings 
Points Description 
20 To demonstrate how they would deliver the service in 
accordance with 10 principles that reflect Council's 
corporate agenda and 9 method statements demonstrating 
operational efficiency. 
8 Visits to 22 leisure centres operated by contractors across 
eight London boroughs to evaluate the quality of the 
services across a variety of factors, including cleaning, 
maintenance, customer comments and complaints, 
marketing and staffing levels and resources. 
8 To demonstrate their technical competence and innovation 
in modernising facilities and lowering operational costs. 
4 Client references taken from all contracts managed by 
contractors 
Source: NLBC, Leisure Centres Contract Evaluation, 2000 
It can be seen from figure 7.1 that half of the quality component of NLBC's leisure 
management contract was based on nineteen method statements that required 
contractors to submit essays outlining how they would achieye the Council's corporate 
agenda. A service review team officer described the quality of contractors' response to 
this component as being 'particular~}' crucial' since it later fom1ed the basis upon which 
the recruited contractor would be monitored (First Leisure Centre i\lanager). The sport 
and physical actiyity section also assessed the contractors' capital im<estment proposals 
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to see how far they demonstrated a commitment to modernise existing facilities, to 
lower the operational cost and, by implication, reduce the level of subsidy required from 
the Council. The 'capital investment' component of the three contractors' bids was 
worth a further fifth of the overall quality score. 
Reassured by the certainty that the authority would appoint externally, ten contractors 
'expressed an interest' in the resulting leisure service contract and four of these \\"ent on 
to submit preliminary bids. The resulting elimination process, according to respondents, 
rapidly became a one-horse race owing chiefly to the fact that one of the four competing 
contractors, a leisure service trust provider, offered such a 'vastly superior preliminary 
bid submission' (Leisure Development and Operations Manager). The feasibility of this 
contractor's preliminary bid submission was sufficient to enable it to be immediately 
subjected to a negotiated procurement route, and enabled the authority to quickly reach 
the 'best andfinal offer' stage of the tendering process. This duly occurred when the BV 
leisure centres contract was awarded to the leisure trust provider. 
One of the main advantages of the leisure trust's bid submission, in comparison to the 
other competing one, was that it had a charitable status. This characteristic enabled it to 
claim relief from business rates, thus lowering costs and 'in effect enabling the Tnlst 
Pro1'ider to submit far higher projected utilisation figures' (Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager). These were duly estimated to rise by 55 per cent over fhe years, 
which was equivalent to a rise from just over one million visits per annum to 2.4 million 
visits per annum (Evaluation of Leisure Management Tenders and A \\"ard of lOY car 
Contract Cabinet Committee, NLBC, 2001). 
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Despite notions of reaching the 'B V position', therefore, this hugely influential 
tendering element of the contract evaluation process depended very much, as the eeT 
exercise before it, on rather dubious income projections. The Deputy Head of the leisure 
trust provider's operations, nevertheless, did not appear to be unduly worried by such 
high projections: 
'Under the old CCT based contract one would have merely considered ways 
of trimming expenditure, but under the revised B V contractual approach, 
selection is more dependent on income generation. Whether or not there is 
fat in the municipal market is not the crucial thing, the crucial thing relates 
to whether they are realising the income potential in the Borough' (Deputy 
Head of Operations). 
In conjunction, with savings on business rates, the income projections estimated by the 
leisure trust provider had, in turn, also allowed the authority to exceed its corporate-
desired cost reduction target for this particular service. It was reported in associated 
contract tender documentation, for example, that the service transfer would result in a 
'£3.1 million saving against the existing service cost over a ten-year period, equivalent 
to a reduction in subsidy from £2.77 per user to £1.40 per user' (NLBC, Evaluation of 
Leisure Management Tenders and Award of 10 Year Contract Cabinet Committee, 
2001). 
Despite the problems it had experienced previously with its own DSO, and in particular 
concerns with over-optimistic income projections, cabinet members and sport and 
physical activity section officers alike accepted the leisure trust's rationale for 
predicting such massive user attendance (Evaluation of Leisure Management Tenders 
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and Award of 10 Year Contract Cabinet Committee, NLBC, 2001). The ne\\' Leisure 
trust provider would, managers from the trust reminded, 'shortly be provided with a 
fourth leisure centre which had good marketing potential' (Chair of Leisure Trust 
Provider). Such a discussion also had direct implications for the way in which quality 
was discussed, as the leisure trust provider services operations manager further 
explained: 
'Unless you take participation as a proxy of quali(l', then you are going to 
run into difficulties. I interpret it as a measure of quali(l' because I think 
there is a threshold level at which people will say I am not going there it is 
rubbish, and then there is a threshold at which the quality is clearly 
acceptable for them. So it is a true measure, I think of quality' (Leisure 
Trust Provider Services Operations Manager). 
An officer from the sport and physical activity section disputed such VIews and 
explained that there were obvious 'limits of spatial management' that had to be 
considered when discussing user levels of swimming pools and that the pools could 
'become overcrowded and therefore of poor qualit) , . (Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager). 
Nineteen service objectives 
Aware also of a number of potentially undesirable incentives that might be created in a 
chase for increased usage, another officer explained how the sport and physical actiyity 
section sought to prevent the leisure trust provider reducing 'social programming. asscf 
maintenance andlor o.ffpeak sen'ice periods' (NLBC. Objectives Action Plan, 2000) by 
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the creation of nineteen key service objectives. These embodied the authority's desired 
corporate priorities and service characteristics and were intended to direct the actions of 
the trust provider (NLBC, Social Programming Objectives, 1999). As shown in Table 
7.2, the nineteen key objectives were separated into the three categories of 'service 
quality' (nine obj ectives), 'service effectiveness ' (eight objectives) and 'service 
economy and efficiency' (two objectives). 
T bl 72 N· t a e . me een k b· f ey service 0 -.Iec Ives 
NO. SERVICE OBJECTIVE ORIGIN 
Service Quality 
1 To improve the perception of service quality at leisure centres Baseline 
2 Reduce all potential health and safety risks Baseline 
3 Reduce written complaints by 10% per annum Baseline 
4 Achieve a Leisure industry quality award at all four centres. Bid Submission 
5 Achieve lIP at all four centres Bid Submission 
6-9 Complete four separate refurbishments Bid Submission 
Service Effectiveness 
10- To increase usage, registration and regular exercise of leisure Baseline 
12 centres by the following target groups: young people (11-19); 
Social Groups D and E; Ethnic Minority Communities. 
13 To encourage participation in regular activity Bid Submission 
14 Introduce a school leavers one year membership card Bid Submission 
15 Commence active partnership to contribute to community Feasibility 
safety in the borough Report 
16 To increase number of residents able to swim 25m or more Bid Submission 
17 To utilise the leisure centre resources to provide opportunities Bid Submission 
for training qualifications and employment 
Service Economv and Efficiency 
18 To reduce the operational costs of the leisure centres. Baseline 
19 To facilitate the Leisure centres' achievement of positive Baseline 
environmental improvement 
Source: NLBC, Objectives Action Plan. 2000 
Despite the creation of the key service objectives to guide and discipline the contractor, 
officers from the sport and physical activity still, nonetheless, explained how they had 
been instnlcted by the authority's leadership to create an 'effectin! partnership 
relationship' \vith the leisure trust provider (NLBC, Evaluation of Leisure ~lanagcJl1cnt 
Tenders and Award of 10 Year Contract Cabinet Committee, 2001). Consequently, in 
accordance with this approach, it \\'as made clear that the contractual obligations to be 
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imposed on the provident society were 'not to be set in stone' but would have sufficient 
flexibility within them to 'account for changes at both a national and local policy level' 
(NLBC, Method Statements, The Councils Principles, 2000). 
In tum, the desired level of service performance demanded by the sport and physical 
activity section during the contract preparation process was not stated explicitly but was 
left to be resolved via further discussion with the contractor 'so as not to antagonise it' 
(NLBC, Method Statements, The Councils Principles, 2000). Indeed, the relatively low 
performance demands expected of the trust provider and the degree of flexibility it 
would be offered was prevalent in many of the service objectives, as can be seen from 
the third column of Table 7.2. 
It can be seen, for example, that in terms of offering flexibility a number of the key 
service objectives and by implication the desired level of future service performance, 
were based upon the contractors own statements (bid submissions) of what it believed it 
could achieve within a variety of time-scales. This was particularly true of the 
requirement placed upon the contractor to state how it would achieve a number of the 
new performance targets such as the achievement of a 'leisure industry quality award' 
and the 'achievement of investors in people' (NLBC, Objectives Action Plan, 2000). 
Meanwhile, in terms of the low performance demands, the third column of Table 7.2 
also shows that, in the case of the six other key service objectives, the desired level of 
perfom1ance demanded by the authority were determined by reference to the existing 
'baseline'. This level of perfom1ance was not considered to be particularly demanding 
since it derived from the 'historical~v 101\' lel'el of performance inherited by the DSO at 
tire pOlm of transfer' (First Leisure Centre Manager). Consequently. the desired level of 
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actual service performance/improvement equated only to the standard that existed prior 
to the commencement of the leisure centres review and thus represented a rather 
dubious interpretation of the term 'continuous improvement'. 
In analysing further the content of the nineteen key performance standards it also 
became apparent that the service objective to improve service economy and efficiency 
involved the targeted reduction in the operational costs of leisure centres. In then 
revealing precisely how this would be achieved, interviewees explained that the Council 
and trust had reached an agreement to increase full paying prices to users by ten per cent 
above the rate of inflation over three years, a solution which illustrated the multifaceted 
nature of continuous improvement. 
More generally, interviews held with two of the trust's semor management team 
revealed that they did not think that the performance targets demanded of the trust were 
particularly demanding. Thus, for example, it was noted that the requirement placed 
upon the trust to increase the levels of participation amongst target groups only required 
it to increase the absolute, rather than the percentage, number of target groups using the 
leisure centres. With a brand new leisure centre at their disposal, such targets were 
consequently not considered to be 'over~l' onerous' (Chair of Leisure Trust Provider). 
The chair also provided an example of how the leisure trust could do even more than 
that required from the nineteen service objectives by seeking to eliminate all rather than 
ten per cent of written complaints at the leisure centres. He explained that this could be 
achieved by encouraging a culture in which users would 1ree~1' air their grievances '. 
There was therefore an element of 'give and take' with respect to the nineteen ser\'\ce , , 
objecti\'es and in line with this reasonably flexible approach, the sport and physical 
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activity section decided against the use of penalty notices for failures in their 
achievement. This meant that the only real remedial action at the disposal of the sport 
and physical activity section was to terminate the contract. The Leisure Development 
and Operations Manager admitted that this reflected an 'all or nothing approach to 
contractual failure' and predicted that it would be quite difficult to ascertain the point at 
which such a termination would be necessary: 
'One of the questions that came up within these 19 key objectives was at 
what point will we say that performance is not good enough. The problem as 
an officer is that you never actually know at what point your Council will 
support a re-tendering exercise, because what I have got under those 19 
objectives is structured into three types 'quality', 'effectiveness' and 
'economy and efficiency'. If we get all of these economy and efficiencies, 
and meet all of our financial targets but find that we are doing nothing in 
terms of increasing our ethnic usage what would members want to do about 
that?' (Leisure Development and Operations Manager). 
More generally, a number of officers from the sport and physical activity section 
believed that, in many respects, improvements in service performance were reasonably 
self-fulfilling since 'salary-seeking incentives' had been unleashed as a result of the 
selection of the external contractor (Service Development Officer). Under such an 
interpretation, profit incentive and service improvement were considered to be 
compatible bedfellows. As the Divisional Director of Recreation maintained: 
'Previolls~v leisure management contracts \\'ere monitored on the basis of 
default systems, penalty points and el'erything else. That H'as 1I0t e.tTcctil'C as 
a controlling mechanism because no matter hOlt' well the managers 
performed, there is not like the same kind of profit incentive if you increase 
turnover. You don't get any sort of additional salary in your pay packet. 
This has now changed with the recruitment of the trust partner, although 
they do not make profits, they pay themselves pretty well' (Divisional 
Director of Recreation). 
Clearly the same level of compensation was not to be offered to employee interests. The 
award of the leisure centres contract to the trust provider had led to a TUPE transfer of 
66 full-time staff together with a recruitment crisis owing to a loss of 'approximately a 
quarter of staff since the transfer' (Branch Secretary, Unison) and the fact that a ncw 
leisure centre was about to be opened. In response, the newly recruited contractor 
created vacancies based on 'more flexible terms and conditions of employment' (Branch 
Secretary, Unison). These required newly recruited staff to work a basic average of 39, 
as opposed to 36 hours, per week, with pay, in part, being determined by a formula that 
penalised sickness absence but did reward attendance (Leisure Trust, Statement of 
Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2001). As the new employment contract stated: 
'Flexibili(r ill your hours of du(v is an essential aspect of this appointment. 
You will be required to attend for duty as required in accordance with the 
demands of the service with a minimum of 36 hours notice. The service 
operates seven days a week from around 6.30 until midnight or even later. 
You may be required to attend for duty during these times as neceSSQl)' and 
to \'(7JY your hours to work peaks and staff shortages. Any hour that YOll 
lVork, irrespective of H11ether it is on a Saturday. Sunday or Bank Holiday is 
lIS 
treated the same and paid at the same rate. Contractual overtime is not 
payable' (Leisure Trust Corporate Employment Contract, 2001). 
The Local Trade Union Branch Secretary was quick to identify the limitations of TUPE, 
in this regard, and how the proposed leisure trust arrangements promoted the creation of 
a two-tier workforce in local government: 
'The Council has told liS of the promotional opportunities that 'will arise as a 
result of the transfer but I do not believe they will materialise. In fact I doubt 
vel)! much the leisure provider will be encouraging staff to stay and get 
promoted. They will be encouraging them to go so they can replace them 
with people they can employ on cheaper salaries ... it is a major loophole 
that the government won't close. You'll end up with a two-tier H'orkforce. 
Those people who transfer H'ill be on conditions 'a' and the people H110 are 
recruited afterwards will be on conditions 'b'. What that \t'ill mean, with 
\'ery few exceptions, is that the companies who take over \t'ill have no stake 
in the future of the staff because they call replace them lvith cheaper people' 
(Branch Secretary, Unison). 
The BV Inspection 
NLBC's leisure centres reVIew was subjected to a two-person BY inspection in the 
summer of 2001, some ten weeks after the service had transferred to the leisure tmst 
proyider. Following preliminary negotiations concerning access to the authority, the 
inspection process began with the inspection team conducting an analysis of the leisure 
sen' icc department's BV documentation and followed this with a series of 'reality 
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checks' including mystery shopping visits to leisure centres, discussions with users and 
interviews with staff. 
Although the BY inspection team reached the verdict that the current performance of 
the service was 'fair', all of the evidence suggested it was far more preoccupied with the 
Council's consequential efforts to improve upon this. In this regard, the team praised the 
Council for having decided to transfer the leisure centres provision. As the BY 
inspection report maintained: 
' ... (the Authority) recognised that the centres have been under utilised and 
have not achieved the financial performance anticipated H'ithin the DSO 
contract. These factors have been part~r responsible for consideration being 
given to different management options and from April ]001 (the new 
contractor) have been alt'arded a ten-year contract to manage all four 
centres' (Audit Commission, 2001d: 8). 
In a similar way, despite not having involved an in-house competitor, the resulting 
tendering and evaluation arrangement was still described as 'robust, rigorous and 
equitable' (Audit Commission, 2001d: 8). It was perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that 
the second inspection judgement concerned with the 'likely future performance of the 
service' was reported positively, with a verdict that the leisure service had 'excellent' 
prospects for future performance. As one respondent explained, the availability of a 
brand new fourth leisure centre, which is far superior to the three existing centres. \\as 
in itself sufficient to improve services (Leisure Deyelopment and Operations Manager). 
The inspection team's upbeat inspection verdict for the 'likely future perfonnance' was 
also, it should also be noted, based on the view that the newly recruited contractor 
would, without problem, rectify both poor levels of service perfonnance and retain 
highly performing areas. This was despite the fact that the case study evidence indicated 
that the contractor had not actually addressed many areas of ser;ice perfonnance 
identified as currently 'under performing' in the BV inspection report. This \\-as 
particularly true with respect to the shortcomings the inspection team found with the 
'overall signage, marketing and promotion of centres', none of which had actually been 
identified in contractual documentation. 
Equally problematic was the inspection team's belief that the leisure trust provider 
would retain the Council's positive emphasis on 'social programming': 
'We found that H'ithill the physical limitations identified, a broad range of 
programming has attracted effective representation from a number of target 
groups. The high overall use from women, nearly 60 per cent, is a 
consequence in part of a commitment to -women only sessions being 
programmed. While usage from ethnic minori(r groups and the over 50 's is 
reflective of the population in Ne-wham '(Audit Commission, 2001d: 14). 
Thus, interviews held previously with managers of the leisure trust revealed how they 
had actually proposed to change the composition of social programming in order to 
integrate 'key groups' into the 'core' programme at discounted prices, rather than to 
treat them separately and provide them with specific sessions. As the Chair of the Trust 
contractor maintained: 
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'We did not want to separate people into different sessions but to allow 
target groups to use mainstream and to integrate them. Targeted groups 
also create a stigma. From a commercial view it makes much sense to go 
down the integrated route' (Chair of the Trust). 
Whatever the merits of the contractor's proposals, in this regard, they still represented a 
marked variation to the Council's previous prioritisation of 'targeted sessions', a facet 
of social programming that the inspection team had viewed so positively. This is not to 
suggest, however, that the inspection team failed to make any recommendations about 
how the service could be improved. In particular, it pointed out that more refurbishment 
was required, particularly in the entrance and reception areas, sport halls and fitness 
areas to make them more accessible and of better physical appearance (Audit 
Commission, 2001d: 11-12). The completion of these tasks would, however, require 
further negotiations between the Council and contractor and had the potential to create 
tensions between them and to antagonise the newly developing partnership. 
More generally, the inspection team's positive interpretation of the Council's decision 
to increase prices 'by ten per cent above the rate of inflation over a three year period I 
(Audit Commission, 2001d: 18) did not appear to acknowledge the likely 
disappointment to be felt by users of the service who would be expected to pay more for 
their swims, thus increasing the consumerist principles of the service. 
Perhaps the most significant revelation to emerge from an examination of the BY 
Inspection response, however, was the fact that despite reaching the \'erdict that the 
leisure service had 'excellent prospects for impro\'ement,' the targets signed between 
council and contractor were not considered to be 'sllfficient to achic\'c upper quartilc 
222 
status within five years' (BY inspection team report back to council). \Vhen probed 
about this apparent contradiction, a member of the inspection team was at pains to state 
that the existing statutory performance indicators for leisure centres provision: 
'".are not that good, especially the cost per head, but I hope that ·within the 
next couple of years the performance indicators will be better' (First BV 
Inspector). 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the same respondent also maintained that the 
limited coverage of statutory leisure centre performance indicators did not excuse the 
authority for having relied so heavily on them for the purpose of demonstrating 
continuous improvement. This was a view that had been published also in the associated 
inspection report, as the following quote reveals: 
'We found that the comparison llsed to inform the review was poor. The 
centres were compared v..,ith the two Audit Commission performance 
indicators, spend per head of population and cost per swim, with other 
comparisons principalZ1' reliant upon internal assessment of previolls 
performance' (Audit Commission, 2001 d: 21). 
The response of the BY inspection team, in this regard, exemplified, as in the previous 
chapter, the types of difficulties faced by local authorities when trying to ascertain and 
prove their competitiveness. One major difficulty according to sport and physical 
activity section officers, in this regard, was knowing precisely in which areas of activity 
they might be asked to prove themselves, given that the evidence used to judge a given 
performance area is subject to much inspector discretion (Leisure Development and 
Operations Manager). At the same time, officers also explained that, in seeking to create 
a partnership arrangement with their newly recruited contractor, they did not want to be 
too demanding in terms of making onerous performance requests and \\ere therefore , , 
caught between two inconsistent policy commitments. 
The authority, therefore, faced a conundrum between, on the one hand, meeting tough 
performance targets and, on the other hand, of fostering a friendly partnership 
relationship with the contractor. This led to one final conundrum of the BV process, 
namely that in believing it necessary to incorporate the BV principles of 'partnership' 
into its contractual relationship, the local authority was duly criticised by the BV 
inspection team for not being firm or ambitious enough with its new partner (Audit 
Commission,2001d). 
Conclusion 
This case study has demonstrated how NLBC conducted a BV review of its leisure 
centres provision and the response to it by the BV inspectorate. It began by detailing the 
impact of CCT on the service and revealed that following two full rounds of tendering, 
the authority managed to retain the service in-house \vith little in the way of a noticeable 
deterioration in jobs or service quality. It was demonstrated that this had been achieved, 
however, on the basis of both officer commitment to the in-house retention of the 
service and the fact that the outcome of the tendering process had been strongly 
influenced by predicted increases in future use of the service made in the in-house bid. 
This second factor was shown to have afforded contract managers a degree of tlexibility 
to protect the service and to do so in the context of the authority's increasingly warm 
approach to the use of external contractors in the delivery of local s('[vices. 
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The chapter went on to highlight how the authority's leadership, in embracing the policy 
of BY, moved towards greater support for the involvement of external contractors in the 
delivery of local services. In particular, it was noted that the authority's BV pilot 
programme contained within it three high profile BV performance targets, one of which 
was to increase the percentage of services externally supplied - an objectiYe which 
appeared to contradict the BV mantra of 'what matters is what works'. 
The third and more substantial section, of the chapter, then, provided a detailed 
overview of the leisure centres review and examined each of the 'four C's' in tum. It 
was revealed that, initially, the review was structured in relation to an internally created 
strategic decision matrix that effectively drew upon the challenge elements of BY. 
Although the utilisation of this tool demonstrated that the existing municipally provided 
leisure centres service had performed admirably, under quite difficult circumstances, the 
pressures of conducting the review led to a loss of operational focus and an associated 
deterioration in service and financial performance. This deterioration was, furthermore, 
compounded as a result of concerns on the part of staff that the authority's leadership 
was singling out leisure centres provision for externalisation on the basis that it wanted 
to demonstrate its commitment to central Government policy objectives. The case 
further explained that a decision to transfer the leisure centres service to an external 
provider was duly taken and a tendering process was subsequently carried out. 
Against this backdrop, the fourth section of the chapter ,,'as devoted to examining how 
the authority employed a revised approach to competitiye tendering in order to award a 
single leisure centres contract to a single 'partnering' leisure trust pro\'ider. In particular, 
this section reyealed how the authoritv, bv utilising the leisure trust proyidcr's 
- -
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charitable objectives, was able to advance two of the three corporate BY pilot targets it 
had created and which related to desired cost reductions and the increased use of 
external contractors in the delivery of local services. The implications of this tenderina 
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decision for future service quality was shown to be rather more uncertain, however. not 
least because the reviewed service, in conjunction with the partner, had failed to 
demonstrate how the service would achieve the continuous improvement standard of 
'upper quartile status'. It was also revealed that the key service objectives demanded of 
the new leisure trust provider were not particularly demanding and imbued it \\"ith a 
good deal of operational flexibility. 
The final section of the chapter went on to examine the response of the BY inspectorate 
to the review. In particular, it noted how, despite the development of a 'partnership', the 
BY inspection team directed most of its efforts towards the authority and raised 
concerns about its inability to properly and rigorously control and monitor its partner. 
Consequently, not only did the resulting recommendations have the potential to upset 
the relatively immature and developing relationship that had been forged between the 
Council and the contractor but they also questioned the authority's new strategic and 
monitoring role. 
The case, nonetheless, also revealed that the inspection report indicated support for the 
decision to appoint an external contractor despite the previous success of the authority'S 
leisure service and the fact that the authority was about to be furnished with a nc\\', far 
superior, leisure facility. Indeed the future likely performance of the leisure trust 
provider was assessed positively because the BY inspectorate belie\"ed that the newly 
recruited contractor would both rectify poorly performing areas of service and maintain 
highly perfom1ing areas of service. At the same time, however, the inspection team did 
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not believe that the targets signed between the Council and the contractor would be 
sufficient to achieve upper quartile status within five years. This finding, therefore. 
lends support to the argument that the BV inspectorate might not be wholly neutral in 
relation to the issue of service delivery ownership. 
Chapter 8 
Brighton and Hove Unitary Authority's review of Refuse Collection 
and Street Cleansing 
The chapter takes as its case a unitary authority's BV review of refuse collection and 
street cleansing. At the start of the review a range of external contractors proyided the 
two services at a combined annual total contract value of £4,234,780. The combined 
workforce of the two services was 233, with 218 employed on the front-line and 15 
employed within management. 
This chapter largely follows the structure of the previous chapters in that it begins by 
charting the impact of CCT on the two services before moving on to outline the BY 
pilot scheme conducted by the unitary authority responsible for the reyic\\'. Following 
this, the third section of the chapter explains how the BV review of refuse collection and 
street cleansing was conducted. Then, in the fourth section of the chapter, attention tums 
to the actual impact of the review before the final section concludes with an overview of 
the response of the BV inspectorate to it. 
The historical legacy of CCT 
Under the forn1er separate jurisdictions of Brighton Borough Council (BBC) and Hove 
Borough Council (HBC) both services had been subjected to two rounds of CCT and. at 
the beginning of the BY reyiew, resided with external contractors (CIPFA data, 1990-
1995). It was, howeyer, the history of CCT in BBC that proved to be the most 
influential in ten11S of the development ofBV and the reason for this was simply that the 
contracts were worth approximately three times as much at £3,800,000 per year (CIPFA 
data, 1995). Consequently, the discussion of the experience of CCT that is conducted in 
this first section is situated within the BBC context. 
The impression given by interviewees, when asked to reflect on their experiences of 
CCT within BBC, was that it 'had been disastrous', with both the threat of competition 
and the exposure to real competition managing to incur 'savage Cllts to the existing level 
of resource allocation' (Waste Manager). The explanation given for this unsatisfactory 
outcome was that, in 'wishing not to be the first Labour controlled council to award a 
high profile CCT contract external~1", the Labour leadership was prepared to 'retain all 
services in house at the expense of Cllts ill service provision' (Waste Manager). 
Thus in anticipation that many external contractors would attempt to gain a foothold in 
the authority's prestigious refuse collection service, senior officers and councillors 
explained how they decided to 'lock themselves in a room without union involvement' 
so that they could make their in-house bid as competitive as possible and thus retain it 
(Head of Contract Services, Environment). As they had predicted, a huge amount of 
external interest was galvanised for this service, with eighteen expressions of interest 
(CIPFA data, 1993) registered. The interest was not sustained, however, as only one of 
the eighteen interested contractors actually submitted a bid, which was, ultimately, 
unsuccessful. Consequently, the Council shortly came to realise that it had suffered the 
'winner's curse', as the Project Officer from the Waste Management Team explained: 
'We started 1I'ith two difJerent~1' priced internal bids and had to make a 
decision in terms ofH'hich one H'e "wellt with. Now of course the danger \\'([S 
that 1I'C could shmpcll the pencil too mllch alld then be unable to de!il'cr if 
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for the price that we put in or that we could submit a higher bid and then 
lose it to a more 10H'~1' priced external bid. III the refuse case we sharpened 
far too much' (Project Officer from the Waste Management Team). 
In the light of this far from satisfactory expenence, interviewees explained how 
immediate changes to the authority's tendering policy were implemented and as a result, 
the street cleansing contract was duly prepared on a more 'realistic and workable basis' 
(Project Officer from the Waste Management Team). In addition, a trade union official 
explained how the Council decided to 'involve the local Trade Union in the preparation 
of the in-house street cleansing bid, ' including both the contract specification and the 
final price submitted: 
The thing that the Council learnt is that when they compiled the bid for the 
street cleansing contract they involved the union 10cal~1' because having not 
done so for refuse collection they had gone ill far too 1011" (GMB Regional 
Officer). 
It was not only the Council that decided to revise its tendering strategy for the street 
cleansing contract, however, but also the contractor which had lost the previous refuse 
collection contract and which then decided to revise its bid submission downwards. The 
result was that, of the nine external tenders submitted (CIPFA data, 1993). two were 
cheaper than the in-house bid and 'the cheapest by approximately a million' (Head of 
Contract Seryices, EnvirOlIDlent). 
,\t the same time. howcycr, those responsible for contractor selection knew that the 
prices secured for both the refuse collection and street cleansing sen'ices \\'ould 'prm'c 
to be financially unsustainable' (Head of Contract Services, Em'ironment). They also 
had serious concerns about the level of service quality that would be prm'ided from the 
refuse collection and street cleansing contracts since 'so many staff had been taken out' 
(Head of City Cleansing). A client side officer did not dispute the \'ie\\ that the 
authority had conducted the first round of CCT unsatisfactorily: 
'I think part of the problem is that, when we were dealing with CCT. it H'(1S 
new to all of us and preparation of contracts in that war was an evolvina 
, b 
science, and perhaps we were not always as smart as we should have been' 
(Procurement Officer). 
As officers had expected, therefore, immediate losses on the in-house refuse collection 
service were reported and continued to grow to the point that by 1994/5 trading deficits 
of £239,000, against an expenditure of approximately £3 million, were reported (BBC, 
DSO accounts, 1994/5; CIPFA data, 1996). In the face of such abject financial 
perfonnance the, then, Department of the Environment decided to serve Section 14 
notices on a range of BBC's loss-making DSO's, including refuse collection, and in 
doing so, demanded that the authority conduct a re-tendering exercise for each of them 
(CIPFA data, 1994/5). 
Second round 
Respondents explained that in the face of the enonnity of the task placed upon the 
Authority to re-tender the financially under perfonning seryices an 'alternati\'(.' course 
of action was proposed' which involved 'voluntarily transferring all of the loss making 
activities to one single sen'ice provider' (Scrutiny Board r-.1ember for Enyironmcnt. 
Transport, Regeneration, Leisure and Tourism). The authority's rationale behind this 
proposal was to gain more control over the tendering process and to reduce the number 
of required tendering exercises to one. As the Leader of the Council explained: 
'Rather than go through the CCT prescribed route we )'t'ould ourselves 
voluntarily transfer ill order to have more control of the outcomes thall we 
would have had from straight CCT We had some DSOs that we did not 
think we would win a second time and there were others that It'ere likely ... it 
was patchy and messy. One of the things we disliked about CCT was the lack 
of long-term certainty and the ability to plan ahead in a sensible 1\'0.1'. So the 
idea was to transfer a range of actil'i(1' to one sen'ice provider vollllzta"i~\" 
(Leader of the Council). 
Figure 8.1 details the eleven service activities that the Council proposed to transfer to a 
single service provider and it should be noted that amongst them was the externally 
provided street cleansing service. This service had been included within the voluntary 
transfer proposal on the basis that 'it too was performing poor~\" and equally its external 
service provider was suffering heavy financial consequences and '\\wlted to get out' 
(Project Officer Waste Management Team). 
Figure 8.1 Composition of services subject to transfer 
Refuse collection 
Highways and repairs 
Grounds maintenance 
Printing and stationery 
Street cleansing Public toilets 
Building repairs Catering 
Leisure seryices Market management 
White collar building services 
Source: BBC. Contract Documentation, 1995 
sse's proposal to transfer the eleven servIce activities to one service provider was 
approved by the Secretary of State, who suspended the Section 14 notices and gave the 
authority eighteen months to go through the necessary tendering procedures. Although 
the local authority saw the voluntary transfer as a means to exert greater control over the 
outcomes of tendering, they also explained that some elements of the organisation of the 
resulting transfer still had to comply with prevailing CCT legislation. This \vas 
particularly true in terms of contract packaging and contract duration whereby 'ill 
. , 
accordance with the legislative requirements', each of the transferred activities had to 
remain separate and distinct entities, governed by independent contract specifications 
and contract managers (Director of Environmental Services). Within this arrangement, 
the refuse collection and street cleansing components of the transfer contributed heavily 
to the overall cost of the eleven services and were worth approximately .+0 per cent of 
the total contract value (BBC, Contract Documentation, 1995). 
Following a huge amount of initial interest in this contract, the Council invited nine 
contractors to tender and of these three submitted fully priced bids. With much of the 
contract value residing in environmental services, however, the process of contractor 
selection quickly became a two horse race between the former street cleaning operator 
and a second contractor which also had more general experience in environmental 
services. Indeed, it was this second contractor that the \\·orkforce and its union 
representatives voiced a preference for given their unsatisfactory experience of the 
fom1er street cleansing contractor. Fortunately for the Council, the union's preferred 
contractor was also the cheapest of the three bids and duly chosen. 
Despite the more positive manner in which the contract had been secured, however. 
intcn·icwees nonetheless described how, \\·ith the pressures of compctition particularly 
prevalent on these two activities, the voluntary transfer was 'unable to address the 
failings of CCT' (Head of Contract Services). Consequently financial and service 
failings were shortly reported, with local newspaper reports identifying financial losses 
of £2 million on the refuse collection and street cleansing components of the contract 
(Argus, 1996). Officers explained that not only had these losses been brought about bv 
the lack of sufficient funding for the services but also by the additional costs incurred as 
a result of liquidated damages associated with service failure. As one senior officer 
explained: 
'Not ol1~r had the contractor underestimated the cost of operating the two 
services but as a result they "were being hem'i~l' penalised for not meeting the 
standards H'ithill the specification ... so not on~l' did they struggle to provide 
the service but they were receiving financial penalties as H'ell' (Procurement 
Officer). 
Although the Council had, in effect, therefore, obtained, what some respondents 
described as 'subsidised, refuse collection and street cleansing services' (Procurement 
Officer, GMB Regional Officer), the poor level of service quality it received proved to 
be politically untenable. In the light of this unsatisfactory outcome, intervie\\'ees 
revealed how an eventual solution was fashioned between the Council and the 
contractor which also 'acknoH'ledged the implications of a local government re-
organisation that would lead [in 1997} to the merger of BBC It'ith HBC into one unitary 
authority' (Scrutiny Board Member for Environment, Transport, Regeneration, Leisure 
and Tourism). Under this, as respondents explained, BBC agreed to a 'request from the 
contractor to negotiate itself out of the loss-making refuse collection and street 
cleansing actil'itics ' (Scrutiny Board 1\ lember for Environment, Transport. Regeneration. 
Leisure and Tourism), and its client-side staff then began work on the preparation of a 
new unitary-wide service within the context of emerging BY policy. 
The BV pilot scheme 
Officers and councillors from the newly created BHUA explained how they warmly 
received the policy of BY and did so primarily because they saw it as providing an 
opportunity to move away from 'CCT's narrow cost foclls' (BHUA, BY Pilot Bid, 
1997). Even if they did not, at this early stage, plan to return the refuse collection and 
street cleansing services in-house, they did, nonetheless, believe that BY policy \\'ould 
consequently allow them to undo some of the problems brought about by CCT (BHUA, 
BY Pilot Bid, 1997). The reason for this was that the key problem of CCT for thc 
majority of respondents had not been the use of external contractors per se but the 
tendering process used to select them. As the Executive Councillor for the ncwly 
created environment portfolio explained: 
'The problem H'ith Ollr contractors lay in CCT legislation and the 
reqllirement to take the 10H'cst bidder. I think the basic idea behind B V is 
that we H'ill not be penned in by having to accept the lowest tender. We \rill 
/Ul1'C far more discretion to select contractors according to Ollr's and the 
public's criteria' (Executive Councillor for Environment). 
The perception of BY put forward by the authority in its BY pilot bid endorsed this 
vicw. In particular, the pilot was described as being able to undo some of the problems 
encountered from previous tendering exercises, whilst simultaneously maintaining a 
commitment to external sen'ice provision (BHUA, BV Pilot Bid, 1997). The strategic 
orientation of the authority was duly described as one of 'enabling, 'where 'decisions on 
whether services are delivered in-house, through or by other providers, would be made 
bv a judgement relevant to each specific service' (BHUA, BY Board H110 should 
provide BV services? 0411999: 1). 
Not all interviewees, however, shared the pilot bid's interpretation of fonner CCT 
difficulties, with one corporate personnel officer from the fonner HBC authority 
explaining that the problems of CCT had been more than just about a poor tendering 
mechanism: 
'Although we lost direct control of contracts we still had responsibility for 
delivering the service, but could not manage the workforce doing it and Ire 
found that that H'as actllal~1' quite difficult. We had problems with the 
delivery of the specification and imposed penal(v notices on contractors, so 
there were considerable difficulties' (Corporate Personnel Officer). 
Despite these concerns, it was explained how the Council 'pressed ahead '.vitli its 
decision to recruit an external contractor for its refuse collection and street cleansing 
services' (Senior Consultant, BY). This it chose to do so, as interviewees explained, by, 
first, integrating the two services and, then, by developing selection criteria that \vould 
provide more scope for quality considerations and allow the adoption of a more flexible 
approach to contractor management which removed the adversarial client-contractor 
relationship which had stifled previous tendering experiences. As a client side officer 
explained: 
'The philosophy of BV is that we should look to be more imaginati1'(? in how 
we provide services and consider a range of different partnerships or 
approaches to the delivery of those services for the future' (Operations 
Manager, Street Cleansing). 
In particular, officers spoke of their plans to provide the BY contractor \\'ith 'more 
responsibility for the location and repairs to waste management facilities and to act 
more directly upon complaints and enquiries received from service users' (BHUA, BV 
Review - Contracts due for renewal, 1998). This was an approach which the Head of 
Contract Services, had previously explained, reflected the authority'S desire to divert 
'some of the venom that had been focused on the Council' following contractual failures 
on the part of previous contractors (Head of Contract Services, Environment). The 
future expectation was, therefore, that the contractor would displace the local authority 
as a buffer between it and users. 
The Refuse collection and street cleansing Review 
Responsibility for the undertaking of the BY review and, ultimately, the BY tendering 
exercise, was given to a service review team. This comprised five client side officers 
from the environmental services department, together with a non-environmental client 
side officer. The service review team reported its BY review findings to a corporate BV 
board, comprising leading members and officers, for approval (BHUA, .\laking 
Decisions, 1998). Within this organisational arrangement, BHUA's BV review of refuse 
collection and street cleansing can be seen to be distinct from the other t\\'O case reviews 
in that it began in the context of services provided extemally (BHCA, B\' Perfonnance 
Plan, 2000/01). It was also conducted primarily in the context of a BV tendering 
exercise, which as this section reveals, was shaped by reference also to the 'challenge'. 
'consult' and 'compare' elements as well. 
Challenge 
As was found with SCC's grounds maintenance and street cleansing reVle\\'. 
respondents from this case viewed the 'challenge' element of the refuse collection and 
street cleansing review as something of a misnomer since the services encapsulated by 
the review were statutorily required and, therefore, Ilecessarif" provided. The only 
component of challenge that appeared relevant to the service review team, therefore, 
was that concerned with 'how' services should be provided. It was, therefore, this 
element of BV that allowed the service review team to combine the 'relativelr similar 
refuse collection and street cleansing actil'ities' in order to create a single integrated 
waste management contract (Waste Local Plan Project Manager), thus bringing together 
the four existing contracts across the two towns. 
The other major feature of this proposed contract, as already mentioned, was that the 
authority envisaged the adoption of a more flexible and anns-Iength approach to 
contract management that would see the contractor take far greater responsibility for 
operating the contract and dealing with any resulting service failures (BHUA. B\' 
Review - Contracts due for renewal, 1998). Thus, it was anticipated that all 'future 
contract specifications H'ill require the contractor to monitor cllstomer satisfaction ill 
line with the principles of B v' and 'all prospective contractors ~vill be required to 
demonstrate competence on /1\'0 grounds - cost and added l'allie' (BHl:A. Policy and 
Resources Committee, Waste BV Revic\\', 1999). In line with this ncw approach to 
contract management, it \vas, therefore, stated that: 'Contracts \\'il/ he awarded to Ihe 
company that not only produces the most competitive bid but also demonstrates hOlt' 
they will deliver a quality service for the city' (BHUA, Policy and Resources Committee 
Waste BY Review, 1999). 
At the same time, although the policy of BY was seen to provide the authority with the 
opportunity to raise the level of resource allocation to a point at which its desired 
service objectives could adequately be met, the authority was also keen to limit 
budgetary increases to 'politically acceptable levels' (Leader of the Council). 
Consultation 
Having 'challenged the existing basis of service provision', officers from the service 
review team explained how they then embarked upon a process of consultation to 
ascertain in more detail the desired needs of service users and to gain legitimacy for 
their original plan to ensure that the contractor dealt more directly with complaints and 
enquiries received from service users (BHUA, BY Review - Contracts due for renewaL 
1998). In this latter respect, the consultation exercise was placed near the beginning of 
the review so that it could 'inform the resulting contract specification process and client 
and contractor responsibilities' (Head of Contract Services Environment). 
Within this set-up, officers from the servIce revIew team were keen to stress, 
nonetheless, that they did not embark upon the BY consultation exercise from afresh 
because a great deal was already known about the views of the public. Thus as the 
Operations Manager for Street Cleansing noted: 
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'Out of all the views and consultation we have had with the public in the 
past, the number one concern has consistently been refuse collection and 
street cleansing. If this service fails, then the Council has failed. You do not 
run a good council unless you have a got a good refuse collection service. It 
is the wrong thinking, but that is how people do think' (Operations Manager 
for Street Cleansing). 
User group consultation 
The consultation process for the refuse collection and street cleansing review began 
with the service review team identifying 233 individual and multiple stakeholders from 
whom it could gain opinions (BHUA, Contract Management BV review, 1998). The 
identified stakeholders included representatives from residents' and tenants' 
associations, businesses and traders, commuters, pressure groups, bus companies, taxis 
and the tourist industry. Each of these representatives were sent a self-completion 
questionnaire that contained within it twenty-three questions concerned with the areas 
of contract management under review. These questions were broken down into four 
sections entitled 'service satisfaction', 'information and communication', 'service 
priority' and 'desired improvements'. Ninety-three questionnaires were returned and 
declared as representative of 4,155 people directly related to the respondents (BHUA, 
Contract Management BV review, 1998). 
Resulting analysis of the responses revealed, according to council documentation, that 
respondents believed the 'refuse collection and street cleansing services were of an 
acceptable standard but that more information about the services should be made 
Gl'ailable' (BHUA, Environmental Services Contract Management BV Review, 
Research and Consultation Report, 1999). Then, in tenns of how the service could be 
improved, it was reported that a number of the survey respondents believed that the 
Council should more tightly police and monitor the contractor (BHUA, Environmental 
Services Contract Management BV Review, Research and Consultation Report, 1999). 
This last view was, therefore, essentially in line with the authority's thinking on the 
Issue. 
The responses from the questionnaire were also supplemented with what interviewees 
referred to as a 'far more informative focus group exercise' (Head of Perfonnance and 
Accountability). This involved twenty 'key' stakeholders, drawn exclusively from the 
resident population, being brought together in a forum of open discussion (BHUA, 
Environmental Services Contract Management BV Review, Report and Discussion 
Paper - Identifying a High Quality Service, 1999). This forum began with participants 
being given a card and asked to briefly indicate what they considered to be the good and 
bad aspects of the services (BHUA, Environmental Services Contract Management BV 
Review, Report and Discussion Paper - Identifying a High Quality Service, 1999). 
The analysis of the card responses identified 'repeat failures' as one of the most 
unsettling facets of service delivery, a view shared in an interview with the Client 
Contracts Manager: 
'In a way a repeat complaint is more important than a complaint. You can 
live with a complaint, you can live with one complaint but you don't want 
two. So we then said that ill the new contract we would strive to reduce 
drastically the level of repeat complaints' (Client Contracts Manager). 
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Interviewees explained that the key issue discussed during the forum was 'what the 
future client and contractor responsibilities should be' (Project Officer \Vaste 
Management Team), though it was broadly agreed that this particular issue had been 
rather forced onto the agenda by the service review team. As the Head of Contractor 
Services explained: 
'During the focus group, I said 'right, you knmt' this is how we structure our 
management arrangement, ·what do you think', and it was, very quick~r 'if 
we phone you it just sloH's things dowll. Ifyoll tell liS H'hat we can expect, 
and tell us H'ho to phone, we'll sort the contractor Ollt' and it was literally 
that sort of language' (Head of Contract Services, Environment). 
Thus, when asked about their VIews on preferred client-contractor responsibilities, 
documentation revealed that the consultation participants tended to hold a poor view of 
external contractors and questioned their oYt'lzership of the service (BHUA, 
Environmental Services Contract Management BV Review, Report and Discussion 
Paper - Identifying a High Quality Service, 1999). In particular, a small number of 
participants believed that the contractor 'did the minimllm amount of It'ork necessary' 
and 'failed to act on its initiatil'e to deal H'ith other 'found' problems' (BHUA, 
Environmental Services Contract Management BV Review, Research and Consultation 
Report, 1999). In the light of these concerns, a number of focus group participants 
encouraged the Council to impose stiffer penalties in the event of service failings 
(BHUA, Enyironmental Services Contract Management BV Review, Research and 
Consultation Report, 1999). 
Other respondents, however, were documented as disputing these types of plans, on the 
basis that they felt that it should 'not be the role of the public to complain, but the role 
of the Council to manage' (BHUA, Environmental Services Contract Management BY 
Review, Research and Consultation Report, 1999). Despite these concerns, the authority 
used the consultation exercise to justify its proposal to let the local community, in 
conjunction with the external contractor, take greater responsibility for resulting 
outcomes: 
'If you have got failing schools and e1'eryone blames the government you 
might think well, hang 011 a second this should be determined 10cal~l'. Why 
don't 1t'e allow people to actual~1' determine it locally and then perhaps they 
H'ill stop blaming us. The problem is trying to develop a different sort of 
contract under B V, which allows the contractor to develop the service for 
the local communit1' and alloH's the local community, almost as a 
stakeholder, to be able to shape the service that is wanted' (Head of 
Performance and Accountability). 
A lack of producer group consultation 
Nevertheless, although service review team officers spoke of their satisfaction with the 
outcome of the consultation exercise, such approval did not extend to front-line 
employees and their representatives, who had not been so heavily involved in the 
process. Thus, union representatives explained that whilst a BY user consultation 
exercise had informed the composition of the resulting integrated waste management 
contract, the opinions of the four disparate workforces had not done so. One union 
representatiYe \yent on to report that the reason \\'hy the refuse collection and street 
2·+3 
cleansing staff had been excluded from the consultation process was that they were not 
employed by the authority and were not, therefore, encapsulated within its corporate 
staff consultation processes: 
'If you are working for the Council and subject to a BV review, that will be 
inclusive and YOll will take part in that. But when ),Oll look at the refuse and 
street cleansing, there H'as no consultation H'ith the llnion or certain/r 110 
consultation with the workforce direct who had alreacJ.l' been externalised a 
number of years prel'ious~r' (GMB Branch Secretary). 
Another union official went onto explain how he felt aggrieved that the service revie\\" 
team had not tapped into such rich experience: 
'On average when YOll do a refuse re-route the refuse crews will, within a 
month, find the quickest way of getting around it, they are \'eIY good at 
finding the quickest H'a)' to finish their H'ork. If changes are imposed that 
leGl'e little in the H'ay of discretion, then l'OU can expect a drop in 
producti\'iZl' ' (GMB Regional Organiser). 
Meanwhile, officers from the service review team reported how the major concerns and 
ideas that they had received during the public consultation exercises were written 
directly into the terms and conditions of the new integrated waste management contract. 
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 8.2, under general conditions, in contrast to previous 
contractual arrangements, the new provisions for the integrated \\'aste management 
contract would, as participants of the focus group had requested, give the recruited 
contractor greater responsibility and discretion for meeting the desired level of sen'ice 
perfonllance, This chiefly involved providing incentives for the contractor (see belo\\') 
2.+.+ 
to avoid the generation of complaints about the service, because one of the main ways 
the authority would audit the contractor would be by reference to a 'complaint's line' 
monitored by client side officers (BHUA, Scrutiny Board, Integrated \Vaste 
Management Contracts: Meeting Service User Expectations, 1999). 
Figure 8.2 Summary of main provisions in integrated waste management contract 
Previous 
General conditions 
New 
1) Client directing contractor 
2) Client judges success of contract 
Street cleansing 
3) Contractor reacts to whom it may concern 
4) Council responsible for deciding location and 
repair of litter and dog bins, seats and shelters 
Waste collection 
5) Enquirieslcomplaints to client 
6) Contractor responsible for publicising services 
Contractor managing the business with council 
auditing arrangements 
Service users determine success of contract 
Increased requirement for se If-supervision 
Contractor responsible for arranging location and 
repair of dog bins, seats and she I ters 
Enquiries/complaints to contractor 
Contractor shares responsibility for publicity 
Source: BHUA, Integrated Waste Management Contract, 1999 
Compare 
During the period of research, nine nationally collected perfonnance indicators could be 
identified for refuse collection and street cleansing services (Audit Commission, 1999. 
:2000, 2001, DETR, 1999, 2000). Despite the relatively high number of such indicators, 
however, there was no evidence that the authority had addressed the issue of how it 
proposed to reach the upper quartile perfonnance position in relation to them. \\'hen 
asked about this apparent failing, one respondent simply explained that 'the problems ill 
current sen'ice performance were so obviolls and pressing' that the authority simply did 
not have time to worry about the future (Assistant Director of Environmental Services). 
Instead, the servIce reVIew team, having made the decision to recruit an external 
contractor, set about ensuring, as the public consultation process had suggested, that in 
cases where the contractor failed it should face default mechanisms and liquidated 
damages procedures (see figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.3 Default procedures in Integrated Waste Management Contract 
• Where the Contractor fails to provide the Service and the Council is required to 
undertake an investigation into the failure, then liquidated damages will be 
recovered. 
• If the Contractor has failed to provide the Service or any part thereof in accordance 
with the Contract, the Council shall be entitled in herlhis absolute discretion to issue 
a Default Notice requiring the Contractor to remedy the failure within the period 
specified in the Default Notice. 
• On each occasion when a Default Notice is issued, the Council shall be entitled to 
charge the Contractor a sum to cover the Council's cost of investigating the failure 
to provide the Service and issuing the Default Notice inclusive of all overheads and 
associated costs. 
Source: BHUA, Integrated Waste Management Contract, 1999 
The resulting contract specifications thus included twenty-seven default procedures 
which posed the threat of liquidated damages for costs incurred. A small number of 
these default procedures derived from statutorily determined performance targets such, 
as the failure to meet 'a grade A street cleansing standard', while others deri\'ed from 
the concerns of local users, such as 'causing damage to property' (BHUA, Default 
Schedule, Appendix 3, Integrated Waste Management Contract), 
Compete 
The sen'ice re\'iew team not only used the policy of BY to repackage and to re\\'ritc the 
contract specifications for its waste management ser\'ice, but also to introduce a re\'ised 
set of tendering nlles that \yould proyide it \yith much greater discretion \\·ith respect to 
contractor selection. In particular, the BV tendering process permitted the ser\'lce 
review team to consider more carefully the desired cost and quality of service provision 
and, by implication, provided it with the opportunity to address the shortfall in resources 
that had been prevalent in previous waste contracts. As the review document governing 
the tendering process pointed out: 
'All prospective contractors will be required to demonstrate competence 011 
two grounds, cost and added value. Contracts will be aH'arded to the 
company that not only produces the most competitive bid but also 
demonstrates how they will deliver a quality service for the city' (BHU A, 
Value Assessment Document, 1999). 
Consequently, the BV framework employed for use in the contract tendering evaluation 
process invited competing contractors to state how they would achieve such desired 
outputs as improved customer satisfaction. The evaluation framework also required the 
service review team to assess whether the contractor had the necessary technical and 
resource capability to deliver the required standard of service. Another important 
component of the quality assessment, meanwhile was entitled 'added value,' and this 
required potential contractors to submit proposals outlining any innovative ideas and 
improvements that they could bring to the service, at no extra cost. These arrangements 
are detailed in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 Evaluation framework for integrated waste management contract 
Component 
Price (500 points) 
Technical Quality (200 points) 
Quality management and 
quality systems (100 points) 
Added value (1 00 points) 
Equal opportunities ( 50 points) 
Health and Safety (50 points) 
Composition 
The value of the contract to be assessed in accordance 
with CIPF A code of practice for CCT and 
Government regulations. 
Contr~ctor must demonstrate that it can apply 
suffiCIent resources to the task, including the i 
necessary staffing, skills, experience, management 
and support systems for the required standard of 
servIce. 
Process performance measures, control and continual 
improvement assessment. Contractors ability to 
maintain and improve service quality and customer 
satisfaction 
Contractors required to submit proposals outlining 
any added value they may bring to process of sen·ice 
delivery, at no extra cost. 
Contractor required to demonstrate commitment to 
equalities equal to that of the Council. Criterion 
included a workforce that reflects the community that 
it serves. 
Contractor compliant to the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 
Source: BHUA, Value Assessment Document, 1999 
From this table it can be seen that only half of the overall score awarded to competing 
tenders captured the price of bid submitted. Of the remainder, two hundred points were 
directed at technical quality, one hundred points to quality management and added value, 
and the remaining hundred split between equal opportunities and health and safety. In 
terms of price, service review team officers also explained how they asked competing 
contractors to include a profit margin within their bid submissions. This request was 
intended to ensure that external contractors were confident that they would make a 
suitable return from the contract and thus not shirk on proposed quality commitments. It 
could also be seen, however, as a means of pressurising the contractor to keep its bid 
lower. 
The head of contract serVIces described the overall philosophy underlying these 
tendering arrangements as follows: 
'What we have done now, is say these are the things that are important to 
residents, or people in the city and when you bid, bid your mone)' and bid 
the level of satisfaction you will achieve in those areas. These companies are 
supposed to be the experts in their field. We do not want the contract 
documents to be directive. They should be receptive as well, what can you 
bring to the contract, so obviously you would have to go through that and 
put a value on it' (Head of Contract Services). 
The Council's invitation to tender received a good response from contractors, with ten 
expressing an interest and eight SUbmitting a preliminary bid (BHUA, PARC April 
2000:82). The service review team attributed this high level of enthusiasm amongst 
contractors to the quality and clarity of the bid documentation it had prepared and to the 
unique partnering arrangement implied within it. The principles of BV were then further 
experimented with when the Council selected the third lowest of the eight bids (BHUA, 
Minutes from Scrutiny Board, 1999) on the basis that it represented the 'best value' 
option. As a client side officer explained: 
'We did not go for the cheapest since there was fair~v clear 'water between 
the chosen contractor and the others about what they could bring to the 
contract. We were very happy with the way that the preferred contractor 
were going to manage it, with the resources they were putting ill, they lrere 
putting in more resources than most of the other contractors said they lrere 
going to do. We also felt that the selected contractor had understood the 
complex nature of the area, especially during the Sllmmer months and 
weekends' (Corporate Finance Officer). 
2.t9 
Notable amongst the eight evaluated bids was the fonner BBC operator, \\"hich had 
originally negotiated out of the refuse collection and street cleansing contract, and 
whose bid was documented as being the most costly of those submitted (BHLA, 
Minutes from Scrutiny Board, 1999). A manager from this fonner operator explained 
how their company's bid had been based on a 'realistic assessment of service delhOe!)' 
and of their experience of operating parts of the service previous~v' (HRM Manager), 
He also spoke, however, of his company's 'political e"yc/usion from the tendering 
process' and put this down to the belief that if his company had been selected, it would 
have cost much more and the fact that this would have been perceived as \\"eak 
contractor management on the part of the Council. This accusation also implied that, 
despite increased resources, the contract secured by the Council would be insufficient 
for the task in hand. 
Union representatives had sympathy for such views and explained that the £2 million 
losses reported by the fonner BBC contractor had not been suffered in return for 
'qua/i(r service provision 0 and that 'something quite substantial' (GMB Regional 
Organiser) would have been necessary to reverse the devastating consequences of CCT. 
Thus, whilst the chosen contract raised the costs of the fonner HBC and BBC contracts 
by £ 1.8 million, an increase to be paid for by 'a £21 rise in the band D council tax' 
(BHUA, Letter to Council residents, 1999), union officials did not belie\'e that the price 
secured was adequate. As the GMB Branch Secretary explained: 
'The Council conducted the BV tendering exercise on the basis of 'Ier the 
companies' do the undercutting, let them do the subsidy and lem'e it lip to 
the unions to manage the staff problems' (GMB Branch Secretary). 
Officers within the service review team, however, disagreed with this pessimistic view 
and were convinced of the robustness of the BV review process. They, therefore, had no 
hesitation in pressing forward with the decision to award the contract to the third lowest 
bidder. Subsequently, explanatory letters were sent out to taxpayers in order to justify 
the £21 council tax rise on the basis that an improved refuse collection and street 
cleansing service had not only been requested but that, with additional resources, and 
improved contract conditions, would be delivered. Somewhat ominously, the 
explanatory letter also explained that service recipients should direct future complaints 
towards the contractor and not the Council. Having secured a £1.8 million increase in 
funding, the Council did not, therefore, rule out the possibility of future service failures. 
The outcome of the BV review in practice 
The £6.5 million integrated waste management contract commenced on the 1st 
November 1999 and was set to last for a term of five years, with the option of a two-
year extension (BHUA, Minutes from Scrutiny Board, 1999). The contact had been 
secured following a BV tendering exercise which gave equal priority to both cost and 
quality. The contract provisions had also been secured under the mantra of 'partnership 
working' and in this respect the contractor was given responsibility for a whole host of 
issues including dealing with service user complaints. Simultaneously, the local 
authority was able to contemplate a future, in this particular range of activity, \\<hereby it 
would essentially be 'enabling' and chiefly concerned with mere arms-length 
monitoring (BHU A, Integrated Waste Management Contract, 1999). 
Failed management and staff relationships 
This interpretation of the partnership arrangement proved to be far too optimistic, 
however, with respondents broadly describing the history of the integrated waste 
management contract as one that 'got off to a bad start and never recovered' (BV 
Research Officer). Even before the contract commenced, the head of contract sen'ices 
explained how the reservations of the workforce were stirred when, during the first 
management-workforce meetings, the newly recruited managers explained that it was 
time 'to make a reality of the bid' and proposed to replace the current 'beat system' of 
working with a 'zone-based system' in a bid to improve productivity. 
This proposal was actually implemented as part of a rather 'reluctantly agreed' 
(Corporate Personnel Officer) staff harmonisation process intended to harmonise the 
four disparate terms and conditions of employment inherited from the previous refuse 
collection and street cleansing contracts (see Figure 8.4). 
Figure 8.4 The origins of four different terms and conditions of employment. 
1. Street cleansing in HBC operated by non-TUPE private contractor 
2. Refuse collection in HBC operated by non-TUPE private contractor 
3. Street cleansing in BBC operated by non-TUPE private contractor 
4. Refuse collection in BBC operated by voluntary transferred contractor via TUPE 
protection. 
Source: GMB Press Release, 2000 
The key industrial relation issue that arose during this process was that although the 
contractor had agreed to address discrepancies in terms and conditions of sen'icc 
'upwards', it simultaneously sought to equalise productivity levels (Regional ~lanagcr). 
As a contract manager from the external contractor explained: 
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'With 60% of our costs labour, if you increase that by any percentage it has 
a fundamental effect on the contract and if you do not get the productivity to 
match it and need more labour then it kills it' (Operations Manager). 
In response, umon representatives explained how they contested the contractor's 
argument that the 'properties per day' productivity rate of the ex -BBC workforce was 
far below that of the ex -HBC workforce and also below the industrial norm. In 
articulating this view, union officials expressed annoyance that the contractor had not 
really tapped into front-line experience before imposing an unworkable zone-based 
system. In particular, union representatives complained bitterly of the abstract nature in 
which the productivity comparisons had been calculated and by implication did not 
believe that the proposed zone-system of organisation would work. As the GMB 
Regional Organiser further elucidated: 
'What the new contractor did was to work on the tonnage, but you cannot 
work on tonnage; tonnage and time is what have you got to look at. They 
looked at tonnage, see that a Have crew was pulling in say 80 tonnes a week 
and there is a Brighton crew only pulling in 60 tonnes a week, more 
productivity needed there. The difference is where the rubbish is. You can go 
all the way up a driveway in some of these places in town and there is 
nothing in the bin, but you have got to go up there and of course its time' 
(GMB Regional Organiser). 
Officers from the service review team had, during the BY re\'iew process, also raised 
similar criticisms about the inadequacy ofproducti\'ity comparisons, which in their \'ic\\': 
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Take no account of local geography, local pressures over waste provision 
of non-statutory services and the availability, cost and proximitJ' of disposal 
facilities' (BHUA, Policy and Resources Committee - Waste BY revie\\', 
April 2000). 
Nevertheless, despite believing that the contractor was being' simplistic', officers from 
the service review team did not consider it necessary to become involved in the debates 
that raged between management and the union, since this would contradict its original 
aspirations for the contract. 
Meanwhile, despite the concerns of the workforce, a deal was brokered with the 
contractor which meant that in return for harmonising the terms and conditions of 
employment upwards the contractor would replace the beat system of working with 
zones, thus seeking to address differences in productivity between the various 
workforces. It was not long, however, before the contractor experienced difficulties and 
failed to meet historically achievable levels of service performance. In particular, 
interviewees explained that the transition from a 'beats' to a 'zoning' system led to 
immediate chaos, as operatives lost areas of work well known to them, and in some 
cases, were even forced to work from maps. 
These problems were, then, further compounded by the inadequate advertising of the 
altered pick-up times that were to apply to 80 per cent of residents. The most pressing 
problem, according to union officials, however, was the uneven distribution of \\'orkload 
between the different refuse crews. Indeed, external contract managers, themselves, 
admitted that the uneven nature of the new rounds meant that some crews 'mal/aged to 
finish their rounds before 1 pm on some days, while other crews returned to the depot as 
late as 6pm after a tam start' (GMB Regional Officer). 
The GMB regional officer further explained that, having failed to consult with the 
unions regarding working practices, employees would only take up some of the slack 
that existed between different areas of the City: 
'We realised that there was some slack in the BBe side of the operation and 
although the guys in BBe were prepared to help the guys in HBC, for a time, 
the stick got bent too far' (GMB Regional Officer). 
Derisory service performance 
The complications brought about by the new zoning system, therefore, exacerbated the 
derisory service performance that had characterised the service since the beginning of 
the integrated waste management contract. During the first six months of the contract, 
for example, it had been reported that the contractor had failed to meet the Council's 
target of no more than '150 weekly total missed bin complaints' on sixteen out of 
twenty-four occasions (BHUA, In House performance report, November 2001). 
Following the introduction of the zoning system, this level of performance deteriorated 
further, with the total missed bins target not being achieved on twenty-seven out of 
thirty-two occasions. On one notable occasion, the level of performance was greater 
than 600 weekly total missed bin complaints and on seventeen occasions it was more 
than double the desired level of 150 (BHUA, In House performance report, :\ovembcr 
2001). 
The randomly measured street cleansing performance was also reported to have suffered 
and fallen to its lowest ever level following the introduction of the new zones (BHU.-\, 
In House performance report, November 2001). In addition, during the first six months 
of the contract, the number of 'service user complaints' rose from approximately 800 to 
2115, with the contractor never once reaching the desired target of '90 per cent 
satisfactory cleansed roads (A, Band 50% C grades)' (BHUA, In House performance 
report, November 2001). Against the backdrop of such derisory performance, a contract 
officer from the authority explained how he formally justified the Council's heayy lise 
of liquidated damages and defaults procedures by merely reverting back to the 
evaluation process and the means by which the contract had actually been secured: 
'I put all the contractor's complaints and concerns aside and said 'here are 
a few things you said you'd do to this level, you'd agreed up front, I'm sorry 
you are not doing it, you are failing' (Client Contracts Manager). 
Another interviewee from the external contractor, however, took a more philosophical 
VIew: 
'It all depends on how you view things. If you go on refuse collection and 
complaints, we H'ere achieving 99.9% success rate, but that still allowed for 
there to be man)' people not being collected and many defaults and when 
things go wrong everyone hides behind contract documentation' (Operations 
Manager). 
Nonetheless, one and half years into the contract, the problems of the integrated waste 
. h tl C '1 gay' the contractor 'six management contract had became so mtense t at 1e ounCI c 
weeks' to bring its refuse collection and street cleansing up to a 'satisfactory 
performance level' (BHUA, Scrutiny report, 2001). The request was not met. howe\"er, 
with the problems continuing to the point that, after 23 months of operation, 
documentary evidence revealed that the contractor had only managed to achie\e the 
desired level of 'missed bin' complaints on twelve out of 100 occasions (BHUA. Call 
Centre Statistics, 2001). The results for the percentage of 'satisfactorily cleansed roads' 
were descried as being even worse, with the contractor never once being reported to 
have achieved the desired level of service standard (BHUA, Scrutiny report, 2001). 
Termination of contract 
Against this background, interviewees explained that the increasingly irate authority 
threatened to withhold payments to the contractor, a sanction that was met by the rushed 
introduction of a fully integrated waste management system, again without staff 
consultation, that involved designated street cleaners sweeping immediately after refuse 
had been collected (GMB Press Release, 2001). This arrangement eventually broke 
down when thirteen street cleansers refused to take part in the contractor's new work 
schedules and as a result were suspended by managers (Davies, 2001). The suspension 
of the thirteen street cleansing operatives was quickly followed by the sacking of 131 
workers for taking part in an unlawful strike in support of the suspended colleagues 
(Davies, 2001). By this time the public and the local press clearly identified the 
contractor as being responsible for service failings and the Council, wishing not to be 
seen as siding with it, gave the contractor forty hours to show how it would meet the 
terms of the contract (Argus, 2001). 
Shortly afterwards, with losses amounting to £350,000 a month, equiyalent to 
approximately £4 million a year and potential losses of £18 million mcr the future life 
of the contract, the contractor reached an agreement with the Council to pay £3 million 
to terminate the contract (Argus, 2001). In agreeing to this proposal, thc authority 
ensured that contractor 'remained in the city for up to three months' while the Council 
found a replacement (BHUA, Scrutiny report, 2001). The five-year contract had. 
therefore, failed after two years of unsatisfactory performance and the Council was once 
again charged with the task of engaging in a fresh tendering exercise. 
Following an emergency tendering process which revealed that external contractors 
would only operate the contract in return for at least a two-fold increase in cost, the 
Authority decided that the only realistic option was to return the service in-house 
(BHUA, Scrutiny report, 2001). By returning the service in-house to a new 'city 
cleansing team,' the contact was documented to have cost the Council £ 12.5 mi Ilion for 
2001/02, with an expected cost of £17.9 million in 2002/03, nearly three times the 
amount paid previously (Audit Commission, 2002). 
In the meantime, the new city cleansing team was required to complete a fresh BV 
review entitled 'waste management services' which was reported as providing the 
'opportuni(v to work ill partnership with the workforce' whilst at the same time 
'ensuring that the refuse collection and street cleansing is provided at the lowest 
possible cost for much improved quality' (BHUA, BY performance plan, 2002/03). It 
was also during this time that the BY Inspectorate decided to make a \'isit to thc 
authority. The inspection team's interpretation of the events is ncxt considered. 
BV Inspection 
Following two years of unsatisfactory service perfonnance from its external contractor 
and having only regained direct control of the integrated refuse collection and street 
cleansing service for a period of six months, BHUA was SUbjected to an inspection of 
'waste management services,' The title of the inspection reflected the name of a fresh 
BY review the authority had commenced upon following the downfall of the earlier 
contract and thus rendered the timing of the inspection somewhat premature since the 
review was still in the process of completion. 
Perhaps even more striking, however, was the fact that despite the torrid history of the 
fonner contract, the only mention of the fonner contractor in the resulting BV 
inspection report was limited to the following short statement: 
The servIce IS delivered hr the Council's own staff following the 
termination of a contract with a waste management contractor' (Audit 
Commission, 2002b: 5), 
The fact that the BV inspection occurred after the failed external contractor had left also 
meant that the BV inspectorate's attention was directed exclusively towards the actions 
of the Council rather than the previous actions of the contractor. Although the main 
body of the report did view positively the decision of the Counci I to take 'actio1l to 
restore satisfactory' performance' (Audit Commission, 2002b: 16), it was also blamed 
for allowing perfom1ance to deteriorate, with the inspection team noting: 
'Concerns about former performance and contract management by the 
Council and their handling of a contractor who did not effectively manage 
its workforce or contract' (Audit Commission, 2002b: 16). 
Against this backdrop, the BV inspection team judged the current performance of the 
service, at the time of the inspection, as 'fair' (Audit Commission, 2002b: 16). This 
assessment was predominantly based on information detailing that the level of 
complaints received by users had fallen from historically high levels since the service 
had come back in-house, with it being noted that the number of complaints and missed 
bins was now approximately 'half of that of the former contractor and still falling. , The 
Council's performance was also reported to have moved 'closer to the average for 
missed refuse collections and satisfaction with street cleaning and refuse collection 
generally' (Audit Commission, 2002b: 27). At the same time, these findings highlight, 
as in the previous case, the importance of baseline figures to the ways in which 
inspectors rate current performance. 
The BV inspection team, however, also noted that in returning the service in-house, the 
cost per household of waste collection had more than doubled. The result of this, the 
team further observed, had been to move the service from a 'poor service provided at 
relatively low overall cost, to a close to average but high cost service' (Audit 
Commission, 2002b: 27). In particular, it was reported that the 'cost of refuse collection 
will have moved (the authority) into the worst 25 per cent performance range' (Audit 
Commission, 2002b: 27). The premise upon which the inspection team rated the 
'current performance of the service' was, therefore, a mixed one. 
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Promising prospects for improvement 
In many respects, the inspection team's impression of the authority's likely future 
performance were not helped by the Council having 'failed to set any long-term aims to 
reduce service costs despite a recent history of rapid cost increase' (Audit Commission, 
2002b). As the inspection report further maintained: 
'The Council's targets for the cost of waste disposal [per tonne} and waste 
collection [per household} in 2002103 both show substantial increases over 
the 2001102 estimated costs. For disposal the figures are £37.14 to £47.81 
(29 per cent) and for collection £37.50 to £57.48 (53 per cent)' (Audit 
Commission, 2002b: 15). 
The reported situation for the authority's approach to the increasingly important process 
of recycling was even less promising, with the inspection team reaching the conclusion 
that the Council had failed to set sufficiently challenging household recycling targets 
and was also incapable of achieving the unchallenging targets it had set (Audit 
Commission, 2002b: 14). 
Nonetheless, despite these identified limitations, inspectors concluded that the reviewed 
service had 'promising' prospects for improvement. Given some of the negative 
comments made in the report, this conclusion seemed to stem from the 'softer' 
information that the inspection team had collected from its reality checking and general 
discussions with officers and other interviewees. Moreover, in spite of reaching the 
rather promising likely future inspection verdict and acknowledging the past history of 
contractor failure, the inspection team still managed to conclude that over time 'the 
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Council would need to continue to assess alternative options for service deli1'ery to 
remain competitive' (Audit Commission, 2002b: 31). This statement, therefore, implied 
the reintroduction of competition at some later stage. 
Conclusion 
The review examined in this third case study was BHUA's review of refuse collection 
and street cleansing services. It began by detailing the impact of CCT on the two 
services and, in doing so, focused on events in the far more significant BBC. The impact 
ofCCT was shown to have been a hugely eventful one, with all of the contracts residing 
with external contractors following the completion of two separate rounds of 
competition. In particular, the impact of CCT on the two services in BBC was shown to 
have been devastating, with the threat of, and exposure to, competition, coupled with 
accusations of loss leading on the part of external contractors, resulting in continuous 
financial and service performance failures. 
Consequently, when the two former borough authorities were combined, against the 
background of a keenness on the part of the existing BBC contractor to negotiate out of 
the refuse collection and street cleansing contract, the introduction of BY policy \\'as 
seen to provide an opportunity to conduct a fundamental review of the future delivery of 
the services. Under the jurisdiction of the newly formed BHUA, the second section of 
the chapter, therefore, explained how the approach adopted towards the BY pilot was 
one which identified previous failings as a result, predominantly, of the tendering 
process of CCT rather than the use of external contractors per se. 
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In line with this approach, the chapter explained how the authority conducted a BV 
review process that was shaped primarily, owing in part to time limitations relating to 
the expiry dates of various contracts, by a BV tendering exercise which afforded more 
priority to quality factors in the resulting tender evaluation. Although the policy of BV, 
therefore, provided the authority with the opportunity to raise the level of resource 
allocation to a point at which desired service objectives could adequately be met, the 
case also revealed how such resources had to be accommodated within politically 
acceptable budgetary levels. Given that these limitations could not rule out future 
service failures, the resulting dilemma faced by the Council was how to disperse the 
potential blame for this onto the externally recruited contractor. 
The answer to this dilemma was provided in the third section of the chapter which 
devoted its attention to the BV review of refuse collection and grounds maintenance and 
revealed how the authority first challenged the existing basis of service provision by 
combining four disparate street cleansing and grounds maintenance contracts into one. 
It, then, proposed that the recruited contractor be required to take greater ownership for 
resulting service performance, even though the language of the contractual relation 
sought was expressed very much in terms of 'partnership.' Along similar lines, the 
resulting consultation process was based on the Council removing itself from 
responsibility for any future service performance failures by requiring service recipients 
to contact the contractor directly in the event of service failures. Nonetheless, it was also 
shown that whilst the ensuing integrated waste management contract contained twenty-
seven carefully crafted defaults procedures, these did not, in themselves, demand that 
the recruited contractor attain the continuous service improvement standard of . upper 
quartile status' within a given period of time. Finally, the third section of the chapter 
also revealed that the BV review process culminated in a BV tendering exercise that 
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gave equal weighting to both cost and quality factors and resulted in the third lowest of 
eight bids being selected. 
Having, therefore, detailed the outcome of the BV review, the fourth section of the 
chapter investigated the impact of BV on the two services and in doing so revealed how 
the new integrated waste management contract quickly failed to live up to its 
partnership expectations. In particular, a staff harmonisation process was revealed as 
having been badly handled by the contractor and consequently resulted in the failed 
introduction of a new zone-system of working. Against the background of rapidly 
deteriorating service performance, it was further reported how the authority had no 
option but to issue the contractor with an increasing flow of default notices. Similarly, 
in the face of mounting public and media pressure, the chapter revealed how the 
Council was forced into removing the failed contractor and ultimately to returning the 
service in house. This was achieved at nearly three times the cost of the former external 
contract, and was accompanied by the Council's decision to conduct a fresh review of 
the two services. 
In the light of this rather eventful experience, the final section of the chapter devoted its 
attention to examining the response of the BV inspectorate and, in doing so, first noted 
that the timing of the visit was of some interest given that it occurred approximately two 
years after the initial review and only once the contractor had departed. Indeed, despite 
the devastating experience of the former contractor, hardly any mention of it was made 
in the resulting BV inspection report. This meant that the resulting inspection efforts 
\\'ere directed exc1usi\'ely at the authority, which was, in part, criticised for not 
managing the contractor effectively enough. The inspection team did, howe\'cL accept 
the reasoning behind the authority's decision to return the sen'ice back in-housc and 
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duly judged the performance of the servIce as 'fair' with 'promising' prospects for 
improvement. In making the second of these judgements, however, the inspection team 
also recommended that the authority consider alternative options for future sen-ice 
delivery, suggesting once again, that the question of the role of competition and the 
utilisation of external contractors is never far from BV inspectors' lips. 
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Chapter 9 
Cross case comparison 
This chapter compares the findings of the three preceding case studies within the 
context of the four attributes of BV that were critically examined in the fourth chapter 
of the thesis. These attributes were identified as 'public involvement', 'flexibility of 
means', 'public-private partnerships' and 'inspection' and had all been purposefully 
selected by this study on the basis that they are at the heart of the GO\'ernment's 
solutions to its identified weaknesses with CCT. By comparing the case study findings 
within the context of these four attributes, this chapter is able to identify both how the 
four attributes were used in the three case studies and to what extent the claims and 
counter claims made for them materialised in practice. In doing this, the chapter is 
organised into four main sections each of which focus attention on one of the attributes. 
Public involvement 
One of the claims made for BV over CCT is that, by virtue of placing a duty on local 
authorities to consult, it is able to gain economies and efficiencies by focusing resources 
on aspects of service that are most important to the public. Having read the policy. 
guidance and literature on BV consultation, this first attribute was referred to in this 
study's literature review as 'public involvement' and was identified as requiring local 
authorities to engage with the public. This occurred in two overlapping \\'ays, Firstly. by 
the policy enforcing local authorities to provide information to, and collect information 
from, the public about the performance of local services. Secondly. by the policy 
encouraging local authorities to involve the public in decisions regarding future sen'ice 
delivery. It was explained that whereas the processes of the fonner operated via 
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statutorily required perfonnance and user satisfaction indicators, the processes of the 
latter were not statutorily defined and embraced a variety of methods including public 
meetings, suggestion cards and citizens juries. This section continues in two main parts. 
Firstly, it details and compares how each of the case reviews involved the public during 
the BV process. Secondly, it cross-compares the potential advantages and limitations 
previously identified as being potentially associated with such involvement. 
Public involvement in the case reviews 
The degree of public involvement undertaken by the three case authorities inevitably 
varied and was found to be the most extensive in the grounds maintenance and refuse 
collection review and the least extensive in the leisure centres review. 
Beginning with the review that entailed the highest level of public involvement, grounds 
maintenance and street cleansing, it was reported how the respective project team 
separated its public consultation process into three distinct phases. The first of these 
sought to gain the standardised views of a fairly wide range of the population and 
entailed the distribution of a random city-wide street survey, a ten-minute questionnaire 
to 99 special interest groups and a series of open door discussions attended by six 
special interest group representatives. The second and third consultation processes. 
meanwhile, entailed two separately organised away-day events. The first of which 
involved special interest group representatives - comprising mostly tenant and other 
local interest groups - engaging with staff officers and councillors in a number of 
workshop activities that primarily required them to state their key concerns about the 
services and to identify their priorities for the future. The second away day event. 
meanwhi Ie, culminated in attendees being asked to endorse the proj ect team's action 
plan for the revie\\ and to agree to three key perfornlance indicators chosen by it to 
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demonstrate the authority's commitment to continuous improvement. Upon gaining this 
endorsement, the process of consultation for this particular review ended. 
The refuse collection and street cleansing case study review, meanwhile, entailed h\"o 
main episodes of specific BV review consultation and, in reflection of the aims of this 
particular review, occurred only once the Council had decided to continue to recruit 
external contractors to deliver the reviewed services. The first episode of consultation 
involved a self-completion questionnaire being sent out to 233 local 'stakeholders' that 
requested information on the four issues of 'service satisfaction', 'infonnation and 
communication', 'service priority' and 'desired improvements'. The second episode of 
consultation involved twenty 'key' stakeholders, drawn from the resident population, 
being brought together in a forum of open discussion. The authority documentation on 
this forum reported that participants had been asked to briefly indicate what they 
considered to be the good and bad aspects of the service. Upon completion, the 
respective service review team spoke of their satisfaction with these two consultation 
processes and expressed confidence in the authority'S plan to encourage the public to 
contact the selected external contractor, rather than the Council, for service complaints. 
Far from confusing the public about where responsibility for service outcomes resided, 
the Council was quite explicit about this issue and ensured that the contractor had full 
liability. 
Finally, the case study of the leisure centres review revealed that the respective service 
review team did not conduct a specific process of BV review consultation in the way 
that the other two review teams had done. Instead, in the face of pressures exerted upon 
it by the authority'S leadership and cascaded down to it via senior officers and the core 
BY team, it relied on already established, albeit, distant, corporate consultation 
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mechanisms and the regularly collected leisure user satisfaction sur,eys to track the 
concerns of the public. Although these methods of consultation were not conducted as 
part of the BV review, interviewees did, nonetheless, explain that they had informed the 
direction and subsequent outcome of the review, with the BV inspectorate also making 
reference to it in the resulting BV inspection report. 
Potential limitations with public involvement 
At face value, therefore, and with the possible exception of the leisure centres case 
study, the efforts of the other two authorities to involve the public in local service 
delivery could be seen to reflect the aspirations of BV in terms of providing the public 
with the opportunity to influence decisions regarding the future delivery of the service. 
Indeed, the consultation exercises certainly embodied a greater degree of public 
involvement than that which was reported to have occurred under CCT. 
Nonetheless, despite these possible advances a number of concerns had also been 
singled out for attention in this study's literature review and these related to doubts 
about the authenticity of public involvement, concerns about whether divergent interests 
could be reconciled and a fear that the information provided to, and collected from, the 
public might not be accurate. The case study evidence was able to shed light on all of 
these issues and they are each considered in tum below. 
Authenticity of public involvement 
One of the key concerns to emerge from the literature about the public inyolyement 
attribute of BV related to doubts about the authenticity of the process in tenns of the 
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depth and intensity of public engagement (Halvorsen, 2003, Irvin, 2004). The reason for 
this concern is that the statutorily required methods of consultation in BV revolve 
around the provision and collection of performance and user satisfaction indicators. 
These are both a fairly limited means of involvement and might not be elaborated upon 
or added to by local authorities already saddled with other BV requirements and 
responsibilities. For this reason, the degree of public involvement undertaken might be 
rather limited. 
In practice, the research evidence revealed that in two of the three cases the methods of 
public involvement progressed far beyond the statutory minimum and involved fairly 
in-depth and interactive processes. The agendas of these episodes of public consultation 
tended to be heavily controlled by the respective review teams, however, thus lending to 
doubts about their authenticity. The review team in the refuse collection and street 
cleansing case, for example, was shown to have purposefully situated its consultation 
process at the start of the review in order to obtain user endorsement of its own plan to 
integrate the two services and to justify resulting contractual arrangements. 
Consequently, the involvement of the public in decisions about the reviewed services 
occurred only once the decision to appoint an external contractor had been decided. 
Similarly, the involvement of the public as a means to legitimise already taken council 
decisions was a prominent feature of the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case, 
particularly during the observed second away day event. For, during this event, the 
grounds maintenance and street cleansing project team sought legitimacy for its review 
findings by asking respondents to agree to future performance targets that had been 
directed entirely at meeting the statutory performance level. Thus, even though neither 
the organisers of the event, nor attendees, really accepted, or believed, that the 
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negotiated targets reflected reality, they did, nonetheless, sign up to the targets on the 
basis that this would best 'promote' continuous service improvement and keep central 
regulators 'off their backs'. In purposefully, steering the consultation process towards 
certain ends, the efforts thus taken by Southampton reflected a rather limited 
interpretation of the concept of participation or empowerment (Arnstein, 1969; Bums, 
Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994 and Gyford, 1994). 
In Newham, meanwhile, despite not progressing much beyond the statutory minimum, 
the style of consultation undertaken could possibly be viewed as being the most 
authentic of all of the three consultation processes examined. The explanation for this is 
that the authority did not seek to mobilise the consultation agenda in any particular way. 
It simply let the issue of resource allocation and user priorities dominate the corporate 
consultation agenda and thus clearly recognised the resource limitations it was faced 
with. Having said that, of course, the sheer lack of direct review consultation in this 
review also meant that the public had no involvement in relation to the authority's 
decision to transfer the service to an external leisure service provider either and thus 
supports the contention that the advances that BV makes over CCT in terms of its 
inclusion of a public involvement element depends on how this opportunity is used. 
This is also not to say that a lack of BV specific public involvement need be viewed as 
being inevitably problematic, particularly if sufficient previous information has already 
been gathered. Thus, as officers from the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case 
study also explained, owing to the nature of the service and the types of information 
previously collected during the day-to-day interaction between staff and users and 
between members and users, the BY review consultation process constituted little more 
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than 'going through the motions' and, by implication, the same time and effort could 
have more effectively been spent on other issues. 
Reconciliation of divergent interests 
A second key concern to emerge from the literature about the public involvement 
attribute of BV was that it might be difficult to reach a consensus on service preferences 
amongst those consulted. ill the Newham case, the authority appeared to recognise this 
tension in the way it organised its corporate consultation process in the direction of 
seeking to ascertain the relative importance individual members of the public attached 
to different local services. In seeking to quantify the public's preferences in this way it 
was able to ascertain the optimum service level thus adhering quite well to the 
'challenge' element of BV. In other words, it was a fairly individualised and 
commercialised form of engagement. 
The grounds maintenance and street cleansing review provided another good example 
of how a consensus might not be reached amongst the various members of the public 
(Curtis, 2002; Martin, 1998) and did so by identifying the differences in opinion 
expressed by local residents and special interest groups with respect to the allocation of 
resources to different aspects of the reviewed services. Thus, for example, whereas local 
residents made calls for more resources to be spent on outlying residential areas, 
representatives from a variety of special interest groups stressed the importance of 
ensuring good quality royal parks as a means to attract visitors. 
More generally, the case study evidence identified tensions in the yariety of definitions 
used to measure performance and achievement. In the Newham case, for example, while 
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review documentation revealed that the leisure service was performing at below the 
upper quartile standard, others argued that this was a function of the socio-economic 
context and high levels of economic deprivation which led to consequential efforts of 
costly social programming being implemented. By stressing economy and efficiency, 
therefore, the very constructs against which the local authorities in the three case studies 
were required to collect information to demonstrate their performance to the public was 
not necessarily even consistent with what the public or other interest groups desired 
(Humphrey, 2002; Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law and Walker, 2002). 
The accuracy of internal and external performance indicators 
The third concern raised in the literature about the public involvement element of BY 
was that information collected from the public via statutorily required user satisfaction 
indicators might not always accord with the information provided to the public in such 
documents as the BV performance plan (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2003). This type 
of concern, in fact, became apparent in both the leisure centres case and in the grounds 
maintenance and street cleansing one. 
In the former it was noted how the level of users' satisfaction with the cleanliness of , 
water did not always coincide with the results attained from the formal assessment of 
water quality. Thus, even though, according to formal evaluations of water, the levels of 
cleanliness had increased, service satisfaction with such cleanliness was found to ha\'e 
deteriorated. In the latter, it was observed how the level of service performance 
measured by the review team's utilisation of the Environmental Protection Act's quality 
standards was reported as being noticeably higher than the respecti\c figure collected 
from the user satisfaction survey. One explanation for this, in contrast to Leisure. is that 
the authority's own measurement processes were not as stringent as they should be and 
higher targets had to be met. 
These outcomes thus reflect the argument that the extent to which users are able to 
accurately and objectively assess their satisfaction with different aspects of service 
delivery depends on the nature of the service for which they are being requested to 
make a judgement (Kelly and Swindell, 2002). In the case of the assessment of water 
quality, for example, users may not have the information or knowledge at their disposal 
to properly evaluate whether a satisfactory job has been undertaken. 
Meanwhile, the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case also raised concerns 
about the source of the user satisfaction data and whether it served to hide differences in 
satisfaction amongst various members of the public (Townsend, 2000). Thus, for 
example, because the statutory satisfaction indicator of street cleanliness was measured 
at the level of satisfaction across the entire city, and in terms of a mean average, it 
served to mask differences in the satisfaction of cleanliness between different areas of 
the city. Moreover, this finding also raises the rather interesting insight that had the 
public not had other avenues of consultation available to them, it might have been 
questionable whether this geographical difference in the cleanliness and maintenance of 
the city would even have been noted. 
In summary, therefore, the inconsistencies in data collected from internal and external 
indicators of performance identified in this study raise doubts about the extent to which 
these processes of BY are able to provide accurate and clear information to the public 
about the performance of local services. Thus, even though the public are certainly 
provided with more opportunity to be involved in decisions regarding future ser,ice 
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delivery, the mechanisms underpinning such opportunities are far from perfect and can 
lead to both the gathering of conflicting information and answers to questions asked 
about the wrong issues. Simultaneously, user satisfaction surveys as a statutorily 
required expression of public involvement might also be rather limited and should not 
necessarily be relied upon. 
Flexibility of means 
The second claim made for BV over CCT is that it affords local authorities a greater 
degree of means flexibility. This is particularly so with respect to the ways they are 
allowed to put services together for BV, thus allowing them to combine previously 
barred combinations. It also expands the range of criteria by which local authorities' can 
assess the relative merits of other potential service providers and this relates not only to 
a more careful consideration of cost and quality issues but also to their choice of a far 
greater range of service delivery options. With these features in mind, this section 
continues in the vein of the previous one, by first identifying how the three case studies 
used the freedoms offered to them to pursue the desired outcomes of BV and, then, by 
detecting whether any problems materialised in relation to the use of such freedom. 
Flexibility of means in the case reviews 
In each of the case studies the authority was found to have used the discretion afforded 
it to conduct the BV review in a way that embodied a number of the alleged virtues of 
the flexibility of means attribute. Thus, for example, the authority in the grounds 
maintenance and refuse collection review immediately used the flexibility in BV to 
pursue a previously prohibited attempt to integrate its grounds maintenance and street 
cleansing services. This course of action was viewed as prO\'iding the opportunity to 
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remove duplicated functions and improve co-ordination. Likewise, having experienced 
a dissatisfactory period of CCT the authority also chose to organise the content of the 
review process in the context only of the consultation and comparison elements of BY 
, 
with a view also to demonstrating its commitment to continuous in-house improvement. 
Consequently, as the authority's standards and guidance document explained 
competition would only be used in cases of 'failing' in-house services. Given that the 
project team did not consider the grounds maintenance and street cleansing services to 
be of this ilk, it did not feel it necessary to subj ect them to competitive tendering. Thus, 
having guided the two reviewed services through the remaining 'Cs' of BV, the project 
team believed that it had identified the necessary improvements to be made to the 
service and explained how it would do this in a service improvement plan, referred to 
formally as an action plan, for examination by the BV inspectorate. 
The authority in the refuse collection and street cleansing reVIew also used the 
flexibility afforded it to combine two former CCT activities in such a way that would 
not have been allowed under CCT. As in the case of the grounds maintenance and street 
cleansing review, service integration was pursued primarily on the basis that the 
authority believed that the two services were sufficiently related to one another so as to 
facilitate the eradication of a number of overlapping functions and duplicated processes. 
It then proceeded to complete the review within the context of two externally provided 
services and this involved them also being subjected to the four C's of BV. In contrast 
to CCT, therefore, where the avoidance of the national policy was pursued in the 
authority'S undertaking of a voluntary approach to contracting out. under BV the 
principles of the legislation were more warmly embraced. Thus having made the 
decision to integrate the two services, the remainder of the refuse collection and street 
cleansing review was then directed towards the creation of an integrated waste 
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management contract and the undertaking of a BY tendering exercise which embodied a 
far greater consideration of quality in the resulting contract evaluation exercise. The 
principles of 'flexibility' were then further endorsed by the selection of the third lowest 
of eight bids on the basis that this represented the 'best value' for money. 
Finally, although the authority in the leisure centres case did not decide to change the 
organisation of its leisure management activity in terms of service composition, it did, 
nonetheless, use the freedom inherent in BY to combine three separate leisure centre 
contracts into one. It also used the discretion afforded it to conduct a BY tendering 
exercise that allowed it to award a single leisure centres contract to a single external 
leisure trust provider. Again, the criteria used to evaluate this particular tendering 
exercise was informed by a variety of factors above and beyond cost and these included 
not only capital investment proposals but also nineteen method statements, which were 
intended to allow the authority to flexibly guide and shape future client and contractor 
responsibilities. 
Potential limitations with flexibility of means 
It can be seen from the above discussion, therefore, that each of the local authorities in 
the three case studies used the freedoms inherent in BY to complete their reviews in 
ways that would have been prohibited under CCT. Upon initial examination, therefore, 
the policy of BY can, indeed, be seen to provide local authorities with more flexible 
means than was the case previously with CCT. In seeking to gauge just how 'free' local 
authorities were to complete the BY review process, it is first necessary to re\'crt back to 
concerns raised in the literature about this particular attribute of BY. Two issues were 
singled out for attention. These related, firstly, to doubts about the degree of discretion 
"l~7 
_I I 
BY would actually provide local authorities in terms of competition and SerYICe 
ownership and, secondly, to the fact that political and financial concerns might sen'c to 
tame some of the aspirations of BY contracting with respect to increased resource 
allocation. Again the case study evidence was able to shed light on both of these issues. 
as illustrated below. 
Degree of discretion 
The differences between BV and CCT in terms of allowing local authorities to freely 
decide how they secure services should not be emphasised too strongly in the two cases 
that utilised external contractors in the delivery of local services. The reason for this is 
that, under CCT, only those local authorities that wanted to retain services in-house had 
to abide by the CCT rules (Painter, 1991). The actions of two of the case authorities to 
utilise external contractors could, therefore, have been undertaken fairly freely under 
CCT as well. Indeed, one important difference between the two policies in this respect 
emerged from the Brighton case given that its externally provided refuse collection and 
street cleansing service was subjected to a BV review. The provisions of CCT in 
contrast extended only to local authority provided services. It would be interesting to 
know if other externally provided services in other authorities were also subjected to a 
BY review in this way. Similarly, both the externally provided services in Newham and 
Brighton were subjected to inspection, with the policy therefore again casting a 
regulatory glance over the actions of the external contractors. Though, as detailed 
below, the extent to which this actually occurred could be doubted. 
Equally important for the purposes of policy comparison, is the case of the Southampton 
authority that did not utilise external contractors or competition in B\', At the same time. 
it was also the only authority of the three to detail explicitly how its revie\\'ed services 
would attain upper quartile performance status within a given period of time. In one 
sense, it had aligned itself to the BV objective of continuous improvement, but had not 
been particularly adventurous or challenging with respect to competition. The fact that 
the authority was met with a BV inspection recommendation to conduct a competiti\'e 
tendering exercise meant that the policy appeared to prioritise competition over 
continuous improvement. 
Relatedly, while officers from this particular review's project team believed that the 
changes they had made would improve the quality of local services, the inspectorate 
disagreed. One key explanation for this was that according to the Audit Commission 
competition and the discipline of the market are considered to be functional to the 
achievement of continuous improvement. Yet, implicitly, by the respective Audit 
Commission's own admission this argument is abstracted from reality because in 
addition to recognising the problems brought about previously by the introduction of 
CCT, particularly with respect to the 'client-contractor split', it still made the 
recommendation that the authority conduct a competitive tendering exercise. A similar 
finding was also reached in the Brighton case, where despite the immense problems the 
authority had incurred with previous external contractors and despite the fact that since 
returning the service in-house service performance levels had improved, the BY 
inspectorate was also at pains to state that the authority should still continue to consider 
alternative options for future service delivery. 
Initial indications from both the grounds maintenance and street cleansing and rcfuse 
collection and street cleansing reviews suggest, therefore, that if local authorities are 
going to satisfy the competition element of BY, certainly for former CCT sen'ices, then. 
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they must at least undertake a competitive tendering exercise. This is a conclusion, 
which, therefore, downplays the differences between the two policies in relation to the 
role of competition. The case study findings also suggest that the BV inspectorate is 
blinded to the principles of the market and, at least local, authority competition to the 
detriment of practical measures to improve performance/quality. Indeed, the mere effort 
by the Southampton authority to demonstrate its competitiveness, in part a function of 
the fear of competition, also diverted its attention from carrying out the necessary 
practical changes that might have led to real improvement. The result of this was that 
the authority's key plan to integrate staff roles and responsibilities, along with other 
action plan proposals, had not really been addressed during the period of the review. 
The resource limitations of BV contracting 
A second identified limitation with the flexibility of means dimension of BV to emerge 
from the case studies was that while, in theory, it provides local authorities with the 
freedom to account more highly for quality in the evaluation of competing tenders' bids, 
in order to do so, such quality must be traded for increases in cost and there are obvious 
limits to resources to allow this to occur on a wide basis. Clearly, the likelihood of this 
problem directly occurring in the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case study 
was negated by the fact that no competitive tendering exercise was conducted. Haying 
said that, however, by virtue of attempting to demonstrate competitiveness by recourse 
to the consult and compare elements of BV, the authority in this case study still reached 
the decision to inject a further 250,000 pounds worth of resources into the t\VO acti\-ities-
One impression given of this additional funding was that it did not equate with the sorts 
of losses in resources that the services had met during the period of CCT and one reason 
for this \vas that there was insufficient money in the Council funds to do this. Thus. 
whilst BV could begin to reverse some of the shortfalls in resources since eeT there 
were also limits to how much reversal was possible. 
Meanwhile, upon initial examination, Brighton's decision to conduct a BY tenderin a 
b 
exercise leant even stronger support to the view that BV allows local authorities to raise 
the quality of local services to a more satisfactory standard. This was achieved, howe\'er, 
at some substantial increase in cost. Thus although the third, as opposed to the cheapest, 
contractor was selected, the resources devoted to the winning contractor still proved to 
be insufficient to deliver aspired performance levels, with inevitable service failures 
resulting. Indeed, when the authority finally priced the cost of a service that would live 
up to both the public's and the inspectorate's expectations, it involved a three-fold 
increase in financial resources. The conclusion to be reached from this case, therefore, 
was that despite all of the emphasis given to BV tendering and the attainment of the BY 
position, the metrics of tendering decisions ultimately reflects what the public are 
willing to pay, and if this is insufficient, then service failures can only be expected, 
Indeed, the particular problems in this authority's reviewed services led to targeted and 
ring-fenced increases in council tax and these were proving to be politically painful. 
Finally, despite the introduction of BV tendering, the quality gains promised by the 
authority in the leisure centres review depended, as in the case of eeT before it, on 
rather suspect income projections and, in particular, on the promise to increase leisure 
centre usage. One potential problem with the increased usage of such facilities as 
swimming pools, however, is that owing to physical parameters they quickly become 
overcrowded. Thus, in seeking to improve the quality of a swimming experience, in 
terms of having space to swim, one strategy might be to raise prices in order to control 
demand. In the event, the evidence from the leisure centres case, demonstrated how the 
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project team both increased prices and accepted the recruited contractor's changes to 
social programming and this action again reflected the existence of a close relationship 
between cost and quality albeit at another point in the service's existence. 
In summary, therefore, whilst the evidence from the case studies suggests that 8V has 
lived up to its claim that it provides local authorities with greater discretion to increase 
the quality component of the tender evaluation, it would appear that there are limits to 
the extent to which this can be achieved on a wide-scale. 
BV partnership 
The third key claim made for BV over CCT is that it allows local authorities to address 
the hugely adversarial way in which many of the CCT contracts with external 
contractors had been negotiated and operated. These problems stemmed from the fact 
that councils and contractors often viewed themselves as competitors for services rather 
than as partners of services, thus leading to a difficult working relationship between 
them. In recognition of this limitation, the policy ofBV was identified as requiring local 
authorities to reach more cost-effective and hannonious partnership arrangements with 
external providers. In doing this, it was further anticipated that local authorities would 
be able to create synergy by drawing upon external expertise and capital and reducing 
some of the transaction and contract monitoring costs fonnally associated \\ith the 
contractual arrangements created under CCT. The fourth chapter of the study also 
explained, however, that in contrast to the public involvement and flexibility of means 
dimensions of BV, the public-private partnership attribute of it is not directly implicated 
in BV policy. It can, instead, be seen to exemplify good practice and thus. as a 
discretionary process, might not encounter such widespread use as the other two 
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attributes on a review-by-review basis. With these issues in mind, this section moves on 
to examine the extent to which the alleged virtues of public-private partnerships 
materialised in the three cases and whether any resulting problems were encountered. 
Public-private partnerships in the three cases 
The public-private partnership attribute is, in a sense, the most difficult to report on 
given that in only one case study did its principles actually materialise, and furthermore, 
this occurred between a local authority and a charitable leisure trust provider rather than 
with a private contractor. In reaching this conclusion, however, it is necessary to 
discount the stated public-private partnership created in the refuse collection and street 
cleansing case study. The reason for this is that the authority, in negotiating this 
'partnership', did not utilise the attributes consistent with partnership working such as a 
strengthened focus on shared achievements and a commitment to common values 
(Baggott, 2004) Instead, the local authority remained firmly in control, with the 
contractor treated much more as an arms-length contractor. 
This is not to suggest, however, that a discussion of the use of, and problems pertaining 
to, the development of public-private partnerships has to be reserved for only one of 
three case studies. In fact, insightful evidence can be drawn from all three case studies, 
not least, because the failure to develop a partnership can itself be seen to be a function 
of the inadequacy of the underpinning foundations behind doing so (Arblaster, COImay, 
Foreman and Hatwin, 1996; Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott, 2002). 
To begin with, therefore, even though the authority in the grounds maintenance and 
. ,t I contractor it did, at th~ street cleansmg case had not awarded a contract to an ex ema . 
macro level, evoke the image of a public-private partnership in its philosophy of 'Citv 
. . 
Governance.' In this image, the private sector was considered to be a genuine source of 
job creation and a potential sponsor of public projects, rather than as a domain to 
outsource services. The particular issue of concern here, therefore, related to the level at 
which service integration or, more directly, partnership working was progressed and 
whether it occurred at the local authority level, as the policy desires, or as in the case 
study, at the level of the city. 
In contrast, the nature of the partnership created in the refuse collection and street 
cleansing case was, at face value, far more in line with the Government's aspirations for 
this particular attribute since it involved the creation of a partnership at a service 
provider level and was created in response to previous problems with external 
contractors under the former regime of CCT. The authority in the refuse collection and 
street cleansing case also maintained a commitment to the use of external contractors in 
the delivery of local services and further stressed the importance of creating a trusting 
relationship with the contractor in the sense of allowing it to deal directly with enquiries 
and complaints from the pUblic. However, as will be detailed further below, many of 
these commitments were founded on a bed of default mechanisms and liquidated 
damages procedures and thus do not accord with the characteristics Sako (1992) 
identifies with obligational contracting. 
Finally, the features usually associated with the existence of a public-private partnership 
were most evident in the leisure centres case. Following a rather lengthy BV re\'iew 
process, that began during the piloting stages of the policy and ended under the 
direction of the Local Government Act 1999 and associated guidance, Newham created 
a partnership arrangement with a leisure trust provider. The more flexible tem1S of this 
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particular partnership were shaped by nineteen key service objectives that both retained 
the council's strategic ownership of core principles and service requirements but which 
also, in contrast to the refuse collection and street cleansing contractual arranoements 
b , 
facilitated a large degree of 'give and take'. Consequently, the partnership arrangement 
was created in such a way as to allow the contractor to complete a number of key 
service projects and to take responsibility for achieving certain performance targets, 
targets that were purposefully set at a level that would allow the contractor to ease into 
its new position. 
Potential limitations with public-private partnerships 
Even though the above discussion suggests that the degree to which the three case 
studies endorsed the Government's desired principles of partnership \'aried 
tremendously, with only one authority experimenting with it fully, it is still possible to 
use the case study evidence to shed light on a number of the concerns raised in the 
literature. Three such issues were singled out from the literature and these related to 
concerns about the feasibility of the desired partnership relationships, fears that the 
creation of partnerships would incur the potential loss of local authority control and 
doubts about the compatibility of public-private partnerships with the other elements of 
BY. 
The potential loss of local authority control 
One of the key limitations identified in the literature about the public-private partnership 
attribute of BY was that it might raise difficulties in temlS of the ability of the authority 
to control the contractor and, by implication. to ensure the delivery of local sen'ices in 
the public interest (Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005). Indeed, despite references to shared 
responsibilities and aspirations, the literature suggested that under a partnership 
relationship one organisation is often in a position to dictate the terms of the contract to 
the other (Roper, 1997) and given the greater experience of private contractors in such 
relationships, this is unlikely to be the client local authority organisation. 
This type of concern was most applicable to the experiences of the authority in the 
leisure centres case which had embarked the furthest in terms of partnership-working. In 
this case it was noted how the local authority did its utmost not to antagonise its newly 
recruited partner, primarily on the basis that it was keen to gain its external capital 
investment and rate relief. Consequently, the authority in this case was shown to ha\'e 
made a number of sacrifices to its partner in order to safeguard these benefits. 
One such sacrifice was that the review team chose not to create defaults procedures as a 
means to discipline its contractor in the event of service failings nor to demand from the 
recruited contractor a commitment to reach the upper quartile position in terms of 
performance. An undesirable by-product of this preferential treatment, however, was 
that, in easing the contractor into a partnership position, the resultant changes the leisure 
trust provider made to social programming were inconsistent with the social 
distributional aspirations of the authority and at least some of the public's preferences, 
thus supporting doubts that under partnership arrangements, local authorities might not 
be able to secure local services in the public interest. 
Moreover evidence from the refuse collection and street cleansing re\'iew, also re\'ealed , 
how in not wanting to lose out to an external contractor under a partnership regime. the 
Brighton authority chose to retain the lead position in its contractual arrangement with 
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the external contractor. According to some respondents, this course of action stemmed 
from its knowledge that the contract price it was able to afford for the service might not 
be sufficient to prevent future service performance failures and it did not want to be 
party to them. Consistent with the characteristics associated with arms-Ien~h 
b 
contracting, therefore, it, created detailed performance measures and standards to 
protect itself from financial responsibility for future service performance failures. There 
was, therefore, less give and take between the council and contractor in Brighton than 
there was in the Newham case. 
Feasibility of partnership relationships 
A second concern raised in the literature about the BY emphasis on public-private 
partnerships was that the underpinning foundations necessary to ensure the creation of 
desired obligational contractual relationships do not yet exist in the local authority 
service context. Indeed, as noted above, while the creation of a partnership was possible 
in Newham, the gains were not shared equally between the Council and contractor and 
thus did not exemplify all of the attributes or claims made for it. 
The concern about the lack of the necessary underpinning foundations for partnership 
working was, however, more apparent in the refuse collection and street cleansing case 
since the respective authority, following its experiences of working with priYate 
contractors previously, ensured that it specified a number of default mechanisms and 
liquidated damages procedures that would penalise its new BY contractor for any 
resulting service failures. In this sense, the existence of an institutional framework 
exalting the need for local authorities to attain centrally defined performance targets 
represented a barrier to the fostering of relational contracting arrangements. 
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Further evidence that the nature of the public-private partnerships emphasised in BV is 
unlikely to be based on stable foundations came from the reasons provided by project 
team members in the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case for not embarking 
upon a partnership relationship with an external contractor. In particular, respondents 
from this particular case expressed concerns that, despite the onset of BV, external 
contractors were still very much perceived as being competitors, rather than partners, 
for local services. This view appeared to be reasonably well founded in the context of 
the authority's attempts to conduct data benchmarking exercises with a range of external 
contractors. Thus, these attempts had to be abandoned owing to a lack of commitment 
on the part of the external contractors to participate because of the commercial nature of 
the desired information sought. This finding again, therefore, supports the argument that 
pUblic-private partnerships might not live up to all of their expectations because of a 
lack of shared aspirations and an associated conflict of interests between the two parties 
(Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005; Arblaster, Conway, Foreman and Hatwin, 1996). 
The compatibili(v of public-private partnerships H'ith other elements of B l' 
A third problem to arise out of the findings from the three case studies with respect to 
the partnering aspirations of BV related to the deleterious impacts that they had on some 
of the other aspirations of BV, particularly service performance. It is the main 
explanation for this impact, however, that is particularly interesting because it relates to 
inadequacies in the management of staff. 
, d h th thr ~at of a proposed In the leisure centres case, for example, It was note ow e c 
. . h'· 'b t d ' part for the rapid increase servIce transfer, and ultImately partners IP, \\ as attn u e ,lll , 
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in sickness absences and staff resignations as employees became fearful of their future 
employment and this had a knock-on effect in terms of reduced service performance. 
Likewise, it was apparent in the refuse collection and street cleansing case that the 
recruitment of an external contractor committed to 'making a reality' of an under-
resourced bid also demanded Herculean efforts on the part of front line workers to a\crt 
failure (Hudson, 1999). A failure to develop partnership in any meaningful sense in this 
authority was attributed to the lack of morale and derisory performance incurred. In the 
light of these tensions, it is questionable whether it is possible, as the policy 
documentation claims, to achieve 'mutually beneficial' , or WIn-wm gams 
simultaneously amongst all of the interested parties and different collaborators affected 
by them in the ways so defined (Roper, Higgins and James, 2005). 
BV inspection 
The fourth identified attribute of BV is inspection. This attribute differs to each of the 
others on the basis that, rather than being concerned with the means by which local 
authorities create continuous service improvements in local services, it is devoted 
instead towards ensuring that local authorities have achieved the desired outcomes of 
BV. In this regard, the inspection process can be seen to provide assurances to the 
public that local authorities are not failing their communities and, furthennore, that in 
the event that they are judged to have failed, remedial actions are at hand. In elaborating 
further on the practical operation of this process, this section continues by first 
identifying the impact that the inspection process had on each of the three casc studies 
before moving on to discussing whether any of the doubts raised in the literature about 
the inspection process materialised in practice. 
BV inspection in the three cases 
Each of the three case reviews had been subjected to a BY inspection whose purpose it 
was to reach a judgement about the current and likely future perfonnance of the 
reviewed services and to provide recommendations in relation to their achie\'ement of 
continuous improvement. In each case, the inspection process proceeded in a \vay that 
advanced beyond a mere examination of council documentation and thus the limitations 
of audit and included, notably, interviews with key stakeholders and a series of reality 
checks - a range of processes that in their entirety were certainly far more detailed than 
that associated with district auditors conducting accounting checks of DSO's financial 
perfonnance under the provisions of CCT. 
Against this backdrop, the inspection visit III the grounds maintenance and street 
cleansing case was found to have been conducted after the completion of the associated 
review and following the pUblication of the local authority's service improvement plan. 
The case study found that the inspection team endorsed many of the changes that the 
project team proposed to make to the reviewed activities and further accepted that 
additional resources were required to make some of the identified changes possible. At 
the same time, however, the inspectorate was also found to have expressed gra\'e 
concern at the authority's failure to conduct a competitive tendering exercise and duly 
recommended that the authority more fully address this aspect of BV in the future. In 
the context of this evaluation, the authority received a verdict of 'fair' current 
perfonnance with 'promising' prospects for improvement. 
In the case of the leisure centres review, meanwhile it was reyealed that th' . 
, e InSpectIOn 
team conducted this particular visit ten weeks into the operation of the contract by the 
leisure trust partner. The case study revealed that the inspection team was very upbeat 
about the authority's review efforts and, in particular, praised its decision to embark 
upon a partnership approach with a leisure trust service provider. The inspection team 
did, however, also suggest that more refurbishment was required to a number of the 
existing leisure centres in order to make them more accessible and of better physical 
appearance. At the same time, despite reaching the verdict that the targets signed 
between council and contractor were insufficient to reach upper quartile status, the 
authority still received a verdict of 'fair' current performance and 'excellent' prospects 
for improvement. 
Finally, the inspection team in the refuse collection and street cleansing review chose to 
visit the respective authority after two years of unsatisfactory performance from the 
externally recruited contractor and once the contract had been returned in-house. Given 
the severity of the situation in this authority, however, the inspection team did not \\'ait 
until the authority had completed its re-review of the two activities but instead chose to 
visit it during its completion. Obviously concerned at recent events in this authority, the 
inspection team accepted the reasoning behind the council's decision to return the two 
services in-house and largely endorsed also the high level of additional resource 
allocation it had incurred in doing so. Strikingly, however, there was very little mention 
in the BV inspection report of the history of the former contractor, with the focus of the 
inspection being primarily concerned with the authority's proposals for the future. Thus. 
in the context of concerns that the costs of the seryice should not be left to rise 
indefinitely, the inspection team awarded the authority a yerdict of 'fair' current 
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performance with 'promising' prospects for improvement exactly the same t 
' ou come as 
the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case review. 
Potential limitations with the inspection process 
With all of the case reviews having been subjected to a BV inspection, there was a large 
swathe of evidence available for the purposes of examining whether the concerns raised 
in the literature about the inspection process of BV materialised in practice. The 
literature review focused on the three pertinent issues of ontology, consistency and 
impartiality and the case study evidence was able to shed light on all of these issues. 
Ontology 
One of the concerns raised in the literature about the BV inspection process was 
whether it would actually be possible for a team of between two and three inspectors to 
properly and accurately capture the actions of such a complex organisation as a local 
authority service activity and reduce it ultimately to a two-dimensional summary of its 
performance. In reflecting upon this issue, the case study evidence certainly leant 
support to concerns in the literature that such complex organisations as local authorities 
are not fixed and unchanging entities but instead are subject to much change and flux 
(Ball, 1997). Thus, what becomes apparent about an organisation at the time of 
inspection might not be apparent at another point in time. 
Indeed, the importance of inspection timing, and thus at what point III time an 
organisation is inspected, was particularly noticeable in the refuse collection and street 
. . t d t elati\'cl\' iatl? cleansing review, given that the authonty concerned was mspec e a a r -
stage and only after the service had been returned in-house. Had the inspection team 
visited a few months earlier, it is likely that a 'poor' inspection verdict would have been 
received. Given this finding, questions must be raised about the longevitv and relevance 
of inspection judgements. 
Another problem that can be identified from an examination of the response of the BV 
inspectorate in each of the three case studies relates to the contested definitions of 'oood 
b 
and bad performance'. Thus, for example, despite the general le\'el of agreement 
amongst local authority respondents about the inspection scores provided for 'current' 
performance a number of respondents also explained that this only related to official 
definitions of 'failure' and that the notion of a 'failing' service depended largely on hO\\ 
one interpreted the underlying meaning of the figures (Humphrey, 2002). Thus, while 
inspectors in the leisure centres case concluded that, in terms of 'net cost per swim/visit' 
and 'net cost per head of population,' the respective authority was London's fifth and 
sixth most expensive leisure service provider respectively, local elected councillors 
strongly disputed the formal interpretation of these figures noting that they were heavily 
influenced by the 'relative deprivation of the authority' and its 'commitment to social 
programming' and 'subsidised access'. 
Consistency 
A second doubt raised in the literature about the process of BY regulation was the fear 
that the collection and analysis of performance comparison data would not be conducted 
on a like-for-like basis (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999). In tum, this fear 
reflected two areas of concern. The first was that it was likely to be incredibly difficult 
., . f . . d s amonost different teams of to set a consIstent mterpretatIOn 0 mspectIOn proce ure b 
inspectors. The second was that the complexity of the service under investigation. and 
the inspector's previous experience of it, was likely to differ fairly widely on a sen'ice-
by-service basis. 
The case study findings found evidence of both these areas of concern. To begin \\"ith, it 
did indeed appear to be the case that the lines of enquiry and types of analysis that the 
various inspection teams drew upon were far from consistent. In particular, it appeared 
to be the case that, armed with an immense amount of potential information to utilise, 
some general and some specific, the three respective inspection teams could effecti vel y 
select information that justified their verdicts about a particular authority's review. To 
illustrate such discretion, it was found, for example, that the teams in the leisure centres 
and refuse collection and street cleansing cases expressed no concern with the effecti ve 
failure on the part of their respective review teams to link their reviews to their 
authority's strategic framework in the way that the one in the grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing authority had. Although such differences in emphasis could be a 
function perhaps of the different types of activity being inspected, this finding does not 
instil one with confidence that the process had been conducted consistently. Rather, it 
seems, inspectors drew upon evidence which supported their own hunches and ignored 
evidence that did not. 
Given this, it was not surprising to find that respondents from across the three cases 
reviews tended to agree more with inspectors' estimation of the 'current' rather than the 
'likely future' performance of the reviewed activity. The explanation for this was that 
the task of predicting the 'likely future performance' score was felt to provide 
inspectors with far more discretion when making their judgements than was the case for 
d t arked '(or currel/! the current level of service performance. Thus, as one respon en rem , . 
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performance we know what sorts of performance data inspectors lril/ base their 
judgements on, for future performance, however, inspectors are able to draw lipon any 
evidence they wish'. 
Meanwhile, in tenns of the issue of service complexity, a comparison of the number of 
national perfonnance indicators in existence amongst the reviewed activities was shown 
to have differed tremendously between the environmental based services and the leisure 
centres service. Thus, whereas the two case studies containing environmental sen'icc 
activity were both exposed to approximately nine national BV performance indicators, 
the leisure centres case was only exposed to two. Consequently, in the case of the latter, 
inspectors are implicitly responsible for compiling a greater range of non-statutorylnon-
consistent infonnation to make their judgements. This affords them far more discretion 
to reach their verdicts since they do not constrained by having to refer to standards 
perfonnance data. Similarly, the accuracy of the indicators used, in terms of the clarity 
of collection, also differs between services. Thus, for example, the procedures involved 
in making a judgement about whether refuse has been collected from a household is 
easier to judge than it is to measure the cleanliness of swimming pool water. In this 
example, therefore, data collected in relation to the fonner, simpler process is more 
likely to be collected with a greater degree of consistency amongst different inspectors 
than the latter, more complicated, process. 
Impartiality of inspection process 
A final and more senous concern about the BV inspection process raised in the 
literature review related to the impartiality of the process - particularly in tem1S of the 
, ~ h I f ,t I contractors in the delivery of degree of local authonty support lor t e ro e 0 ex ema 
local services as against their actual and proposed perfonnance. Chapter four of this 
thesis suggested, for example, that the scoring parameters of the 'likely' future 
performance' assessment is structured in such a way so as to make the mere act of 
changing service providers, whether willingly or not, a positive one - since it clearl\' 
demonstrates the authority'S ability to 'challenge' the existing basis of service provision 
irrespective of outcome. 
A cross examination of the BV inspection team's visits and associated reports appears 
to lend support to this contention, given that the most positive inspection verdict was 
awarded to the authority which awarded a leisure centres contract to an external 
contractor. Although, this outcome might have simply reflected the small sample size. 
and the fact that this might have been perfectly legitimate, what makes this outcome 
particularly enlightening is the related failure on the part of the associated BV 
inspection team to be concerned with the authority's failure to demonstrate its 
commitment to continuous improvement. Thus, despite receiving the highest inspection 
score for 'likely future improvement,' the authority in the leisure centres review did not 
satisfy inspectors that its recruited 'partnering' contractor would propel the service into 
the upper quartile position within five years. This finding was a striking one, gi\'en the 
great importance that has been placed by BV policy on the need for local authorities to 
reach the upper quartile, and as a result, raises grave doubts about the impartiality of the 
BY inspection process. 
In contrast, despite being the only authority to make an explicit commitment to reach 
the upper quartile position within a given period of time, the BV inspection tcJm in the 
grounds maintenance and street cleansing case remained focused upon the authority's 
failure to conduct a competitive tendering exercise and subsequently recommended thJt 
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it conducted one. This was a recommendation which not only reinforced the view that 
the policy has an in-built tendency against continued in-house provision but appeared 
also to be inconsistent with both the inspectorate's and authority's view that the removal 
of the former client-contractor split had been a worthy one. 
Meanwhile, the relatively dire situation of the refuse collection and street cleansinu 
:::-
review case faced no worse inspection result than the grounds maintenance and street 
collection one. One possible explanation for this being that the authority had at least 
demonstrated a recent commitment to experiment with external contractors and by 
implication to embody the underlying principles of BV. Moreover, it was also noted in 
the inspection report that the mention of the role of the external contractor in relation to 
the failed previous service performance was the subject of only one short statement. 
This downplays the difference between BV and CCT in terms of the extent to which 
they might actually regulate the external provision of public services. 
It might be suspected, therefore, that just as the literature on CCT revealed a relaxation 
of the associated legislation occurred in the event that local authorities directly awarded 
contracts to external contractors (Painter, 1991), the severity of BV regulation also 
subsides in cases where external contractors take responsibility for sen'ice deli\'ery 
under BV (Ridowski, 2002). Indeed, one key explanation why the inspection team 
believed that the newly recruited contractor in the leisure centres case would do \\ell 
was because it wrongly believed that the contractor would both rectify poorly 
performing areas and retain highly performing ones. It is a finding that once again lends 
support to Rikowski's (2002) argument that the BV inspection process is implicitly 
biased towards supporting the role of external contractors in the delivery of local 
. . . I . h dB' (2004) discussion of puhlic 
sernces. It also marks a stnkmg paraUe \\,It van e erg s 
choice theory more generally and the argument that its proponents tend to compare 
public officials' behaviour in practice unfavourably with the assumed practices of 
private entrepreneurs ill theory. A similar argument could be levelled at the B\· 
inspection process, with inspectors being seen to compare local authorities' 
performance unfavourably compared to the assumed gains of alternative pro\'iders. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has cross-examined the findings from three case studies each devoted to 
the examination of the implementation of BY amongst former CCT activities. It was 
primarily structured with a view to examining the extent to which doubts about the four 
claimed attributes of BY materialised empirically. Beginning first with the attribute of 
public involvement, the chapter revealed that, consistent with the claims made for this 
particular aspect of BY, the evidence from the case studies identified numerous 
examples of how the BY review process provided the public with a far greater 
opportunity to have a say in local service delivery than was the case with CCT. This 
was certainly true of both the grounds maintenance and street cleansing and the refuse 
collection and street cleansing case studies, whose respective review teams conducted a 
range of consultation exercises with a wide cross-section of the public. 
Having reached this conclusion, however, the evidence on the public involvement 
attribute of BY also supported a number of the doubts raised in the literature. To begin 
with, it was found that although BY does provide the public with the opportunity to be 
involved in decisions about local services, in doing this, complicated decisions then 
. . . t I th 'r \\'ords have to be made to deal with the needs and wIshes of divergent mteres s. n 0 l: , 
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a zero-sum game is in operation with some members of the public likely to be pleased 
with the outcomes of consultation for future service delivery and others less so. 
In addition, doubts were also raised about the extent to which data collected from 
internally collected performance indicators corresponds with data collected \'ia user 
satisfaction surveys, with the result that published performance data might actually be 
confusing to the public. Consequently, although the policy emphasises the importance 
of providing the public with information about services and to allow the public to 
express their degree of satisfaction, both mechanisms were shown to have a number of 
flaws. 
Finally, the process of public involvement was also shown to be limited in terms of the 
authenticity by which the processes of consultation had been conducted. In all three 
cases it was revealed, for example, how the consultation process had been steered in 
particular directions so as to ensure that the public did not challenge decisions already 
taken by the respective councils and thus involved a degree of mobilisation of bias. In 
this sense, although there clearly was more public involvement in the BY review 
process than with CCT, the degree of involvement was rather superficial and inauthentic. 
Secondly, in terms of the flexibility of means dimension, the case study evidence 
certainly revealed how the two local authorities that conducted competitiye tendering 
exercises used the flexibility in BV to increase the quality component of the exercise. :\t 
the same time however concerns in the literature that the additional attention on quality , , 
would require politically and financially sensitive resource allocation also appeared to 
be supported in the findings. Thus, the outcome for the refuse collection and street 
. . I I d d' . t 18 of resource implications cleans111g case proved to be partlcu ar y eman 111g 111 em 
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because it required an effective tripling of service costs between comm f } 
encement 0 t 1e 
BY review and the eventual return of the service in-house. Similarly. although the 
contractual arrangement in the leisure centres case was achieved at a stated saving to the 
authority, the related tendering evaluation, heavily weighted as it was by predicted user 
numbers and income projections, differed little to the evaluation used under CCT. with 
the implications for quality, therefore, remaining uncertain. 
Meanwhile, the claim that BV policy freely allows local authorities to progress the B\' 
review process without necessarily having to engage in competitive tendering ,vas not 
supported by the evidence collected from the grounds maintenance and street cleansing 
review. In particular, although it was the authority in this case that went the furthest of 
the three case authorities to demonstrate its commitment to continuous improvement, 
the inspectorate still, nonetheless, recommended that it addressed the competition 
element of the review. Consequently, it seems that, with the possible exception of those 
authorities' with current upper quartile performance status, competition will remain an 
almost obligatory tool given that the other elements of BY are not as powerful as 
competition in terms of demonstrating competitiveness. 
Thirdly, in terms of the implications of the case study findings for the BY attribute of 
pUblic-private partnerships, the case study evidence was rather limited by the fact that in 
only one case was a meaningful attempt made to establish a partnership relationship. 
The limited availability of primary evidence in this respect was in itself insightful. 
however, given that the failure to develop desired partnership relations can itsel f be seen 
to be a function of the lack of the necessary underpinning foundations for such a 
relationship. Thus, for example, despite heralding the benefits of partnership. the 
. . I'" study demonstrated how a 
cndence from the refuse collectIOn and street c eansmg case -
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lack of shared aspirations and a willingness to share risk involved the authoritv ensurin a 
. ~ 
that it wrote into its contract specification, clauses that would diYert resulting blame for 
service perfonnance squarely onto the contractor. This action clearly did not encourage 
the creation of a friendly, partnering, relationship. 
Similarly, even in the case study that did involve a partnership relationship being 
created, it was found that, consistent with the concerns raised in the literature. the 
relationship was one of unequal power. It was revealed, for example, how the authority 
in the leisure centres case was keen not to upset the newly emerging and developing 
contractual relationship with its leisure trust provider and chose not, therefore, to 
demand high perfonnance levels from it. In doing this, however, the authority was 
identified as losing control of the strategic direction of the service, with the fear that its 
social objectives were, in particular, being undennined. 
Finally, as suggested in the literature, in each of the cases involving an external 
contractor, the implications for staff was shown to have been far from satisfactory and 
duly resulted in reduced service perfonnance, either as a result of the threat of a service 
transfer or following their experience of actual partnership-type management 
arrangements. For these and other reasons, some support could be gi\'cn to the concern 
that the emphasis on public-private partnerships might not be consistent with some of 
the other aims of the policy. 
Having examined the empirical implications of the three identified attributes of the 8V 
review process, the second part of the chapter then turned its attention to thc regulatory 
f th B\' 'nspectorate to each of mechanisms of BV and, in particular. to the response 0 e 1 
the reviews. In each case it was revealed how the degree of external independent 
3()\ 
enquiry into the actions of the respective local authorities was far greater than that 
experienced under CCT, and thus supported claims that BV could indeed provide a 
better safeguard to the public against failing servl'ces At the s t' h 
' arne lme. O\\c\er, a 
number of the potential limitations of the BV inspection process were also prevalent in 
the case study evidence, 
Thus, for example, in terms of ontological limitations, doubts raised in the literature 
about the longevity of inspection scores appeared to be supported by the case study 
evidence particularly in terms of the timing of the inspection, Similarly, the leisure 
centres case study evidence also supported doubts regarding the depth and breadth of 
BV inspection criteria and whether it is able to capture all of the aspects of service 
performance deemed to be important to the local authority and its electorate, As for the 
issue of consistency, meanwhile, the concerns of the literature more forcefully 
materialised. Thus, for example, whilst respondents generally believed that inspectors 
could accurately judge the current performance of a service - in part, because of the 
nature of this particular aspect of performance evaluation - far less satisfactory findings 
were obtained in relation to how the inspectorate went about making likely future 
performance judgements. The explanation for this not only reflected the methodological 
issue that different services were being cross-examined but also that inspectors did not 
consistently draw upon the same range of information and arguments to make their 
cases. Consequently, it appeared to be the case, certainly for the likely future 
performance assessment, that inspectors both possessed and used the discretion afforded 
to them to reach their desired conclusions, 
Finally, and perhaps of most significance, the case study e\'idence supported claims that 
the BV inspection process might, as a result of the scoring parameters of this aspect of 
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BV, reward highly local authorities that increase the use of external contractors in the 
delivery of local services. Thus, for example, although the authority in the leisure 
centres case had not explained how it would attain the upper quartile performance 
position in the way that the grounds maintenance and street cleansing review had, it still 
received the highest inspection score for likely future performance. In contrast, the BV 
inspection team in the grounds maintenance and street cleansing case remained focused 
upon the authority's failure to conduct a competitive tendering exercise. Indeed, perhaps 
the most consistent feature of both the Brighton and Southampton cases was the 
continued role and importance placed on the tool of competition. Thus, even though the 
authority in the refuse collection and street cleansing review had previously 
experimented rather unsatisfactorily with external contractors, the inspectorate still 
concluded that it should revert back to competition at some later date. Given these and 
other findings, therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that the severity of BV 
regulation subsides in cases where external contractors take responsibility for service 
delivery under BV. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
This study has conducted a companson of the policies of compulsory competitiye 
tendering (CCT) and Best Value (BV) in local government. The research on which it 
was based had four objectives and it is the task of this final chapter to reach overall 
conclusions in relation to them. The chapter also considers the thesis' implications for 
more recent government policy in local government and identifies future research 
opportunities. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first section begins by charting the findings obtained on the rationale and impact of 
CCT and the way in which it exerted a retrospective influence over the development of 
BV policy. It, then, turns its attention to a discussion of the rationale, composition and 
practical impact of the four attributes of BV selected in this study to reflect the claims 
made for it over CCT. Finally, an overall summary of the differences between BY and 
CCT in terms of process and impact is provided. 
The second section, initially, reviews the nature of the post-BY policy of comprehensive 
performance assessment (CPA) before going on to consider what light the present study 
sheds on its likely future success. In the context of the present study's limitations, the 
third then identifies a number of areas where future research could usefully be , , 
undertaken. 
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CCT and BV 
The thesis began in the context of CCT and revealed that the philosophical rationale for 
it resided in the speeches and publications of the 'new right'. Drawing upon the work of 
Hayek (1944) and public choice theory, it was explained that those associated with the 
'new right' complained persistently about what they then saw as the prevailing ills of 
state monopolistic local authority provision of services and sought to eradicate these 
identified problems by imposing an obligatory cost-orientated tendering process on 
certain local government services. The success of this policy, however, proved to be 
mixed, with the levels of competition and external contractor involvement lower than 
had been expected (Local Government Management Board, 1997) and the extent of 
micro economic cost savings below that achieved under voluntary competitive tendering 
(Local Government Chronicle, 1990; Walsh, 1991a; Walsh and Davis, 1993; Austin 
Mayfield, 1997). Moreover, other research evidence (Escott and Whitfield, 1995b) 
raised doubts about the broader cost-effectiveness of CCT, once account had been taken 
of job losses and increased social transfer payments. 
Against this backdrop attention was turned to Labour's response to CCT. Here it was 
revealed how Labour initially expressed grave opposition to the aims and distributional 
outcomes of CCT but then increasingly, as part of its wider transformation into New 
Labour, centred its attention on the deleterious quality implications of the policy. The 
result of this was that during the build up to the 1997 general election, Labour had, as 
part of its longer-term response to CCT, indicated its intention to create a policy that 
would be devoted to the 'superior' policy objective of continuous service improvement. 
In doing this, Labour demonstrated that it now shared its predecessor's preoccupation 
with micro efficiency and appeared to pay far less interest, from a social justice 
30S 
perspective, to how such continuous improvements were to be made. 
Given this transformation in priorities, the thesis moved on to consider the issue of 
precisely how BV proposed to represent an advance on CCT. This question led to the 
identification of four attributes of BV that the Government considered to be at the heart 
of its solutions to the identified weaknesses of CCT. These were described under the 
headings of 'public involvement', 'flexibility of means', 'public private partnerships' 
and 'inspection' and represented this study's unique approach to the examination of BV 
and one that particularly recognises the way in which the development and formulation 
of this policy is ultimately linked with the previous regime of CCT. 
Having thus directed the study towards an examination of these four chosen attributes of 
BV, the thesis moved on to consider their likely impact in practice. This was achieved 
through a consideration of the claims made for the identified attributes and the degree to 
which they could be supported empirically. The main results obtained from this analysis 
in relation to each of the identified attributes are summarised below. 
Public involvement 
The first attribute of 'public involvement' was singled out for attention on the basis that 
BV not only places a duty on local authorities to consult with the public but also 
supports this duty by statutorily requiring local authorities to (a) publicly publish certain 
information on its service performance and (b) obtain via the use of standard indicators 
user satisfaction data. 
~06 
These inter-related statutory duties are, it was noted, claimed by the government to 
facilitate the continuous improvement of service delivery by enabling authorities to 
focus resources on aspects of service provision 'which matter most'. However, it was 
further noted that whilst existing research evidence suggests that the emphasis on public 
consultation and involvement in BY is largely welcome amongst local authority 
councillors and officers (Martin, 1998; Improvement and Development Agency, 1999), 
it seemed likely that the placing of sole reliance on the statutory techniques of public 
involvement would lead to a rather limited depth of public engagement (Goss, 1999; 
Cook, 2002). It was further suggested that there were good reasons for believing that 
this potential limitation could be compounded by the fact that the information collected 
from, and circulated to, the public, was itself confusing as a result of problems with the 
accuracy of performance and user satisfaction indicators, as well as inconsistencies 
between them. In addition, and more generally, attention was drawn to the way in which 
the role played by such involvement was likely to be shaped by how far an authority 
seeks to undermine its authenticity in order to pursue other pre-determined ends. 
As regards to the empirical findings obtained, these suggested that BY had led local 
authorities to involve the public and other stakeholders in decisions about future service 
delivery in ways that were not previously considered necessary or adopted under CCT. 
At Southampton, for example, it was noted how, as part of the BY review process, the 
views of the public were gathered via self-completion questionnaires and open meetings. 
These meetings, held either as part of an away-day process or via a forum of open 
debate were furthermore found to have been engaging and therefore as being examples , 
of how local authorities can go beyond the statutory elements ofBV consultation. \lore 
generally, the impression gained from many respondents was that local authority 
consultation and dialogue with the public was a good thing. 
Upon closer examination, however, the authenticity of the actual public involvement 
conducted, despite traversing beyond the minimum, was, nonetheless, found to have 
been fairly limited in terms of influence. This was particularly true with respect to the 
processes of public consultation conducted in Brighton and Southampton. Thus, in both 
of these cases, it was found that the public consultation processes were carefully guided 
by the respective review teams, either by keeping issues off the agenda, such as in 
Brighton's choice of contract provider, or by forcing issues onto the agenda, such as 
Southampton seeking public endorsement for its desired performance targets. Moreover, 
as the Southampton case revealed, there seemed, at the same time, a risk that the duty to 
consult in BV could lead to wasteful and uninformative consultation being conducted, 
particularly in situations where much information about the public is already known, 
such as via the day-to-day interaction between staff and users. 
As for the statutory measures of public involvement, the case study findings support 
arguments that performance and user satisfaction indicators are subject to both flaws 
and unintended consequences (Neely, 1998; Kelly and Swindell, 2002). For example, 
the cases studies revealed differences in perception amongst various members of the 
public about the success or failure of local services and related divergencies of interest 
amongst those consulted (Curtis, 2002; Martin, 1998). They also indicated that these 
differences of viewpoint and interest were difficult to meaningfully resolve, through a 
process of public consultation characterised by a fairly individualised and narrow 
approach to the concept of involvement. 
Flexibility of means 
The second attribute identified - 'flexibility of means' - was seen to stem from the 
government's attempt to use BV to address several perceived inflexibilities associated 
with CCT. In particular, it was noted to potentially provide a means whereby local 
authorities could seek to improve services without recourse to competitive tendering 
and also utilise such tendering more flexibly, by, for example, packaging services in a 
way that was not possible under CCT and utilise criteria, other than cost, as a basis for 
selecting contractors. 
The initial analysis of this attribute made clear, however, that the flexibility so provided 
is potentially very constrained. Thus, attention was drawn to the fact that it does not put 
an end to the once negatively perceived threat posed to local government service 
delivery by competitive tendering. Instead, it supplements this 'tool' with a far greater 
range of service delivery options, only one of which offers retained in-house provision -
and this depends on local authorities' demonstrating competitiveness. As a result, the 
analysis raised doubts about the extent to which local authorities really would be free to 
improve in-house services without recourse to competitive tendering and, in doing so, 
questioned, more specifically, whether the obligation under BV to demonstrate 
competitiveness would act to obstruct the pursuit of continuous improvement. In 
addition, while acknowledging that BV does effectively allow local authorities to 
increase the quality component of their tendering evaluation, it also noted that their 
ability, in practice, to do so might be curtailed by political and financial limitations. 
In practice, the case study evidence certainly found evidence that the three authorities 
had all completed their BV reviews in far more varied ways than would have been the 
case under CCT. Thus, it was found that all three of the case authorities made tellina 
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changes to the way the reviewed services were packed in order to reduce the contract 
preparation and tendering costs formerly associated with competitive tendering and to 
remove duplicated functions - the knowledge about which had, somewhat ironically, 
been unearthed by the organisational and managerial demands introduced by CCT. 
Indeed, in Southampton, the flexibility provided by BY even led it to disband the client-
contractor distinction and move back to a traditional hierarchical management approach. 
Whilst all of these approaches to BY were, therefore, distinct from those employed for 
the purposes of CCT, the ramifications of the continued role of competition and, in 
particular, competitive tendering remained uncertain. This was particularly found to be 
the case in Southampton, and to a certain extent also in Brighton, where the issue of 
competitive tendering remained firmly at the forefront of the inspectors' minds. What 
was striking about these two cases, however, was that the inspectors' insistence on the 
importance of competition was formed in recognition of the earlier negative experiences 
of CCT. What these findings suggest, therefore, is that the BY inspectorate remains 
committed to the principles of the market, even where this is possibly to the detriment 
of pursuit of practical measures to improve performance/quality. They further illustrate 
how BY policy has retained competitive tendering as a disciplining tool of local 
government, albeit one that is not necessarily enacted during the review process, but 
rather as an outcome of the Audit Commission's assessment of the reviewed service's 
'current' and 'likely future' performance. Moreover, the thesis' analysis of the BY 
policy literature also suggests that, very much as was the case with eeT, it is the 
demonstration of competition for in-house service delivery rather than externally 
provided service delivery that is important. 
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Finally, while notably in the Brighton and Southampton cases, the flexibility of BV was 
used to increase the quality component of the contract evaluation, there were clear signs 
that the scope to increase the weight accorded to this factor was limited. Thus, for 
example, Brighton's ability to raise the quality of its refuse collection and street 
cleansing services to a satisfactory standard of service necessitated a targeted and ring-
fenced increase in council tax and this proved to be both politically and financially 
difficult. Similarly, the increase in resources given to the grounds maintenance and 
street cleansing services in the Southampton case was still found to be insufficient, for 
financial reasons, to compensate for the levels of losses incurred during the period of 
CCT. 
Public-private partnership 
Aligned to the issue of competition is the encouragement that BV policy gives to public-
private partnerships. The rationale behind this is that it provides local authorities with 
the opportunity to move away from the hostile nature of the contracts they negotiated 
under CCT and to reap gains through synergy, shared expertise and shared ambition. 
Despite these aspirations, initial analysis questioned the principle of whether the 
underpinning foundations necessary to ensure mutually beneficial collaborative 
arrangements were likely to exist in the BV context (Arblaster, Conway, Foreman and 
Hatwin, 1996; Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott, 2002). For example, as the 
straightforward indicator of profit does not exist for public organisations, it might be 
difficult for both parties to achieve a common focus in relation to desired service 
objectives. It was further observed that the surrounding institutional contcxt \\ithin 
which the establishment of public-private partnerships might take place could crcate 
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problems of joint integration, particularly gIven the demands that BV places on 
continuous improvement and the achievement of centrally defined perfonnance targets _ 
demands which might, therefore, obstruct the achievement of obligational contractino 
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arrangements characterised, for example, by the deployment of 'loose' perfonnance 
measures. In addition, in noting that the differing priorities, goals and responsibilities of 
public and private sector organisations often exist alongside differences in power and 
resources between them, the analysis pointed out that it might, in practice, be difficult 
for even-handed relationships to materialise because of the ability of the private sector 
partner to gain at the other's expense. 
The pnmary evidence collected in the study tended to support these doubts, with 
evidence from Southampton demonstrating how even miniscule attempts at public-
private partnership working, such as the completion of data benchmarking exercises, 
failed to materialise owing to the commercial sensitivity of such collaboration. These 
barriers to effective partnership working were further exacerbated by the fact that the 
local authority and potential external contractors continued to view themselves as 
competitors for local services, feelings not helped by the retained emphasis BY gives to 
competition. Similarly, it was owing to a lack of shared interests and aspirations that 
Brighton chose not to lessen its grip on the control of the service in favour of a fully 
blown public-private partnership but instead ensured that it wrote into its contract 
specification clauses that would divert resulting blame for service perfonnance failures 
exclusively onto the contractor. 
Moreover, in the case of Newham, \vhich did embark upon a 'partnership' relationship, 
the case study findings suggested that the Council had relinquished some of its control 
over the service, particularly with respect to social programming. This finding thus 
'l1' 
lends support to Grimshaw and Hebson's (2005) argument that the establishment of 
pUblic-private partnerships are rarely conducted amongst equally powerful parties. 
Finally, the case study evidence suggests that the forced introduction of public-private 
partnerships might actually serve to lower performance/quality, particularly if staff feel 
that such endeavours conflict with the means-neutral 'what matters is what works' 
philosophy, a suggestion that received particularly strong support from the Newham 
study where following the Council's decision to transfer the service, it was found that 
morale dropped and performance levels deteriorated. Indeed, in this context, it was 
observed, more generally, that BV can be seen to provide a more hostile regime for staff 
and unions than CCT since at least under the latter the grounds for externalisation - cost 
- was transparent and it was possible for staff to concede terms and conditions of 
employment in order to retain their employment. 
Inspection 
The fourth attribute discussed III the thesis was BV inspection, the foremost 
responsibility for which resides with the Audit Commission. The objective of BY 
inspection is to decide formally whether the 'current' and 'likely future' performance of 
a reviewed local service is satisfactory or not and to recommend any necessary remedial 
actions. The role of the Audit Commission in protecting the public from 'failing' 
services in this way can thus be seen to provide a more robust means of ensuring that 
local authorities are delivering services to the highest possible standard, \\hilst also 
addressing some of the limitations identified with BV audit. Despite the claims made for 
the BV inspection process, however, the literature-based analysis argued that it is likely 
d 'th t loav consistency and to be tarnished by fairly well establishe concerns WI on 0 b_' 
impartiality. 
The case study findings on inspection revealed that both Brighton and Southampton 
received a verdict of 'fair' for current performance and 'promising prospects' for future 
performance. Newham, meanwhile, received the jUdgement of 'fair' for current 
performance and 'excellent prospects' for future performance. What is interesting to 
note about these scores, however, is that not only were they created in the context of 
highly turbulent service activity, in part a function of the demands placed upon the local 
authorities to conduct the process of BV, but that the assessment of 'likely future 
performance', and by implication the quality of the review conducted, was also highl y 
unstable and subject to inconsistencies. 
In particular, the case study findings suggest that because local authority services are 
subject to much change and flux the timing of the inspection visit influences greatly the 
resulting verdict reached. Thus, for example, had the Brighton inspection team visited a 
few months earlier, during the downfall of the externally provided service, it is likely 
that a 'poor' rather than a 'fair' inspection verdict would have been given. By 
implication, such flux and transformation in service activity also raises question marks 
about the longevity and validity of the inspection scores received in the sense that they 
can only be relied upon as a snapshot of an activity's performance across time. More 
recent evidence, furthermore, (Higgins, 2005a) suggests that it is not only local 
authorities that are subject to change and flux but the very regulatory processes and 
guidance used to assess them. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the issue of consistency, it was found that whereas the 
Southampton inspection team expressed a particularly strong concem at the lack of a 
strategic framework in the respective authority's performance plan, the other two 
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inspection teams did not even raise this issue. While it is to be expected, giyen the 
dissimilar contexts within which the reviews were conducted, that different issues 
would materialise from each of the inspections, it was still noticeable that in relation to 
the one crucial issue of continuous service improvement, the whole raison d'etre of BY. 
the case study findings leant support to Rikowski's (2002) claim that the BY inspection 
process is not impartial in relation to the issue of service ownership and tends to favour 
external contractor delivery. This conclusion can be illustrated by comparing the 
inspectorate's positive response to Newham's decision to transfer its reviewed service 
to an external contractor, with its negative response to Southampton's decision to retain 
its reviewed services. 
Thus, in Newham, the inspection team, despite accepting that the externally recruited 
contractor would not propel the service into the upper quartile position, still decided that 
the service had 'excellent' prospects for improvement. In contrast, Southampton, the 
only authority to make an explicit commitment to reach the upper quartile position and 
to detail precisely how it proposed to do so, received the most damning inspection 
verdict of the three authorities and was even provided with the recommendation to 
undertake a competitive tendering exercise. 
To conclude therefore it seems to be the case that whilst the inspection process does , , 
have a potentially useful function, in terms of providing an independent check of 
reviewed activity and pointing out flaws in aspects of service delivery that might 
otherwise go unnoticed, less useful, it seems, is the associated process of 'scoring' the 
service. This is particularly so given that one key purpose of the BY inspection process 
is to provide recommendations detailing how they think local authorities can improve 
services. Indeed, if the inspector's recommendations are to be \'alued, no local authority 
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should, logically, be branded as 'unlikely to improve in the future' since, by \'irtue of 
the recommendations received, it should have sufficient knowledge about how to rectify 
any identified problems and improve performance. 
Summary 
Having reached conclusions on the four identified attributes of BV, this section ends by 
providing a final verdict on whether the changes brought about by BV actually differ to 
CCT and, relatedly, to what extent they represent an advance the former policy's 
shortcomings. 
To begin with, it should be reiterated that the policy of CCT had created problems in all 
three of the case authorities. In Brighton, for example, the reviewed services had never 
under CCT been performed to an adequate standard, with staff-management tensions a 
constant feature of the service ever since the first round of competition. Likewise, in 
Southampton, the impact of CCT had been to remove too many needed resources from 
the grounds maintenance and street cleansing service with quality revealed as having 
suffered and the client-contractor separation as having led to a disjointed service 
approach. Finally, in Newham the impact of CCT, though less obvious than in the other 
two cases, was, nonetheless, masking underlying tensions in terms of demanding a 
higher take-up of the service and efforts to complete the process of CCT diverting 
officers' attention from issues relating to real service delivery. 
It was not surprising to find, therefore, that in all three case studies there was genuine 
enthusiasm for BV, a discovery most obviously evidenced by the fact that all three case 
authorities chose to bid to pilot the policy. Neyertheless, the o\'erriding conclusion to 
~16 
emerge from the empirical findings was that whilst the four distinguishing attributes of 
BY had, in one way or another, gone some way to improve upon the unsatisfactory 
situations left by CCT, each had problems associated with them, with the result that care 
needs to be taken not to overstate the extent to which they really do herald major 
changes in the regulatory framework relating to local authorities. 
In the case of consultation, for example, whilst BY certainly offers more opportunity for 
public involvement in matters relating to service delivery than was possible under CCT, 
the depth of engagement undertaken in the case studies was found to have been rather 
superficial and limited in terms of actual influence (Halvorsen, 2003, Harrison, 1999). 
In addition, it was further noted that, insofar as meaningful consultation does take place, 
financial constraints, as well as the structure of the policy itself, renders the generation 
of mutually satisfactory outcomes highly problematic. 
Meanwhile, although the policy of BY undoubtedly provides a more flexible regulatory 
regime, as evidenced by the diverse way in which the three case studies structured and 
conducted their respective reviews, it does still appear to share its predecessor's 
suspicion of monopolised public services and, as a result, still appears, both in terms of 
its structure and the way it is operationalised by inspectors, to embody a preference for 
both competition and externalisation; a preference that itself sits uncomfortably with the 
emphasis placed on public consultation and suggests that, given its universal coverage 
of local authority services BY may provide a mechanism for increased, rather than 
reduced levels of external contractor involvement. Furthermore, while provision is 
, 
made for greater weight to be attached to quality consideration in awarding contracts, it 
would seem that, in practice, the scope for doing this is inevitably likely to be limited by 
financial considerations and constraints. 
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Finally, the case study findings also suggest that in many cases it is unlikely that the 
pre-conditions necessary for the establishment of collaborative, partnership-based 
relationships between local authorities and external service providers exist. In doing so, 
they therefore cast doubt on the extent to which BV is, in practice, serving to encourage 
their development and suggest that much of the externalisation taking place is often 
likely to differ little in terms of its nature from that which occurred under CCT. 
Implications of study for the post-BY reform of local government 
This section of the chapter considers the implications of the study for the post-BY 
reform of local Government. It begins by summarising the key elements of the Labour 
Government's comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) scheme which has, in 
many respects, been used to supplement certain elements of the BV process. It then 
moves on to consider how some of the findings of this study, particularly those relating 
to inspection, have implications for the direction taken by this more recent policy 
initiative. 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment in Local Government 
Since the introduction of BV in 1999, Labour's reform of local government has moved 
on at a rapid pace and in 2002 the tangential policy of CPA was introduced. This more 
recent policy initiative involves auditors and inspectors assessing local authorities' 
entire performance rather than, as in BY, the performance of indi\'idual ser\'ices or 
packages of services (Andrews, 2004). As a result of this, local authorities no longer 
conduct five-yearly reviews of all their sen'ices but can instead focus their rc\'ic\\'s on 
priority areas (ODPM, 2003). In particular, local authorities have been encouraged to 
take a 'proportionate' approach to reviews, to conduct them where costs are above 
average or performance levels are low and hence where most improvement can 
materialise (ODPM, 2003). 
The means by which the CPA process produces assessments of local authorities' 
'overall performance' is based on the compilation of quantitative performance 
assessments in the domains of education, social care, adults, children, environment, 
libraries and leisure, and use of resources (DTLR, 200 1 b). These include inspection 
scores from various inspectorates, including BV, auditor judgements and performance 
indicator data (Rashman and Radnor, 2005). This information is then combined with an 
assessment by the Audit Commission of the corporate capacity of individual councils to 
plan, deliver and continuously improve local services, coupled with a 'self-assessment' 
process (DTLR, 200lb). Each of the CPA sub-elements can then, so the policy literature 
suggests, be combined to form a 'data model' collated in what is referred to as 'an 
objective and rigorous yet transparent way'. 
From this assessment, each council is awarded an overall judgement, based on a 
combination of current performance and ability to improve, of 'poor', 'weak', 'fair', 
'good' or 'excellent' (Audit Commission, 2002c). These five 'performance' categories 
themselves having been arrived at following the rejection of four alternative categories 
of 'high performing', 'striving', 'coasting' and 'poor performing' - on the basis that 
such terms as 'coasting' and 'striving' were considered to be ambiguous. The 
ramifications for 'failing' services under this regime are potentially even morc 
draconian than those of CCT and BV and could entail prohibitions being placed 011 not 
only the right of locally elected authorities to provide services directly but also on their 
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right to retain strategic, and by implication, democratic control. For 'excellent' 
performing authorities, meanwhile, CPA promises a three-year inspection holiday for 
most activity, whilst 'good' ones can expect to receive a reduction of at least twenty-
five per cent in required inspection activity (DTLR, 2001b). 
Implications of this study for CPA 
In considering the implications of this study's findings on the direction taken by CPA, 
attention can be directed towards the findings on the BV inspection process since it is 
this element of BV that shares a number of the properties associated with attempts to 
assess local authorities' entire performance. Moreover, each CPA score provided 
depends in part on the compilation of scores received for each individual BV inspection. 
Consequently, BV inspection is both an integral element of, and a foundation for, CPA. 
Based as it is, therefore, on a similar premise to CPA, it seems appropriate to 
extrapolate the research evidence gathered from BV inspection to the CPA process. 
Lessons from inspection 
The first potentially problematic feature of CPA in the light of the knowledge gained 
about BV relates to the scale of the judgements made in terms of the extent of acti\'ity 
captured. For example, whereas the BV review process resulted in judgements being 
made about the current and likely future performance of individual services or small 
packages of services, the CPA process results in a single judgement being made about 
the performance of local authorities' entire performance. Thus, in contrast to the fairly 
specific and targeted approach of BV, the large-scale nature of the CPA score is likely 
to make it more difficult to attribute performance to anything particular about the local 
authority. Consequently, one would expect the public to be more in agreement \\-ith the 
inspection scores given to individually reviewed services, as in the case of BV, on the 
basis that these allow for the more clear identification of highly performing and lowly 
performing services, than to a single score concerned with the performance of an entire 
authority. 
Moreover, given that an overall CPA score of 'excellent' might be given to an authority 
that has received some relatively poor BV inspection ratings in respect of individual 
services, it would be unsurprising if members of the public were somewhat suspicious 
of its validity and confused as to its meaning. Consequently, given the concerns 
expressed in this study about the robustness of verdicts reached for the three BY 
reviewed services, particularly in terms of 'likely future' performance, there seems no 
reason for assuming that the adding together of data collected from a number of 
inaccurate, inconsistent and unreliable regulatory mechanisms is going to build a more 
accurate picture of performance. In fact, this process would seem at least as likely 
provide an even less reliable assessment of performance. 
It is not only the scale of the judgements that are being made under CPA that warrant 
concern but also their legitimacy on democratic grounds given their potential to 
misleadingly and inaccurately criticise the performance of local authorities, which are 
merely putting into practice the wishes of their electorate. This was a problem identified 
also with BV in terms of the potential divergence of views between inspectors' and the 
multifaceted public. However, by increasing the range of activity that is being assessed 
uniformly, the introduction of CPA might only serve to exacerbate this problem. 
Arguably, in what is claimed to be a social democratic society, it is citizens who should 
have the ultimate say in whether or not they believe that their council is doing a good 
job. Thus, it is further revealing, in this regard that research on publ' t' c: . 
, IC sa ISlactlOn 
scores in Canadian municipalities (Rouban, 1995 in Bouckaert and Van de Walle. 2003) 
found that while there was a negative public perception of government, in genera1. 
ratings of specific services were, nevertheless, positive. The alignment of the regulatory 
framework to the whole of local government rather than to specific services might, 
therefore, serve to further act against the public provision of local services as calls to 
redress failures are exemplified. 
Related to the issue of the legitimacy of the CPA judgements, the evidence from this 
study has also provided good grounds to question the Audit Commission's (2002c) 
assertion that the sub-elements of the CPA scheme can be combined in an objective way 
to score an entire local authorities' performance. Whilst, the aforementioned 'CPA data 
model' certainly entails the compilation of a number of operationalised components, 
which go someway to ensuring consistency between different authorities, the choice and 
composition of them remains ultimately a subjective exercise. Consequently, the notion 
that the CPA process is an objective and, by implication, value-free one, fails to 
acknowledge that decisions have to be made concerning the various components of the 
data model and that these decisions reflect pre-conceived normative ideas. To illustrate 
the value-laden nature of the CPA scoring process, one only need consider the policy 
decision to move from four scoring categories to five scoring categories. Somewhat 
surprisingly, as the following quote suggests, even the Audit Commission (2002c: 68) 
appears to recognise the value-laden nature of its scoring criteria: 
"We will use the scores for the key questions to help us reach all O1'crall score for 
the top-level question. We need to consider \t'hat H'eightings \t'c may need to apply 
to certain questions ". 
A final, more general implication of this study's findings for the direction since taken 
by CPA relates to the noted way in which the development and experience of BV has 
been marked by changing definitions of performance indicators (Boyne, 2002a), reyised 
approaches to the carrying out of reviews (DETR, 1999; ODP,\1, 2003) and 
contradictory findings and suggestions between auditors and inspectors (Audit 
Commission, 1999a; 2001c). These features not only serve to reinforce concerns that the 
CP A system has not been built on stable foundations - a point further reinforced in the 
light of a Treasury report examining regulation in the public sector (Byatt and Lyons, 
2001) which concluded that there is no evidence to show that the results of inspections 
and audits can be relied upon as a predictor of performance - but with the onset of CP A 
suggest that these episodes have merely been added to. Whilst a changing 
policy/regulatory framework might be considered necessary to reduce costs, improve 
processes and to take account of changes and new information and insights (DETR, 
1999; ODPM, 2003), it does beg the question of whether any inspected entity should be 
'named and shamed' according to a framework that has yet to arrive at something that is 
comfortable with itself and which is still effectively going through a process of 
experimentation. 
Limitations of current study and suggestions for future research 
The thesis has been largely exploratory in orientation, and began at a time \\"hen BV 
policy was in the process of development. This made it possible, howc\"er, to present 
. ., fr CCT to BV and to yield both a unique and grounded overvIew of the tranSItion om 
much valuable information on the implementation of BV amongst fom1er CCT 
activities. The depth of research conducted also made it possible to examine critically 
the underlying rationale for BV in terms of how it claims to represent an advance on 
CCT. 
Inevitably, case study work, such as that conducted here, is vulnerable to well 
established concerns about generalis ability and, in particular, doubts about the extent to 
which its findings can be applied to other settings. However, whilst the author accepts 
that the research reported here cannot be considered to be generalisable in the statistical 
sense of the term, he does consider it to have theoretical generalisability or 'fittingness' 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and, therefore, believes that the problems identified with the 
four attributes of BV identified in this study are likely to exist in local authorities 
throughout England and Wales. This is particularly so given, as explained in the fi fth 
chapter, that the study did not select cases on the basis of being typical, but rather on the 
basis that they would have expected better than average experience of BY because they 
were self-selecting pilots. 
That said, the study was devoted solely to services formerly encapsulated by CeT on 
the grounds that BV originated out of a critique of CCT and that this approach enabled 
one to compare the two policies at the operational level. As a result, one obvious way to 
elaborate upon the findings of this study would be to consider the impact of BY on 
services not formerly exposed to CCT. Another would be to examine the impact of the 
policy in Conservative controlled and Liberal Democratic controlled authorities - an 
option that was not available here due to the case selection criteria used and the priority 
. I 
given to type of service activity, BV pilot status and level of DSO retentIOn . 
Thus, in making recommendations for future research one suggestion \\ould be to opt 
h . f BV on a far wider scale than that for a research strategy that captured t e expenences 0 
achieved here. This is precisely what the author, along with two co-researchers, has 
since done via the distribution of a postal questionnaire sent to 'the Best \'alue Lead 
Officer' for every named service on the Audit Commission's database of all BV audited 
services in England and Wales as of July 2002. Many of the questions asked in the 
questionnaire derived from the findings gathered from this study and focused, for 
example, on the role of competition in BV and how it differs to CCT (Higgins, James, 
Roper, 2005b); the outcomes of BV in terms of a number of proxies for service quality 
(Higgins, James, Roper, 2004b); the level of external contractor provision under BV and 
its relationship with BV inspection verdicts (Higgins, James and Roper, 2004a); the 
interplay between the performance comparison and consultation processes of BV 
(Higgins, James, Roper, 2005a) and the correspondence between data collected from 
performance indicators and data collected from user satisfaction indicators (Higgins, 
2005b). More recently, a longer-term project devised to examine the impact of the Audit 
Commission's regulatory role on the bargaining agenda of trade unions in British local 
government has been initiated. 
One final suggestion for future research to emerge out of the findings obtained from this 
study relates to the examination of how well local authorities actually perform in 
comparison to their predicted 'likely future' performance score. The explanation behind 
suggesting this research issue is that the unearthing of a lack of correlation betwccn 
predicted and actual service performance would raise grave question marks against the 
underlying robustness of the entire regulatory regime of BY and CPA. Currently, the 
evidence from this and another more wide-scale study (Higgins, James, Roper, 200.+a) 
suggests that inspectors tended to favour the assumed gains of cxtemal contractors' 
'likely future' performance over the 'current' level of local authority perfonnance and 
thus to examine whether these verdicts were justified comparisons could be made 
between the actual and predicted perfonnance of internally and externally pro\.ided 
services. Such a study would, however, have to proceed carefully because much 
depends on the definition of improvement used and one concern of this study has been 
that that under contemporary public management refonns the concept of quality or 
service improvement has been hijacked by simplified representations of reality. via 
perfonnance indicators, that do not capture all that there is about even the 'simplest' of 
public sector activity. 
Consequently, and more generally, in the context of all this and other on-going research 
(Rashman and Radnor, 2005; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Wilson, 2005), what does 
appear to be certain is that, with both major British political parties now locked into 
providing largely instrumental solutions to the alleged failings of local government, as 
detailed throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's, a minefield of research 
opportunities will remain available to researchers for the considerable future. 
Notes 
1 Moreover, subsequent survey work by Higgins, James and Roper (2005a) has identified no .party 
differences with respect to local authorities' utilisation of the competition and external contractors til the 
BV process. 
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APPENDIX 1 
s ummary 0 f I vo untary competitive tendering research 
Author, date, Method Findings I services 
"-
Audit Commission Analysed 340 local authorities Overall cost savings of 200 0, \Vith contracted 
1984 in UK. out among the lowest 25 0 0 of council refuse 
Refuse collection, 
service expenditure. Most aggregate council 
housing maintenance inefficiency attributed to a minority of under-
and vehicle performing authorities. Further research into 
maintenance 
vehicle maintenance and housing maintenance 
revealed that costs were higher if services were 
not subject to competition. 
Domberger, Employed regression 20% savings overall. Local authorities which 
Meadowcroft and techniques to test was whether had contracted out refuse collection had costs 
Thompson contracts awarded to the private 22% lower. Local authorities which held a 
1986 sector were cheaper than those competitive tender and then awarded the 
Refuse Collection retained in-house following a contract to existing in-house workforce had 
competitive tender; and how lower costs of 17%. The difference between 
they both compared to non- these two figures not statistically significant. 
tendering authorities. 305 local But it was significant compared with non-
authorities studied, 19 had tendering authorities. 
private contractors and 10 
subject to CCT and retained in-
house. 
Cubbin, Domberger Used much of Domberger, Large element of savings identified by 
and Meadowcroft Meadowcroft and Thompson Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson 1986 
1987 1986 data but examined source found to have been due to improvements in 
Refuse Collection of reported cost savings such as physical productivity of men and vehicles rather 
such as physical productivity than lower wages and fringe benefits. A revised 
and input utilisation. labour-vehicle mix and reductions in overheads 
317 councils researched. 17 of was responsible for better productivity. 
these were awarded to private 
contractors and 9 were awarded 
in-house. 
Szymanski and Dataset for 403 local authorities In authorities which held a competitive tender 
Wilkins between1981-1988. 91 total costs were on average 20% lower for each 
1993 questions from CIPF A used. year in the sample. Between 1984-86 LAs 
Refuse Collection Only LAs that had contracted which held a CT and contracted out had costs 
out! 0% of service were around 20% lower than those that did not hold a 
included. tender this was significant at the 5% level. 
Savings rose throughout the life of the contract 
but tended to be reversed at the time of 
renegotiation. A contention that costs may rise 
as contracts are re-tendered. Productivity 
improvements accounted for most of the cost 
savings, rather than pay reductions, but an 
increase in productivity may have resulted in a 
fall in the effective hourly wage rate. 
APPENDIX 2 
s f 1 ummary 0 compu sory competitive tendering research 
Author, date, Method Findings 
services 
SCAT/CPS 448 -789 contracts 1 7% savings involving to annual reduction in the 
1989 1 st round 18 months in. costs of 488 contracts, equivalent to £94.0m. 
Small range Survey requests However, additional costs of £55.4m in 789 I 
contracts also identified. 11,780 job losses 
identified excluding those workers re-employed 
b~ contractors. 
Local Government 231 authorities Average cost savings of 5.6%. Refuse collection 
Chronicle 476 contracts worth £ 1. 6 (40.4%) and building cleaning (15°0) had greatest 
1990 billion levels of cost savings. Total net saving was 
Small range £74.4m 
Walsh 40 local authorities, study Average cost savings of5.7% (-48.9% to +25.9%) 
1991 paid attention to client-side Building cleaning (17.1 %), and vehicle 
Small range administration costs maintenance (11.9%) recorded greatest cost 
including negotiation and savings. Only street cleaning registered an average 
monitoring costs. increase in service costs and this was due to 
increased service standard requirements. 
Preparation costs estimated as 10.7% of annual 
contract value ( 2.5% of the total cost). 
Painter 299 local authorities Most intense competition in refuse collection, 
1991 438 services street 
All 1988 defined cleaning and building cleaning, bulk of contracting 
activities out in Conservative-dominated shires in England 
and Wales. Three-quarters of all contracts retained 
in-house. 
Walsh and Davis 40 Local authorities 6.5% savings (-62.4% to +49.7%) Job losses 16% 
1993 1 st round, years 1-3 for building cleaning, 5% for education catering 
All 1988 defmed 213 service areas 16% for refuse collection, 5% for sports and 
activities leisure manag_ement 
Szymanski Dataset for 365 local Total cost reduction of 19.5%. - £6 per household 
1996 authorities between 19 84- (1995 prices). Includes all client side costs. Pattern 
Refuse Collection 1994. Regression analysis of eroding benefits identified, however, with 
employed. DSO's only making significant savings in years 1 
and 2. The introduction of CCT was correlated 
with the reduction ofDSO costs by around 10% 
and a reduction in private contractors' costs of 
around 20% compared with previous figures. 
'Ownership'matters. 
Austin Mayfield Second round. 32 of 38 Estimated annual cost savings under the second 
1997 studied authorities were round of CCT of 9%, though about one-third of 
All 1988 defined involved in Walsh and contracts had an increase in costs. Largest cost 
activities Davis 1993 study (373 reductions in schools and welfare catering; 
individual contracts) smallest cost reductions (loss of 2.4°u) in vehicle 
covered. maintenance. 85% contracts awarded to the lowest 
bidder. External provision produced savings about 
twice as larKe as in-house provision. 
APPENDIX 3 
FO dO f ° In In2;S r~m mdependent analysis of pilot authority's approaches to Best Value 
Local AuthorIty/ No. and type of services included A h 
Political control pproac 
1 Birmingham C C 
Labour 
2 Bradford MDC: Labour 
3 Braintree DC Labour 
4 Brent LB NOC 
5 Brighton & Hove BC 
Labour 
6 Bristol C C Labour 
7 Camden LB Labour 
8 Carrick DC NOC 
9 Cumbria C C Labour 
10 Exeter C C Labour 
11 Gosport BC Lib dem 
12 Great Yarmouth BC 
Labour 
13 Greenwich LB Labour 
14 Harrow NOC 
15 Ipswich BC Labour 
16 Leeds C C Labour 
17 Lewisham LB Labour 
18 Lincolnshire C C Cons 
19 Manchester C C 
Labour 
20 Newark and Sherwood 
DC Labour 
21 Newcastle C C Lab 
22 Newham LB Labour 
23 Northamptonshire C C 
Labour 
24 Oldham MBC Labour 
25 Portsmouth C C 
Labour 
26 Reading BC Labour 
27 Redcar & Cleveland 
BC Labour 
28 Southampton CC Lab 
29 South Norfolk DC Lib 
Oem 
30 SWlderland BC Lab 
3 I Surrey C C Cons 
32 Warwickshire CC 
NOC 
33 Watford BC Labour 
34 York (' C Labour 
4 Housing Services; Benefits; Services for the elderly, Catering 
10 HO.me Care & Do~ciliary Se0ce; Youth Justice; Youth and Community; Exclusions; School 
Secunty; TransportatI?n PI~~g & Design Services; Tenancy development; Tenac)' 
Enforcement; Community MediatIon; and Safe at Home. 
All Services 
21 Str~et cle.aning; :efuse collectio~;. t~mpora~ acconnnodation; women's refuge; homeless day 
centre,Secun~ seTVIces; renewallrutIatIves; highways enforcement; HMO registrations; (Housing-
benefits;clearung, grounds, management services, redevelopment, repairs, resources; sheltered) 
M&E contracts; property; leasehold management; tenants initiatives. 
All services 
4 Corporate Framework; City Centre Strategy, IT in the Community; Transport Pro\ision. 
All services 
~ O?entated ~round Housing Services: management; homelessness; advice; grants; private sector; 
hfelme; enablm):!; and housing needs. 
6 Residential Facilities; Supported Housing; Day Care; Home Care; Sheltered Employment; 
Education 
20 Housing: estate management; allocations; housing rents; Neighbour Disputes; housing 
partnership; home aid; private sector housing; repairs; homelessness housing benefits; private 
sector housing Envirorunent issues: Public Health Energy Efficiency; Cleansing; car parking:: 
Highways Maintenance; street lighting. Social issues: Community Care; health promotion; Safety: 
Facilities 
3 Building Control; Food Safety; Housing Services and peripheral activities 
15 Splint into 6 groups: Treasurers: benefits, local taxation, debtors; welfare rights; Housing: 
management, needs, policy, technical Planning: land; access; reclamation; statistics: 
Envirorunent: all aspects. Development: economic development; en):!;ineerin):!; and leisure. 
8 Advice & Benefits Service; Domiciliary Care; Early Years Services; Education Inspectorate & 
Advisory Services; Housing Repairs; Libraries; Property Management: and Transport. 
4 broad areas: Domiciliary care; Special needs transport; LEA administration; Financial services 
14 initially Benefits; Museums; internal audit; development control; Building & Design Services; 
Town Centre Management; Theatre; Corporate Directors Team; Envirorunent policy; Town Hall 
& Com Exchange; Community Safety; local tax; Transportation; human resources. 
11 Advice & Benefits; Community Sport; Refuse Collection; Social Services; libraries; training: 
street cleansing; street li):!;htin):!;; highways maintenance; ):!;fOunds maintenance; housing. 
17 Raising LEA Standards; Housing Benefits; Community Safety; Telephone response: Catering 
PFI; Passenger transport services; Leisure centres; housing provision; revenues; construction; 
school buildings; Children's services; communications; External resources; libraries waste 
mana):!;ement; social services and corporate buildin):!;s. 
9 in year 1 Waste; Children in care; Highways; Student & School Services; Home Care; 
Community Services; Finance & Resources; fire brigade training; fire maintenance. 
3 Physical appearance; education and family support; vandalism and crime. 
8 Revenues, Benefits, Legal, Housing- client and contractor; Envirorunental Services, DSO and 
IT. 
2 Integrated Environmental Services (defined area, many services) Council Tax Service(whole 
city) 
All of the Authority's services will be reviewed in 3 stages 
4 Highways & Transportation; Residential Care for Elderly; Waste Management; and Youth 
14 Rent collection; caretaking; housing rehabilitation; housing repairs; highway repairs; 
allocations and lettings; tenancy management; crime prevention; graffiti removal; street lighting; 
grounds maintenance: refuse collection; street cleanin):!;; voids management 
8 Behaviour support; parks; residential care; Economic Development; voluntary sector; asset 
Management; young people; learning difficulties 
All services 
5 initially: Training & Development initiative; Local Estates Service lni?ative; Occupational 
Therapy; Council Tax Collection; and Housing/Council Tax Benefit Jomt SW1CC Delivcr) 
Initiative. 
3 Crisis Prevention & Support; Night Watch Scheme; and the Home Safety Scheme 
21 Welfare Advice; Council Tax, NNDR; Sundry income; Benefit Admin; LETS; Village shops 
employment promotion; rural transport; housing (advice; enabling; management); safety; 
homelessness; contact care; adaptations; leisure; grants; play development; co~trystde access. 
6 Geographically _ Youth Justice; After Care: Housing; Leisure: Adult EducatIOn; Youth semcc 
3 Libraries, Adult Education: and Youth Services. 
All services. 
Client 
claimants, 
people 
conswners 
Tenants. 
older 
and 
Issue - Fighting 
crime 
\\ 110le authoritv 
Issue - living in 
Kilburn 
\\ 110le authority 
Individual seT\ices 
Whole authority 
Client - housing 
tenants 
Client - Disability 
and mental health 
Geographical: 6 of 
18 wards 
Individual services 
Issue: Social 
Strategy 
Individual 
Individual 
Whole authorit, 
Geographical -2 
wards 
Individual 
Whole authority 
Geographical - 3 
areas 
Individual 
Geographical -
12.5% 
Whole authority 
Individual. 
Geographical -2 
areas 
Individual 
Whole authority 
\\ 110le authority 
Client - elders 
Issue - Social J uslice 
('lien! - 16-18 year 
olds in I area of cit\ 
Geographical I area 
related 10 
'COlmnUnl!' 
Whole authont) 
7 Keeping the ToWll Clean; Recycling; Traffic Congestion: Regul.ato? seT\l(c~,; 1~1pn:\ing the : 
quality oflife in a local area; Housing & Councd Tax Benefits: SeT\lCe, tor VllWI_ peuple 
8 Street Lighting, School Meals, ConmJercial \\' aste: Libranes. Personnel & Payroll, 
Independent Livin):!;. Transport ProcurenJenL and leISure SeT\lCes. 
APPENDIX 4 
BV survey evidence, key findings 
Use of Market-based activities during BV Reviews and Impact f B\' R . 
U d f k 
. . . 0 enews 
se rna e 0 mar et-based activities during BV Reviews 
Agree to some extent that analysis of the market formed part of the BV Review 
Opportunities for partnership tested during BV Review 
Market testing through competition to some extent used in BV Review 
BV Review used to develop market to enhance alternative providers 
Agree t~ so~e extent that recommendations of BV Review will lead to more 
externalisation 
Agr~e t~ some extent that recommendations of BV Review will lead to significant 
service 1m rovement 
*Percentages based on responses from service officers' responses. 
Source: Enticott, G., Walker, R., Boyne, G., Martin, S. and Ashworth, R. (2002) 
Views on Audits and Inspections 
Views on Audits and Inspections 
'Fairly' or 'very' satisfied with 2001/02 audit (Mori) 
Most recent inspection report was 'fairly' or 'very' informative (Mori) 
Agreed/tend to agree with most recent inspection report's judgement on current 
performance (Mori) 
Agree/tend to agree with most recent inspection report's judgement of likely future 
performance (Mori) 
Agree/tend to agree that inspections support the management of change (Mori) 
Agree/tend to agree that inspections challenge attitudes and performance (Mori) 
Agree to some extent that ilnspections will lead to significant service improvement 
(Cardiff) 
Agree to some extent that the benefits of inspections outweigh their costs (Cardiff) 
Agree to some extent that inspectors have 'appropriate expertise' (Cardiff) 
% of 
respondents* 
63 
43 
61 
20 
35 
87 
%of 
respondents* 
64 
59 
61 
50 
57 
75 
36 
26 
26 
Agree to some extent that inspections lead to an undue focus on the concerns of BV to 
the exclusion of service delive Cardiff 67 
* Mori percentages based on responses from BV officers and chief executives. Cardiff ones based on 
responses from corporate and services officers . 
Sources: Audit Commission (2001) pages 10-12; Enticott Enticott, G., Walker, R., Boyne, G., \lartm, S. 
and Ashworth, R. (2002), page 19 
APPENDIX 5 
C overage 0 fCCT ·th· BV ·1 serVIces WI III PlotS 
Activity No. of bids 
Housing 39 
Leisure 25 
Refuse 22 
Street Cleansing 15 
Highways 15 
Ground Maintenance 13 
Infonnation technology 12 
Property services 11 
Personnel 8 
Catering 7 
Legal 7 
Building maintenance 6 
Building Cleaning 5 
Parking 5 
Architecture 3 
Engineering 3 
APPENDIX 6 
Best Value pilots' expenence of CCT 
Authority 
Portsmouth 
Brighton & Hove 
Carrick 
Brent 
Camden 
Northamptonshire 
Bristol 
Exeter 
Gosport 
Redcar and Cleveland 
Lincolnshire 
Bradford 
Oldham 
South Norfolk 
Greenwich 
Birmingham 
Harrow 
Southampton 
Great Yarmouth 
Ipswich 
Surrey 
Reading 
Newark & Sherwood 
Watford 
Sunderland 
Cumbria 
Braintree 
Lewisham 
Leeds 
Manchester 
Newcastle-u pon-Tyne 
Newham 
Warwickshire 
York 
Type 
Non-met 
Unitary 
Non-met 
LBC 
LBC 
County 
Unitary 
Non-met 
Non-met 
Unitary 
County 
met 
met 
non-met 
LBC 
met 
LBC 
Unitary 
Non-met 
Non-met 
County 
Non-met 
Non-met 
Non-met 
met 
County 
Non-met 
LBC 
met 
met 
met 
LBC 
County 
Unitary 
Contracts Value 
(#) 
20 5848897 
19 11320178 
8 1870036 
48 42913526 
40 26161663 
8 1488335 
9 5000000 
3 3899535 
11 2260382 
3 590077 
14 1227660 
16 28078576 
13 20972218 
6 1512182 
28 21310820 
69 129733865 
15 11179020 
44 7936223 
7 3624014 
12 3037478 
17 17015325 
7 4932215 
6 883843 
12 3444460 
29 26214007 
28 8409436 
10 3039805 
31 20405879 
21 41136417 
34 40270307 
22 33260016 
11 9188170 
10 6901463 
6 2178122 
050% 
7.47 
20.98 
22.75 
34.59 
39.61 
40.00 
54.79 
56.29 
62.30 
67.65 
74.94 
76.16 
77.61 
80.45 
82.89 
84.16 
89.34 
89.70 
92.73 
93.33 
94.16 
95.10 
95.35 
96.41 
96.94 
96.95 
99.67 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
10000 
Pol 
Control 
Lab 
Lab 
NOC 
NOC 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lib Oem 
Lab 
Cons 
Lab 
Lab 
Lib Oem 
Lab 
Lab 
NOC 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Cons 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
Lab 
NOC 
Lab 
APPENDIX 7 
Examples of interview schedules 
Interview schedule for Brighton Officer 
1) Background 
How long have you been an officer at Brighton? 
Which departments have you worked in? 
Tell me a little bit about your role at Brighton? 
How would you say Brighton has changed since you were fIrst employed here? 
How would you describe the politics of Brighton? 
2 CCT in general 
How much involvement did you have with CCT in Brighton? 
What do you think the Conservatives objectives for CCT were? 
Befo:e outso~cing arrangement was CCT readily accepted and embraced by this authority as a whole') 
In this authonty, was the policy officer or member led? 
Was there a strong commitment to retain services in-house, in the face of CCT? 
In general, what would you say the most positive benefIts of CCT? 
and for Brighton? 
In general, what would you say the most negative benefIts of CCT? 
and for Brighton? 
What impact generally did CCT have on the quality of services? 
What impact generally did CCT have on the cost of services? 
Is there anything else you'd like to say about CCT? 
3 Best Value 
What do you think the Labour government's underlying objectives for BY are? 
How would you say BY differs to the Conservative's wider objectives for local government? (probe 
CCT, enabling authority, citizen charter's indicators) 
Why did your authority decide to pilot BY? 
How 'free' is the authority to pursue its desired service delivery objectives under BY? 
Do you think BY's embracement of all services is a positive step forward from the sectoral approach to 
CCT? 
Can BV be seen as a means for protecting in-house service provision from the rigours of CCT or as a 
tougher means by which authorities must prove the worth of their in-house services provision? 
Which services do you think most savings will emerge? 
What in your opinion are the best aspects of BY? 
What in your opinion are the worst aspects ofBV? 
Which in your opinion is better BV or CCT and why? 
BV review 
In your own words how would you describe the overall approach to BY in Brighton? ? 
In piloting BY, I understand that Brighton was exempt from CCT reqUlrements, IS thIS correct. 
Can you tell me a little about the organisation of the review') . .. 
(probe who leads it, councillor officer led, link to corporate approach, lmk to legIslatIOn) 
What do you think has been the hardest part ofBV? 
How have you challenged? 
How have you compared? 
How have you consulted? 
How have you competed? 
Would something like the four C's been utilised had not BV come about? 
Which of the four C's were being utilised before advent ofBV? 
Is the review process more robust that CCT tendering process? 
Do you think your authority could attain continuous improvement without the actual requirements ofB\") 
Contractual arrangements 
What year did the Contractor take over the integrated waste management contract? 
How many companies expressed an interest in the BV contract? 
What criteria did you use (see documents)? 
Under CCT there were certain anti-competitive tendering rules, do you think that under BV you have 
more control over the criteria by which contractors can be evaluated? 
Which tests of competitiveness have you found most useful? 
Is the review process more robust that CCT tendering process in terms of selecting an effective service 
provider? 
Can you tell me about the unions' involvement with this contract? 
Can you tell me about the officers/councillors' involvement with this contract? 
Can you tell me about the users' involvement with this contract? 
What other services does it provide the authority? 
What impact generally did this arrangement have on the quality of services'! 
What impact generally did it have on the cost of services? 
What other successes and difficulties did the contractor face? 
Performance 
Obviously BV places much stress on performance management? 
Do you think the number ofBVPI is satisfactory? 
Why? 
What do you think the public's perception of Pis are? 
Do you compare yourself with the private and voluntary sectors, If so, in what ways, what about other 
local authorities? 
., . . '? 
Do you think benchmarking can be seen as a way of provmg competltIveness . 
How do you account for the differences in performance amongst Brighton's comparator groups? 
Are the comparator groups - self selected or suggested by government? 
How useful are they? 
BV Outcomes 
Do you think that the BV process is bringing anything new to the delivery of sen'ice') 
Is this a much if a different outcome to that of CC~,? . ? 
To what extent does the BV review process deal WIth the shortconungs of CCT. 
What else has changed since the introduction ofBV? 
. . .) 
How much staff time do you estimate will be required to undertake B\ renews. 
How much do you estimate the costs of review to .~ost? 
What have been the key emerging issues from B \ . 
Interview schedule with Brighton councillor 
1 Background 
How long have you been a councillor at Brighton? 
Which committees were you on? 
How would you say Brighton council has changed over the years you have bee h ') 
H ld d 'b h I' , n ere, ow wou you escn e t e po ltICS of Brighton Unitary council? 
2) CCT in general 
What do you think the Conservatives objectives for CCT were? 
How much involvement did you have with CCT in Brighton? 
Who led the policy of CCT - councillors or officers? 
Was CCT readily accepted and embraced by this authority as a whole? 
I understand that a large outsourcing arrangement was undertaken in 1996 - how did this come about'! 
How did the initial contractor perform? 
and for street cleansing and refuse? 
In terms of renegotiating the contract which X took over, how much consultation with the public was 
there? 
What happened to the funding of the service following the re-negotiation of the contract? Eg, reduced 
costs, increased costs ~ 
What impact generally did CCT have on the quality of services? 
What impact generally did CCT have on the cost of services? 
What impact generally did CCT have on employment? 
Is there anything else you'd like to say about CCT? 
3 Best Value in general 
What do you think the Labour government's underlying objectives for BY really are? 
How in your view does BY differ to the conservative's wider policies for local government? 
Can BY be seen as a means of protecting in-house service provision from the rigours of CCT) 
Can BY be seen as a tougher means by which authorities must prove the worth of their in-house services 
provision? 
What in your opinion are the best aspects of BY? 
What in your opinion are the worst aspects of BY? 
Which in your opinion is better BY or CCT and why? 
4 Political structure 
Tell me about the changing political structure from a committee to cabinet structure, - please sum up the 
main experiences of it? . 
Has the introduction of a cabinet structure interfered with the decision making processes assocIated \\Ith 
BY? 
5 Best Value review 
In your own words how would you describe the overall approach to B\' in Brighton? . . 
What is the relationship between councillors and officers in cont~xt of B~T - I understand that It IS a 
member led approach and that almost every councillor \\as directly Involved In the BY renew process - IS 
this true? 
What do you think has been the hardest part of the implementation of the BV review? 
How have you challenged? 
How have you compared? 
How have you consulted? 
How have you competed? 
Would something like the four C's been utilised had not BV come about? 
Which of the four C's were being utilised before advent ofBV? 
What in your view are the public perceptions ofBV? 
Has consultation influenced service selection and PIs in the BVPP? 
Is there a process to ensure that the outcomes of consultation are considered as part of decision making) 
Do you think that BV will lead to services currently being provided externally being returned in-house'? 
Following CCT, has BV in your view given local government more power over the requirements of 
external contractors? 
BV Outcomes 
Do you think that the BV process is bringing anything new to the delivery of service? 
Is this a much if a different outcome to that of CCT? 
To what extent does the BV review process deal with the shortcomings of CCT) 
What else has changed since the introduction ofBV? 
Do you think the electorate is aware ofBV? 
How much staff time do you estimate will be required to undertake BV reviews'? 
How much do you estimate the costs of review to cost? 
What have been the key emerging issues from BV? 
What do you think the nature of local government will be in 10 years time? 
Final points and clarification 
